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SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the attitudes of British people to the aerial bombardment of German 
cities during the Second World War, with particular attention given to those who challenged 
the nature of the campaign. I use contemporary sources with a strong emphasis on qualitative 
data to develop a picture of attitudes at the time and situate the roots of the significant post-
war controversy within these contemporary attitudes. The thesis offers a more sustained and 
textured account of anti-bombing sentiment than other historiographical works. An 
introductory chapter charts the development of aerial bombing in the early years of the 
twentieth century. The extent to which Britain engaged with aerial bombardment, and how it 
was understood by people in Britain, are addressed here. 
Three case studies – each focusing on a different raid on a German city – are then used to 
address how attitudes to the bomber offensive were shaped at different stages of the war. The 
first is the December 1940 attack on Mannheim. This took place during the Blitz on British 
cities, a factor which has implications for the nature of responses at this time. The question of 
reprisals is important here. I show how the desire for reprisals was far from universal, yet it 
was overstated in the press and by Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The second case study 
addresses the series of heavy attacks on Hamburg in July and August 1943. This followed the 
decision, taken the previous year, to officially adopt a policy of area bombing. This chapter 
shows how the Archbishop of Canterbury’s support for the campaign stifled voices of protest 
at this time. The final case study considers the raids on Dresden in February 1945. Churchill’s 
response is addressed in this chapter and contrasted with the immediate concerns raised in 
the press and in private diaries. 
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Introduction 
In late March 1945 the Second World War in Europe was almost over. Nazi Germany was on 
the verge of total collapse, unable to resist the rapid advance of Soviet forces. From the 
autumn of 1943 Adolf Hitler had no longer been able to count on Italian support, and the 
Normandy landings which took place the following summer restored Allied strength in 
Western Europe. Back in Britain, Prime Minister Winston Churchill felt that a tipping point had 
been reached. The large scale area bombing of German cities, a major feature of the Allied war 
effort, could no longer be justified. Further, he indicated that the policy had already been 
taken too far. Six weeks earlier the city of Dresden in the east of Germany had been destroyed 
in four raids across less than 48 hours. Around 25,000 people were killed and vast areas of the 
city lay in ruin. This attack, Churchill wrote in a minute to the Chiefs of Staff, specifically 
marked the point at which Allied bombing had gone beyond what was acceptable, and taken 
on a wholly different character. For the remainder of the war, RAF Bomber Command was to 
avoid “mere acts of terror and wanton destruction”. Churchill’s assessment of the attacks was 
clear: “The destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied 
bombing.”1 
Following firm prompting from Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Charles Portal, Churchill redrafted his 
minute in far less dramatic terms. Yet this incident is indicative of a subject which still arouses 
passionate debate and controversy today. The area bombing of Germany by Bomber 
Command remains a contentious element of the Allied war effort, and what Churchill wrote 
shows an appreciation of its divisive nature. Despite the deaths in service of 55,573 members 
                                                          
1 National Archives Kew (hereafter TNA). CAB 120/303. Churchill to Chiefs of Staff, 28th March 1945. 
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of aircrew, no official monument to those involved in the work of Bomber Command was 
opened until 2012.2 
The debate in the post-war years has raged, periodically gaining greater attention in political, 
historiographical and literary contexts. Yet while a broad range of historiography has 
addressed the nature of the bombing campaign and the subsequent debates that have arisen 
in the years since the end of the war, far less attention has been paid to how it was received 
during the period in which it took place. This thesis will consider the wartime attitudes of 
British people to the bombing of German cities. Churchill’s denouncement of the policy came 
very shortly before the end of the war. Others though took a critical approach far earlier. In 
late 1943, as Bomber Command made sustained attacks on Berlin, one man told the social 
research organisation Mass-Observation that he felt: “our present bombing of Germany is one 
of the greatest sins we as a nation have committed.” Earlier still, as the Blitz presented nightly 
peril to civilians in British cities, there was a reluctance to see the same tactics applied in 
response. The New Statesman and Nation wrote: “people who have really been bombed do 
not want a similar misery for others.”3 
The Allied bombing campaign has come under sustained scrutiny in the decades since 1945. 
This aspect of the war in the air remains highly controversial. In public and political discourse, 
and the pages of a broad range of historiography, the debate remains active. The element of 
the campaign which has drawn most negative comment is the area bombing of German cities 
by Bomber Command. This was the approach taken during the latter part of the war and which 
was responsible for the massive destruction caused in cities across Germany. Precision 
                                                          
2 Churchill’s minute and the reaction to it has been discussed extensively. See for example Tami Davis 
Biddle, ‘Wartime Reactions’ in Paul Addison and Jeremy Crang, Firestorm: The Bombing of Dresden, 
1945 (London: Pimlico, 2006), 113-116; Stephen A. Garrett, Ethics and Airpower in World War II (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 34-38; Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive 
Against Germany 1939-1945. Volume III: Victory (London: HMSO, 1961), 109-113. 
3 Mass-Observation Archive (hereafter M-O A): DR 2699, reply to December 1943 Directive; New 
Statesman and Nation, ‘A London Diary’. 23rd November 1940, 510-511. 
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bombing had proved an ineffective use of Bomber Command resources. Raids based on this 
method took specifically identifiable targets – railway yards, munitions factories, 
communication centres – as their aiming point. The Butt Report in August 1941 showed how 
inaccurate this method was, and following experiments with area bombing the previous 
winter, this new policy was officially adopted in mid-February 1942. Now whole urban areas 
became the target, with a heavy weight of bombs dropped into a concentrated area. Six weeks 
later the Cherwell paper – which advocated the direct targeting of civilian areas – confirmed 
the “shift in bombing priorities”. Civilians were now, officially, to come under attack. By the 
end of the war at estimated 353,000 German civilians had been killed.4 The controversy stoked 
since the war about the legitimacy of this method of attack has meant that retrospective 
accounts of the campaign – from historians and journalists and equally from those involved in 
the raids themselves – have been influenced by the debate itself. The wealth and depth of 
historiography this has created is increasingly vast and provides much for the modern reader 
to consider. Yet often absent from this debate are the voices of those who responded to the 
bombing campaign at the time. There is much to be gained from an understanding of how 
attitudes were shaped during the war itself. 
In Reaching for the Stars, his history of Bomber Command during the Second World War, Mark 
Connelly expresses sympathy for those who offered outright support to the area bombing 
campaign as it was taking place, and he sets out with this position in mind. Further, he argues 
that certain prominent figures who disputed the legitimacy of the campaign have gained a 
significant place within discussion of anti-bombing sentiment, and that their views were not in 
                                                          
4 Richard Overy, The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 288-289, 474-477. 
The total number of civilian deaths in Germany has been disputed and, more importantly, very difficult 
to state accurately. The figure of 353,000 is an estimate made by Richard Overy in 2013 based on a 
number of recent sources, estimates and calculations. It is a high death rate, yet markedly lower than 
the estimates of over 600,000 which had been circulated for many years since the end of the war. 
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step with the wider British public.5 My own thesis takes a different route, though I can agree 
with some of these points. Certainly individuals such as Bishop George Bell and Vera Brittain, 
who were opposed to the bombing campaign, have received considerably more attention in 
the historiography than, for example, views of members of the public. I would argue however 
that while Connelly is right to address reasons for support of the campaign, it is also of vital 
importance to consider reasons why people were either opposed to it, or held strong 
reservations. My thesis seeks to uncover the voices of such people. It is not the intention here 
to suggest that a majority in Britain were against the bombing campaign: this was not the case. 
Brett Holman argues that on the whole the British public were in favour reprisal bombing 
against German cities, yet he does not adequately acknowledge, or account for, those who did 
not share this view. His conclusion – that: “The Blitz myth and the reprisals debate cannot 
coexist; one must make way for the other” – is particularly worthy of challenge, since it ignores 
undermines the breadth and complexity of public opinion in Britain.6 There certainly was a 
significant minority of people who, while supporting the war effort in general terms, did not 
support the deliberate bombing of civilians as a means to winning it. The texture and extent of 
their views will be addressed in this thesis. By doing so it is possible to learn more about the 
levels of support for particular methods of warfare, rather than only for the war effort as a 
whole. By addressing the question of what British people thought of the bombing of Germany 
at the time it took place, it is possible to add a further level of nuance to the question of 
popular support for the war. The majority of the views aired and analysed within these pages 
belonged to people who were not pacifists. In most cases they indicate broad support for the 
war against the Axis Powers and firmly believed in the importance of defeating Adolf Hitler. 
                                                          
5 Mark Connelly, Reaching for the Stars: A New History of Bomber Command in World War II (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2001), 3-4; Mark Connelly, ‘The British People, the Press and the Strategic Air Campaign 
against Germany, 1939-45’ in Contemporary British History, 16, no. 2 (2002), 39-40. 
6 Brett Holman, ‘“Bomb Back, and Bomb Hard”: Debating Reprisals during the Blitz’ in Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, 58, no. 3 (2012), 407. 
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Yet this thesis shows that within this consensus, there existed a clear level of discomfort and 
dissent against the methods of warfare used to achieve these ends. In a letter to Sir Edward 
Keeling in November 1942, Squadron Leader J. S. Comper, son of the architect Sir Ninian 
Comper, articulates this position quite clearly. Qualifying what he would write by saying he 
was: “not a pacifist myself”, he declared that bombing cathedrals and other targets which 
were not directly connected to the Nazi war effort lowered the Allied campaign to the level of 
those whom they were fighting. Bombing such buildings, he wrote, was: “destroying some of 
the very aspects of that civilisation which we set out to save by this war.”7 
The legality of the area bombing of residential areas as a policy – and of cities such as Hamburg 
and Dresden in particular – continues to provoke debate and disagreement. In recent 
historiography the question of whether accusations of war criminality can be levelled in 
relation to the area bombing of civilians has been raised. Jörg Friedrich’s book The Fire, first 
published in Germany in 2002, provocatively encouraged consideration of this issue.8 Yet even 
the extent to which this is a question to be answered at all has proved problematic. Frederick 
Taylor, the author of a volume specifically about the bombing of Dresden, rejects the notion 
that as a historian he should answer such questions. In an interview he said: “a war crime is a 
very specific thing which international lawyers argue about all the time and I would not be 
prepared to commit myself nor do I see why I should.”9 Others are far less reticent. A. C. 
Grayling built a case against the Allies in which he described attacks on civil populations as 
                                                          
7 Imperial War Museum Archive (hereafter IWM), Misc 10(201). Comper to Keeling, 24th November 
1942. 
8 Jörg Friedrich, The Fire: The Bombing of Germany 1940-1945 (Chichester: Columbia University Press, 
2006). 
9 Spiegel Online International, ‘Dresden Bombing is to be Regretted Enormously’. 11th February 2005, 
accessed online. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel-interview-dresden-bombing-
is-to-be-regretted-enormously-a-341239.html 
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“moral atrocities”10 (my emphasis); Donald Bloxham explicitly calls the attack on Dresden “a 
war crime.”11  
The issue is not easy to pin down. At the Hague Conference of 1899 and 1907 attempts were 
made to provide a legal framework for the use of aerial bombardment, yet with the first aerial 
bombings from powered aircraft still predicted rather than actual, this provided fruitless.12 The 
rapid growth of aerial warfare during the early part of the twentieth century allowed nations 
to utilise bombing as a tool for colonial control. This aspect of the history of bombing is dealt 
with in chapter one. It contributed to the ongoing impossibility of reaching agreement on the 
legal use of bombing as a form of warfare. Further moves were made to codify acceptable 
aerial conduct in relation to bombing. Notably, efforts were made at the Hague Conference 
which took place from December 1922 to February 1923 and produced the Hague Rules of Air 
Warfare. Article 22 stated: “Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorising the civilian 
population, of destroying or damaging private property not of a military character, or of 
injuring non-combatants is prohibited.” The document, however, was not ratified.  This lack of 
legal certainty over how aeroplanes could be used in wartime was compounded the lack of, in 
Joel Hayward’s words, “a moral consensus of any strength”.13 It meant that the Second World 
War began with no clear limits on its use. According to Tami Davis Biddle, the Manual of 
Military Law (“the reference of record prior to the war”), gave the Allies legal grounding for 
attacks. Bombardment, along with investment, assault, and regular siege, were “severally and 
jointly legitimate means of warfare.”14 Since the war part of the historiographical challenge has 
                                                          
10 A. C. Grayling, Among the Dead Cities: Was the Allied Bombing of Civilians in WWII a Necessity or a 
Crime? (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), 279. 
11 Donald Bloxham, ‘Dresden as a War Crime’ in Addison and Crang, Firestorm, 180. 
12 Lee Kennett, A History of Strategic Bombing (New York: Scribner, 1982), 9-11. On the Hague 
Conventions and their precursors, see also Joel Hayward, ‘Air Power, Ethics, and Civilian Immunity 
during the First World War and its Aftermath’, Global War Studies 7, no. 2 (2010), 8-9. 
13 Hayward, ‘Air Power’, 24-25. 
14 Tami Davis Biddle, ‘Air Power’ in Michael Howard, George Andreopoulos and Mark Shulman (eds.) The 
Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (London: Yale University Press, 1994), 150; 
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been to establish the legality of the area bombing campaign. Within his argument Bloxham 
accepts that the legal picture is “not entirely clear-cut”. Yet he suggests that: “there would 
have been a strong prima facie case for [an independent war crimes tribunal] to consider the 
bombing [of Dresden] as a war crime.”15 In either case there would be no criminal charges for 
any of those who planned or took part in the Allied bomber offensive; indeed this probably 
saved German air staff from prosecution. Donald A. Wells writes: “aerial bombing of civilian 
centers was such standard practice by the air forces of all armies that no German or Japanese 
was ever prosecuted for the deliberate aerial attack on civilians.”16 This thesis goes back to the 
years in which the bombing of German cities was taking place and considers how it was viewed 
before the commencement of the post-war debate. 
The bomber war was an expansive one. German cities across the Reich were targeted and vast 
damage caused. The campaign grew in scope and ferocity as the war went on. Accordingly it is 
not the intention here to chronologically consider the entire Allied bomber offensive. Rather, I 
have chosen three case studies which will be used to analyse attitudes at three distinct stages 
of the war. Each case study focuses on a particular attack on a German city and seeks to 
establish how attitudes towards the bomber campaign were framed at that point. Sonya O. 
Rose writes of the experience of the Second World War in Britain: “in a time now remembered 
in popular memory as one in which the people of the country were of one mind and were fully 
unified around the war effort, there was defiance, resistance and indifference.”17 This multi-
faceted nature of wartime experience comes under investigation here. The complexity of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
War Office. Manual of Military Law (London: Stationary Office, 1914). 252-253; See also Overy, The 
Bombing War, 29-32. 
15 Bloxham, ‘Dresden as a War Crime’, 180-208. 
16 Donald A. Wells, War Crimes and Laws of War: Second Edition (London: University Press of America, 
1991), 39. See also Telford Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: an American Tragedy (Chicago: Quadrangle, 
1970), 140. As Richard Overy notes, General Alexander Löhr is the exception to Wells’ suggestion that no 
Germans were prosecuted for bombing civilians. Löhr was executed by the Yugoslavs for the 1941 
bombing of Belgrade. Overy, The Bombing War, 630. 
17 Sonya O. Rose, Which People’s War? National Identity and Citizenship in Wartime Britain, 1939-1945 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 8. 
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sources used here present an opportunity to dig beneath what for most people was support of 
a just Allied war: what becomes clear is that in terms of the bombing of Germany this support 
did not always extend to the methods of waging the war. The bombing of civilians during the 
Spanish Civil War provoked outrage in Britain. It was not long before the British military would 
have to make decisions about how to effectively and appropriately utilise its own aerial 
resources in wartime.18  
Before embarking on the series of case studies, chapter one charts the development of aerial 
bombardment during the early part of the twentieth century. The intention is to show how 
aerial bombardment developed rapidly in scale and usage and to consider how bombing was 
understood in Britain before the start of the Blitz in September 1940. Civil populations in 
Britain would experience aerial bombardment on a considerably larger scale than when under 
attack by Zeppelin and Gotha raids during the First World War. This chapter establishes the 
novelty of bombing as a form of weaponry. By the start of the Second World War bombing 
from powered aircraft remained a youthful concept. Less than thirty years separated the first 
experiment with the first raids of the Second World War; indeed just over thirty years had 
passed since the Wright brothers first achieved powered flight in 1907. Yet this short period of 
time encompassed a relative age in the era of aerial bombing. The meagre effects of a small 
number of grenades thrown from an aeroplane over Libya in 1911 were a far cry from the 
wholesale destruction of Guernica by German planes in 1937. The bombing of Guernica – 
followed as it was by a series of first-hand reports by The Times journalist George Steer – will 
be shown to have brought the prospect of bombing home to a British audience. The story of 
bombing in the pre-war period is multi-national, with different nations experimenting with and 
                                                          
18 Burleigh, M. Moral Combat: A History of World War II (London: HarperPress, 2010), 173-180; Overy, 
The Bombing War, 239. 
16 
 
developing their own aerial capabilities. The first chapter will situate Britain within this 
narrative and consider levels of knowledge – and fears – as the Second World War began. 
Another key factor for the remainder of the thesis emerges in this chapter: the position 
Winston Churchill takes on aerial bombardment as the eve of the Second World War 
approaches. His initial scepticism about the role bombing could play in winning a war would be 
tested throughout the conflict and it is important to establish his position – as a key actor in 
British high command – at this stage. 
The first case study of an attack on a German city then addresses the first RAF experiment with 
area bombing during the war: the December 1940 attack on Mannheim. This is addressed in 
chapter two. The raid was, officially, a reprisal for the attack a month previously on Coventry, 
and was, according to some press reports, supported wholeheartedly by civilians in Coventry. 
The initial raid on Coventry took place as a part of the Blitz on British cities which began on 7th 
September 1940 and continued for – with one exception – 76 successive nights. Even after the 
end of this run, attacks continued in earnest until the following summer, when German 
resources and attention were diverted to the planned invasion of the Soviet Union. This 
background of British civilians being subjected to nightly attacks in cities across the country 
offers vital context at this stage. Responses to the bombing of Mannheim – and more widely 
the question of other reprisals for attacks on British cities – are shown to be strongly 
influenced by the level of experience of bombing. The grim pre-war expectations of massive air 
raids did not come to pass in the early years of the war; indeed the bombardment experienced 
by British citizens did not reach the same scale as that which would increasingly be visited 
upon German civilians. Nevertheless as Malcolm Smith argues, this fact should not undermine 
the impact the Blitz had on those who lived through it. Amid the indiscriminate pattern of 
falling bombs, Smith writes of a public: “responding stoically to the challenge to their 
community, their families, their civic buildings, their sense of the past and, therefore, their 
17 
 
identity in the present.” To be addressed here will be how this stoicism was manifested. For 
Smith, the experience of the Blitz “made it that much easier to contemplate visiting the same 
fate on the enemy.” As the evidence of this chapter of my thesis will show, this did not always 
translate into an enthusiastic response.19 I will demonstrate that the assumed public support in 
Coventry for reprisals was not an accurate picture of the actual feeling within the city, and that 
this was mirrored in other cities when under bombardment. The question of reprisals was not 
only considered at the highest levels of British military command but also in the press and by 
members of the public who had direct experience of aerial attack. As this chapter will show, it 
was far more nuanced and subject to condition than some press accounts indicated. The 
correlation between physical experience of bombing and desire for reprisal attacks in different 
geographical areas will be considered in depth here. 
The reprisal raid on Mannheim itself was limited in terms of the damage caused compared to 
what was intended – and what was hoped for – by those planning the attack. This is an 
indicator of the technological capacity of Bomber Command at the time. In turn, the response 
to the bombing of Mannheim specifically is also somewhat limited. The source material used in 
this section of the thesis relates not only to Mannheim but to bombing more widely in 
response to raids on British cities. This offers the opportunity to consider in detail the question 
of reprisals and how it was treated in different parts of the country. 
Mannheim has a vital place in the story. The official documents surrounding the planning of 
the raid show, without question, a willingness at Whitehall and within Bomber Command to 
begin practising area bombing as an alternative to precision attacks. The second and third case 
studies consider area attacks on a wholly grander scale which saw death and damage inflicted 
                                                          
19 Malcolm Smith, Britain and 1940: History, Myth and Popular Memory (London: Routledge, 2000), 70-
71, 89-90. 
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far more extensively. The attack on Mannheim – for all its limited results – will be shown as a 
vital step on the road towards the considerably larger raids which took place later in the war.  
The subject of the next case study – addressed in chapter three – took place two and a half 
years after the attack on Mannheim. In July and August 1943 the RAF, with daytime support 
from the United States Army Air Force (USAAF), destroyed vast areas of Hamburg in the most 
devastating series of attacks during the war. This huge area attack was the ultimate expression 
of what had been attempted in Mannheim. Around 37,000 people were killed. By this stage 
Bomber Command had a far greater capability and capacity to support its ambition, and was 
operating under an official policy of area bombing. Several people took issue with the new 
scale of the bomber war at this point and were particularly concerned by the attacks on 
Hamburg. By this stage of the war a number people displayed knowledge that the bombing 
campaign against German cities was being operated on a different scale to that which had 
been experienced in British cities during the Blitz. The work of the campaign group the 
Bombing Restriction Committee will be examined here, and attention will be paid to the 
responses to a directive issued by Mass-Observation which sought to assess how those 
surveyed viewed the bombing of Germany. This chapter will consider the role of the Church 
within the debate, and particularly the role of William Temple, the Archbishop of Canterbury. 
It will show evidence of individuals who did not feel empowered to effectively engage in 
protest against the bombing of cities, and sought a leader, Temple, who might act as a 
figurehead. In spite of this Temple maintained his qualified support for the bomber campaign. 
This chapter will show how this blocked the voices of those seeking a wider audience for their 
protest. The bombing of Hamburg, and reaction to it, came at a critical stage of the war. 
Without a strong wave of effective protest about their tactics, and with the Air Ministry able to 
ward off mild questions about new tactics, Bomber Command continued to launch heavy raids 
on German cities until the very end of the war.  
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The final case study – the subject of chapter four – focuses on the bombing of Dresden in 
February 1945: one of those heavy raids and another major success for Bomber Command. 
This attack occupies arguably the most prominent place in memory of the bomber war. The 
city, previously largely undamaged, was destroyed in a series of raids just months before VE 
Day. Around 25,000 people – many of them refugees from other bombed out cities – were 
killed. Initial estimates of the death toll were far higher, and persisted for several years after 
the war. It was this attack which provoked Churchill to write his minute, as discussed above. 
Concerned about the impact this would have at the end of the war, he sought to 
retrospectively distance himself from the decision making process and to rein in the excesses 
of the campaign. The purpose of this chapter will be to move back to the immediate aftermath 
of the bombings and show that there followed an abrupt sense of dismay about the raids in 
Britain. The attacks were discussed in the House of Commons, and foreign press reports, 
reproduced in the Manchester Guardian, alerted readers to the massive destruction caused in 
the city. The responses given in the Mass-Observation diaries surveyed here show how even 
after over five years of war, hardened pragmatism had not replaced a clear sense of how war 
should be waged. As will be discussed in this chapter, Churchill’s motivations for writing his 
minute cannot be definitively identified. He did not leave a clear account of this episode, and 
his history of the Second World War is largely quiet on the controversial nature of the bombing 
campaign. Yet what this chapter can certainly show is that this controversy over the bombing 
of Dresden, and around the area bombing campaign more widely, is not merely a post-war 
argument. Its roots were firmly established before the end of the war. 
The primary sources used within this thesis were produced during the war itself. The 
establishment of disquiet around the nature of the Bomber Command campaign as the war 
progressed helps to justify the focus on contemporary sources in this thesis. As Sonya O. Rose 
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argues, such an approach can allow the historian to access understandings of events which are 
neither augmented nor diluted by “post-war reconstructions” of lived experiences.20 I have 
avoided the use of memoirs and oral history accounts for a number of reasons. One issue 
raised by this point made by Rose is that of composure. According to Penny Summerfield: 
“public discourses are inevitably drawn upon in the composition of a story about the self.”21 In 
relation to the bombing war this is of particular relevance given the often fractious nature of 
the post-war debate. Of course, identifying where and how such influences are present is 
challenging. Yet the following quote seems clearly to be borne of reflection on events past, and 
seems influenced by passage of time. Roy MacDonald, a gunner in the Pathfinder Force, said in 
2000: “I’d no conscience about what we were doing, none at all. I don’t think anybody did. It 
had to be done. That was the way we looked at it anyway.”22 While issues surrounding 
composure can be addressed and indeed studied in their own right, in this thesis, given the 
very limited amount of historiography which does address contemporary sources of public 
opinion, it is of value to limit the discussion to contemporary sources. There is another 
imperative for doing so. In Bomber Boys, Patrick Bishop offers a justification for the 
devastating attack on Dresden because: “the end was not in sight. No one could know when 
the war would finish and in the middle of February 1945 there was no indication that the 
Germans would not fight until the death of the last Nazi.”23 While it may not have been 
possible then to predict an exact date for the end of the war, it was clear to most that it was 
not far away. With a focus on contemporary sources, this thesis will show that there was 
immediate anger and dismay in Britain at the size and scale of the raids. Not only this, but such 
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a reaction came against attacks far earlier in the war, when Bishop’s justification would have 
carried more weight. Arguing that most people in Britain felt that the Germans, as architects of 
the war, were “reaping the whirlwind”, Connelly writes: “Only after the war when other 
factors came into play would the image of Bomber Command and Harris be altered.” One of 
the main functions of this thesis will be to show that the criticisms of the bombing campaign 
are rooted in the midst of the campaign itself.24 A. C. Grayling notes the following on the 
opening page of his book Among the Dead Cities, first published in 2006: “It is a controversy 
which has grown during the decades since the war ended, as the benefit of hindsight has 
prompted fresh examination of the area bombing strategy”.25 Hindsight, as Grayling identifies, 
has been a primary motivator of much post-war discourse on the legality and morality of the 
area bombing of residential areas. Yet by focusing on contemporary sources it is possible to 
exclude retrospective judgements and consider how the campaign was assessed as it began 
and grew through the war. It is important to understand the existence and nature of 
discomfort about attacks on civilians as those attacks took place. 
There is another more straightforward reason for addressing contemporary sources and 
seeking an understanding of the initial response: it is a relatively under-researched topic. 
Churchill’s minute – quoted above – has been a chronological starting point in some 
discussions of the issue. This thesis will show that this minute was far from the beginning of 
the story. In Richard Overy’s impressive, comprehensive survey The Bombing War, attitudes of 
British people at the time are touched upon but not investigated in depth. Some studies of 
Britain during the war address attitudes to the bombing of Germany but given the wider 
subject matter, do not have the scope to sustain this scrutiny.26 As such there is a wealth of 
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historiography from which developments can be made. It is hoped that this thesis can 
contribute to a clearer understanding of this aspect of public opinion during the Second World 
War. 
German cities across the Reich were heavily bombed during the war, and it is worth noting 
here why certain other cities have not been taken as a focal point for the thesis. Berlin is 
perhaps the most obvious omission. The capital city was bombed throughout the war, and a 
concerted effort was made during the winter of 1943-1944 to strike a decisive blow. Yet while 
considerable effort and resources were diverted to this end, the campaign against Berlin never 
reached a successful outcome for the Allies. Robin Neillands writes: “The Battle of Berlin was a 
defeat for the RAF.”27 Given that this most sustained series of attacks on Berlin took place at a 
similar stage of the war to Hamburg, and given the wildly different outcomes of the attacks, 
Hamburg is the more appropriate subject for consideration here. The attacks on Hamburg 
were concentrated into a period of little more than a week; by contrast the most sustained 
period of bombing Berlin was drawn out over a number of months. For these reasons the 
bombing of Berlin would make for a less coherent case study within this thesis. As a target for 
bombing Berlin had symbolic importance. Yet the specific existence of dissent against the 
bombings of Hamburg and Dresden shows an engagement with the policy of bombing away 
from the capital city. 
Lübeck and Rostock were subjected to major raids in the months following the official switch 
to an area bombing policy in February 1942, while shortly afterwards Cologne and Essen were 
the targets of the first ‘Thousand Bomber Raids’. Few built-up areas were spared, particularly 
as the Allies gained ever greater superiority in the skies above Europe. Yet Hamburg and 
Dresden are certainly the most appropriate subjects for sustained discussion here. Hamburg 
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received the most devastating series of attacks by Bomber Command and came as the tide of 
the war began to turn irretrievably against Nazi Germany. The scale of the attack at Dresden 
was also huge, and the proximity to the end of the war, coupled with the position it holds 
within memory of the area bombing campaign, makes it a vital point of interest.28 
Each case study includes discussion of the operational aspects of the attacks in question. 
Official documentation produced in the build-up to the attacks, as well as reports in the 
aftermath, show how the raids took place and consider their effectiveness and the extent of 
the damage caused and human life lost. Discussion of documents related to the planning of 
the attack on Mannheim are given particular attention due to the change in approach it 
represented. A range of documents are then used to provide a broad representation of 
attitudes at each stage of the war. This initial discussion of operational aspects of the raids 
gives an opportunity to consider how figures involved in the decision making process viewed 
the nature of the attacks. As the pitch of the bombing campaign heightened, a greater 
challenge was issued to those in its command. At a more functional level the views of aircrew 
carrying out the attacks have also been sought. These are often hard to come by as many 
diaries and log-books contain only the minimal details of particular attacks: location, date, and 
weight of bombs dropped. Where sufficient source material is available I have included more 
detailed comment about the recorded experience of taking part in the campaign. Yet as Martin 
Francis notes  wartime reflections among crew members on the nature of the campaign were 
limited. What is often evident in diaries is the entirely understandable focus on mere survival: 
the high casualty rate of those crews was a direct product of the treacherous nature of active 
service. “During the war itself bomber aircrews had little opportunity, or desire, to visit the 
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issue of air-power ethics. The demands of operational life discouraged excessive reflection.”29 
Where members of aircrew did record reflections, they can offer an important insight into how 
the changing form of Allied bombing was received by those physically carrying it out. 
In each chapter newspaper reports and editorials feature prominently to show how the 
bombing of German cities was addressed in the press. In 1939 the founders of the Mass-
Observation project – Charles Madge and Tom Harrisson – published findings from the 
research carried out in the organisation’s early years. They found that newspapers continued 
to play a substantial role in informing the views of the British public, a view later echoed by 
James Curran and Jean Seaton.30 Two thirds of adults “regularly saw” a daily newspaper,31 and 
although radio overtook print media during the war years, the suspension of the BBC’s 
independent constitution during this period ensured that newspapers could offer a wider 
range of information for their readers to digest.32 The censorial controls in Great Britain during 
the war evidently had an impact on the nature of material which could be printed, and this 
issue is dealt with further in the chapter on Mannheim. Yet the differing tones of different 
newspapers’ output offered scope for members of the public to consider the bombing of 
German cities. Local press reports in Britain during the Blitz challenged the myth that angry 
calls for reprisals spread through cities after a raid. Details of conditions in Dresden after its 
own destruction had an immediate bearing on British opinion and a lasting effect on the 
legitimacy of bombing the city.  
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This thesis uses for discussion a range of publications diverse in their political stance and  
readership. In 1939 five daily newspapers – the Daily Express, Daily Herald, Daily Mirror, Daily 
Mail and News Chronicle – all had circulations of over one million. The Daily Express, at over 
2.5 million, had the highest sales figures.33 Together, as Adrian Bingham writes, they 
“dominated the market”.34 These newspapers also catered for readers across the political 
spectrum. The Daily Express and Daily Mail, read predominantly by middle-class readers, 
pursued a Conservative editorial approach, while the Daily Mirror and Daily Herald, with their 
Labour sympathies, had a more working-class readership. The Daily Herald, under Walter 
Layton, espoused a Liberal agenda.35 While these most popular newspapers could, clearly, 
reach the largest audience, other publications with a far smaller print-run were able to exert 
an influence due to the readership they did cater for. Compared to the sales figures of those 
newspapers discussed above, the Times sold a relatively meagre 204,000.36 Yet its influence 
certainly outweighed this statistic and, according to Lance Price, the newspaper was viewed 
abroad as “the voice of the British nation”, even when this was not always the case in Britain.37 
The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post sits somewhere between these examples. With a 
circulation of 737,000 on the eve of the war, it sold more widely than the Times without quite 
the reach of the most popular dailies.38 The Liberal-supporting Manchester Guardian, 
meanwhile, is included here as it had a greater focus on foreign affairs than other regional 
newspapers and played a particularly visible role in reporting the aftermath of the Dresden 
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attacks.39 Another left-wing publication, the New Statesman and Nation, has been included 
here because, despite its low circulation, Price writes that its editors were prepared to ask 
bigger questions than the popular press.40 This is especially evident during the Blitz, where, as 
the chapter on Mannheim will show, the publication regularly presented which challenged 
calls for reprisals. The growing scarcity of newsprint ensured that newspapers – as individual 
products – thinned through the war years. Yet they remained in high demand and helped 
inform public opinion.41 
With regards to political stance and editorial policy, the wartime careers of Walter Layton, 
editorial director of the News Chronicle, and Lord Beaverbrook, owner of the Daily Mail, can 
help to illustrate how external pressures could affect the editorial line in newspapers. The 
News Chronicle had campaigned against the bombing of civilians during the Spanish Civil War, 
and as the chapter on the bombing of Hamburg will show, did little to gloss over the impact 
bombing had on civilians as the weight of Allied bombs grew into the summer of 1943. Yet 
when Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940 – prior to the start of the Blitz – Layton 
was appointed Director-General of Programmes at the Ministry of Supply. Although he 
retained some authority over the editorial line of the newspaper during his time in the 
government, he came to an understanding with Churchill that he would not put across his 
political views in the newspaper. Following a period of ill-health Layton confirmed in February 
1943 that he would stand down from his position in government. According to David Hubback, 
Layton “wanted to be able to express his political opinion publically”, a state of affairs which 
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would have contravened his agreement with the Prime Minister.42 The proprietor of the Daily 
Express meanwhile, Lord Beaverbrook, took up office as Minister of Aircraft Production, also in 
May 1940. Beaverbrook was an enthusiastic cheerleader for the bombing campaign and the 
chapter on Mannheim will help confirm the claim made by Tom Harrisson: that Beaverbrook 
“vigorously reported and elaborated on public demand, nay clamour, for ‘reprisals’ through his 
news chain.”43 Stephen Koss writes that during the 1930s editors of a number of newspapers 
gained an increasingly powerful position against the control of proprietors. The Times, the 
News Chronicle and the Manchester Guardian all stand as examples of this phenomenon; the 
Daily Express remained under Beaverbrook’s far tighter control. Laurence Cadbury, the owner 
of the of the News Chronicle, was present for weekly editorial conferences but placed his trust 
in Layton to ensure policy was appropriate.44 The differing political views and the levels of 
influence respectively enjoyed by Layton and Beaverbrook are illustrative both of the ways in 
which editorial freedom could be compromised, and the extent to which Layton was able to 
reclaim it.  
By surveying a wide selection of newspapers, with an awareness of their reach, aims and 
restrictions, it has been possible to build up a comprehensive picture of the range of print-
media available to the British public to help inform them about the progress of the war. 
A number of sources have been used through the thesis in order to build a picture of the 
opinions of the British public. Chief among them are the Mass-Observation Archive and data 
collected by the British Institute for Public Opinion.  During the Second World War volunteers 
for Mass-Observation kept regular diaries recording their daily life and their thoughts on the 
progress of the war. Some of the panel also gave written responses to set ‘directives’, and field 
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research was carried out by the organisation. Although the cross-section of those surveyed – 
particularly the diarists – was not representative of the entire British population, there are two 
major advantages in using the resource for this project. First, they provide the contemporary 
perspectives of the events that are collected in this paper. As such, they provide an insight into 
daily reflections on a diverse range of subjects. As Robert Mackay writes: “Mass-Observation’s 
wartime files constitute a rich vein of raw material on how people felt and acted at this 
time.”45 Sandra Koa Wing adds: “By 1939 Mass-Observation was well placed to preserve the 
fabric of individual responses to the war [including] personal comments about how the war 
was being waged and how it was reported in the press.”46 In a thesis which actively seeks 
voices and accounts which have rarely, if ever, been heard, Mass-Observation is a hugely 
valuable resource. Keeping a diary or responding to directives gave people an opportunity to 
record their views. The directive responses in chapter three are evidence of a channel for 
those who felt that they otherwise lacked a suitable forum for their views about the bombing 
of Germany.47 Lucy Noakes explains the great utility of Mass-Observation to go beyond more 
quantitative approaches to garnering public opinion. Those who kept diaries for the 
organisation, or who responded to specific directives: “are able to write at length on various 
issues, and thus show the complexities of belief that can underlie simple yes/no  responses to 
more quantitative studies of public opinion.” Further, Noakes considers possible motivations 
for those writing; in the following case with specific reference to the directive responses on 
the subject of bombing. One respondent gave particularly qualified support for the bombing 
campaign. By giving such a response to Mass-Observation: “he was able to express his views 
                                                          
45 Robert Mackay, Half the Battle: Civilian Morale in Britain during the Second World War (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2002), 11. 
46 Sandra Koa Wing, Mass Observation: Britain in the Second World War (London: The Folio Society, 
2007), xii. 
47 Dorothy Sheridan, Brian Street and David Bloome, Writing Ourselves: Mass-Observation and Literary 
Practices (Cresskill: Hampton Press, 2000), 282-283. 
29 
 
and reservations to a wider audience”.48 Mass-Observation then could serve, at the time, as a 
receptive ear for those who wanted to find an outlet for their thoughts on the progress of the 
war; it can serve now as a window to the highly textured canvas of public opinion. They are an 
incredibly rich series of sources which demonstrate in great depth why some people held 
particular views; not simply that they held them. As Summerfield writes, the depth of the 
material produced for Mass-Observation allowed the production of a “fuller picture” of public 
opinion than more statistically driven research.49 Alongside these positive appraisals of Mass-
Observation it must, of course, be noted that the archive does not offer a perfect reflection of 
wider attitudes. James Hinton for example considers demographic representation within the 
panel and the inevitable biases created: some of these particular issues are discussed further 
in chapter three. With an awareness of the limits of what conclusions can be drawn, Mass-
Observation can provide qualitative material evidence of attitudes to the bombing offensive.50 
In order to gain a greater sense of the number of those holding particular views, BIPO surveys, 
where available, have also been addressed. Formed in 1937 the organisation sought to gain 
the views of a representative cross-section of the British public. This was hard to achieve in 
practice. Even Henry Durant, who founded the BIPO, “lacked confidence in the reliability of 
detailed breakdowns of the results”: for example the views within divisions of gender, age, and 
social class.51 There are certainly valid reservations about the use of BIPO surveys. Yet their 
function within this thesis is to help to give some indication of the levels of broader public 
support for the bombing campaign at different stages of the war. It is Mass-Observation 
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though which contributes the most valuable evidence here, and helps to create a layered 
picture of some of the reasoned responses to the bombing of Germany.52 
The combined use of these varied sources through three case studies will help create a sense 
of how the area bombing of German cities was received in Britain. What emerges is a sense of 
a nation which was not unified in its desire for unrestrained warfare against Germany. 
Assumptions about near-universal support for an ever greater weight of bombs to be dropped 
on cities – an assumption which Churchill expressed publically in 1941 – were not accurate. 
The area bombing campaign still elicits powerful debate on military tactics and the position of 
civilians in times of conflict. The condemnation which the policy has received in a number of 
quarters has been met by staunch defence: both in terms of the role aerial bombardment 
played in the Allied victory and the incredible bravery of those who participated in it. By 
examining responses to the raids as they were still taking place, we stand to learn far more 
about the relationship between states waging war, and the citizens in whose name it is carried 
out. 
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Chapter 1 – Aerial bombing before the Second World War 
Harding: What’s all this fuss about in the papers tonight, Mr Cabal? 
Cabal: Wars, and rumours about wars. 
Harding: Crying wolf? 
Cabal: Someday a wolf will come. These fools are capable of anything.53 
The above exchange takes place at the start of Alexander Korda and William Cameron 
Menzies’ Things to Come, released in 1936. One of the most popular films of the year with 
critics and the public alike, it took £350,000 in cinemas.54 The film forecasts a world at war and 
depicts a city under aerial attack. It is based on H.G. Wells’ 1933 novel The Shape of Things to 
Come. ‘Everytown’ (a barely disguised London, with a version of St. Paul’s Cathedral 
prominent) is hit by a destructive bombing raid on the same night as Harding and Cabal discuss 
the impending war. The city is thrown into chaos: the anti-aircraft guns unable to prevent the 
onslaught. A cinema and a department store are destroyed and fires are shown burning in 
hollowed out buildings. The lifeless body of a young boy is seen in the rubble. Soldiers, tanks 
and warships are mobilised. Waves of countless aeroplanes appear over the coast, continue 
overland and appear in the sky above a town.55 
Things to Come was shown again in cinemas in the spring of 1940. World war had moved from 
feared future to reality, though the effects of it had yet to be extended to the British home 
front. The scenes of aeroplanes crossing the coast aroused laughter in audiences, “but the 
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actual shots of air raid panic, of gas-masks being issued, of people running for shelter, and so 
on, were received in silence and with interest.”56 Susan Grayzel suggests that the film’s release 
in 1936 tapped into the particular climate of fear and apprehension which was taking hold.57 
The experience of air raids would soon become a reality for civil populations across Europe. 
The purpose of this chapter is to address three key issues which are an important background 
to the Allied Bomber Offensive that reduced German cities to rubble during the Second World 
War. A clear appreciation of these issues allows us to come to a deeper understanding of what 
was at stake as Bomber Command attacked the Reich with increasing vigour. British people in 
their thirties and older had lived through the birth and subsequent growth of aerial 
bombardment. 
The first subject that this chapter will address is the very novelty of aerial bombardment, and 
indeed powered flight itself, on the eve of the Second World War. The rapid development of 
bombing as a viable form of warfare is striking: just twenty-six years separated the very first 
incident of bombs being dropped from an aeroplane in 1911, and the deliberate destruction of 
Guernica during the Spanish Civil War by a fleet of aircraft in 1937 (which will be discussed in 
greater depth later in this chapter) as the prospect of a second global conflict grew ever more 
real. As British people came under sustained bombing attack by the Luftwaffe in 1940 and 
1941, and began to cast their minds east to fellow civilians with a shared experience in 
Germany, they had also to come to terms with a form of warfare which had, until relatively 
recently, been the territory only of science fiction writers. It is vital that we approach the 
wartime debate on aerial bombardment with a keen understanding of its youthfulness. To 
further emphasise this point, public understanding of the realities of bombing was limited by 
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the lack of documentary evidence of its effects and the fact that most attacks took place far 
from Britain. The impact of the attack on Guernica for British observers was that first-hand 
reports were published in British newspapers; bombing as a weapon that could be used to kill 
European citizens was now clearly displayed in the press. Much of this chapter will be devoted 
to the British press response to the bombing of Guernica, for it will inform the later discussion 
of the bombing of Germany. 
The second key function of this chapter will be to situate Britain squarely within the pre-war 
bombing narrative. With the recent advent of bombing – and, after the end of the First World 
War, the newly enlarged British Empire – there arose a pressing need to seek a cheap and 
effective method of exercising colonial control. The growing claim of the Royal Air Force to be 
involved in this process will be examined in this chapter, as will the expanding duties it took on 
away from the European sphere. The use of aerial bombardment as a method of colonial 
policing ensured that Bomber Command had developed useful experience by the eve of the 
Second World War.  
The final point will be, as has already been touched upon, to show how the bombing of 
Guernica was presented to a British audience. Though the attack on the small Basque town 
took place twenty-six years after the first bombs were dropped on Libya, this was the first 
aerial attack which drew major press attention in Britain. The presence of British fighters in 
Spain, along with a body of international reporters, ensured that the Spanish Civil War 
featured prominently in the pages of British newspapers. The bombing of Guernica was, as will 
be outlined here, covered by the first-hand reports of George Steer in the Times. 
Understanding the outrage that this attack provoked is a vital precursor to the bombing 
campaign of the Second World War. 
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Innovation 
The first century of aerial bombardment began and ended in Libya. Over the course of one 
hundred years, starting in 1911, aircraft have been used to bomb targets on land across the 
world. During this period bombing from the skies developed from a pilot manually throwing 
grenades out of his cockpit onto military garrisons below, to precision bombing from high 
speed, often unmanned aircraft. With modern air forces now engaged in conflict in different 
arenas around the world, targets can be bombed by “pilots” sitting in control rooms thousands 
of miles from the action. Thus have civilians been killed in an environment which, to the 
aggressor, is largely risk-free. It is a far cry from the first aerial bombing, carried out by a lone 
pilot in a plane with an open cockpit.58 
Aeroplane flight was still a very new technology in the early twentieth century, but building on 
the foundations created from other “technologies of speed” – railways and cars – it 
“conquered distances and reinvented geography” for converts.59 With the constantly increased 
capability of aircraft through the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first, 
methods of attack from the sky have changed dramatically across this century of bombing. The 
main focus of this thesis will be the relatively short period of the Second World War. Before 
aiming the spotlight at this period it is useful first to understand the background to it. By 
charting the rapid development of this new method of warfare and the way in which it came 
to be understood we can gain a far clearer perspective on the issues surrounding reception of 
the Second World War campaigns. 
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Aerial bombing, given its broadest definition, began ninety years before the outbreak of WWII 
with the use of unmanned balloons. As will be discussed this practice was banned temporarily 
in 1899. The failure to agree on an extension to the ban paved the way for the use of 
aeroplanes for bombing in the early part of the twentieth century.60 The first part of this 
opening chapter will serve as a history of aerial bombardment using powered aircraft. This 
period begins with the first use of bombs thrown on Libya in 1911 and closes with the aerial 
attacks on Spanish towns during the Spanish Civil War, of which Guernica stands as a symbol. 
Aerial bombardment in this period can be considered in three different contexts: wartime 
bombing; imperial policing; and the less frequent instances of a state bombing its own 
civilians. As is to be expected these definitions – specifically the first two – are fluid. Drawing a 
clear dividing line between warfare and policing is not easy, in part where there was a colonial 
setting of both. This overlap means that it makes sense to address instances of aerial bombing 
chronologically rather than thematically. Most weight will be given to the Spanish Civil War 
due to the great interest it attracted in Britain. Interspersed with this attempt to outline the 
facts of different attacks and the theory behind them will be discussion of the development of 
socio-political understanding of bombing through the period. In keeping with the main focus of 
this thesis most of the contemporary analysis will be from British commentators. 
Futurism 
In the early days of air power the Italian Giulio Douhet was one of the first people to recognise 
the “tremendous potential” of bomber planes. His writings were hugely influential in the 
doctrinal development of aerial bombing. I will return in more detail to Douhet later; here it is 
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useful to briefly consider his own influences.61 On 20th February 1909, the French newspaper 
Le Figaro published on its front page ‘The Futurist Manifesto’ written by the Italian Filippo 
Tommaso Marinetti, resident in Paris at the time. Itself built on the Nietzschean principle of 
self-enhancement over mere existence, the argument was clear. Marinetti was adamant that 
Italy had to discard the “gangrene” that was its traditions (“We want to demolish museums 
and libraries”) and instead embrace modern technology if it were to achieve great power 
status. He made direct reference to the importance of aeroplanes in his vision, and links them 
to the image of a proud nation: “We will sing of… the gliding flight of aeroplanes whose 
propeller sounds like the flapping of a flag and the applause of enthusiastic crowds.”62 
Notwithstanding the short-lived Vorticist art movement and the related literary magazine 
BLAST, Futurism did not properly take off in Britain. Marinetti had mixed feelings about the 
English: while he admired their patriotism he was critical of their “lamentable love of tradition” 
which evidently did not sit within the parameters of Futurism.63 These cultural differences are 
well illustrated by the remarkable story told by the journalist Francis McCullagh who 
condemned Italian conduct in Libya. Piqued by the criticism Marinetti, along with the Futurist 
painter Umberto Boccioni and another, unnamed, “gentleman”, came to McCullagh’s house, 
armed and prepared to fight him. Though the incident eventually passed, if not without 
argument then at least without violence, McCullagh’s reflection on the incident demonstrates 
both “this manifesto of ruinous and incendiary violence” and the English tradition Marinetti so 
disliked. “Is it not rather impudent of foreigners enjoying the hospitality of this country to thus 
                                                          
61 Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 573. 
62 Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, ‘The Futurist Manifesto’. On Futurism and its significance, see, for 
example, James Joll, Three Intellectuals in Politics (New York: Pantheon Books, 1960), 133-139; Gunter 
Berghaus, The Genesis of Futurism: Marinetti's Early Career and Writings, 1899-1909 (Leeds: The Society 
for Italian Studies, 1995), 12-17. 
63 Joll, Three Intellectuals, 151-154 
37 
 
burst, armed, and presume into the houses of men who criticise the conduct of their troops in 
Tripoli?”64 
The First World War “meant the end of Futurism as a coherent movement”65 but it retains 
huge importance in this story due to its influence on the early proponents of aerial 
bombardment. The closing line of the manifesto is a bombastic summation of the mission of 
Futurism; it can also be read a challenge to those who would in the coming years embrace air 
power. “Standing on the world’s summit we launch once again our insolent challenge to the 
stars!”66 
Early experiments 
Aerial bombing was not new in 1911. The Habsburgs had dropped bombs from unmanned 
balloons – capable of carrying a single bomb – on Venice in 1849. A five year ban was placed 
on dropping projectiles or explosives from aircraft at the Hague Convention of 1899. With the 
first successful aeroplane flight still four years away the presumed targets of the ban were 
balloons, which made an inaccurate and ineffective vessel for bombardment (Kennett 
describes them as a mere “plaything of the winds”)67. The reason for limiting the ban to five 
years was that if aircraft could be developed with greater control over direction and speed, 
they could make a far greater contribution to a war effort and indeed shorten the length of 
conflicts. By the time of the second Hague Convention in 1907 the ban had expired and 
attempts were made to restore it. Those countries at the forefront of aviation research – 
Germany, France and Italy – did not consent to the ban. Military utility and the failure to agree 
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on how regulation would work paved the way for the early experiments in the 1910s and later 
for the use of bomber planes during the First World War.68 
It is difficult to overstate quite how novel the concept of piloting powered aircraft was by the 
time the first bombs were dropped from a plane in 1911. The Wright brothers completed the 
first successful flights on 17th December 1903, the first of which covered 37 metres at less than 
7mph. By the beginning of 1908 there were just four airmen worldwide. Three years later, in 
March 1911, this number had swelled to around 700. Yet the very fact that they could be 
counted and listed by name (even in a list which does not purport to be fully complete) reveals 
the enduring novelty of piloting. Graham-White and Harper published the list in an edited 
collection The Aeroplane: Past, Present and Future. The more notable airmen and airwomen 
on the list were afforded a paragraph or two about their achievements; Louis Bleriot for 
example, was given greater attention having flown across the English Channel in 1909. The 
majority were listed by surname alongside the model of plane they flew. Scanning the list, one 
particular entry appears individually insignificant amongst the raft of airmen less distinguished 
than Bleriot. “GAVOTTI, Lieut – Flies a Voisin biplane” reads this entry in full. Worthy of only 
four words to accompany his name at the start of 1911; by the end of the year this pilot would 
have set in motion the age of aerial bombardment from powered aircraft.69 This development 
was itself anticipated later in the same book in a chapter by C. G. Grunhold.70 In his chapter 
Louis Paulhan considered what future developments might be seen in aviation. He highlighted 
the dangers in “set[ting] up as a prophet” where the development of flight technology was 
concerned: an unnamed person had been prepared to bet £1,000,000 that no-one would ever 
fly to Manchester from London by plane! Paulhan himself won the rather more modest prize 
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of £10,000 offered by the Daily Mail when he achieved the feat in 1910. Perhaps it was this 
success at pushing boundaries which helped persuade Paulhan to risk a prediction: “I see no 
reason at all to doubt but that the use of aeroplanes for military purposes on land, and for 
naval work at sea, will be the next definite and practical advance which will be made.”71 Later 
in the book Colonel John Capper considered specifically the use of planes in warfare. He 
outlined what the possible uses for aeroplanes were and explicitly notes the dropping of 
grenades from a cockpit (he did not, even by implication, suggest that aeroplanes would be 
used to bomb cities) while also arguing that the “moral effect cannot…be eliminated.” He 
thought that damage would inevitably be limited due to the inaccuracy which would be 
associated with throwing a grenade overboard, but he suggested that repeated evening 
attacks would be “excessively annoying.” Capper noted early in his chapter that planes had 
not, at the time of writing, been used in warfare. It was not long however before his forecasts 
were put to the test.72 
Much of the early history of aerial bombing can be told from a colonial viewpoint and this first 
foray very much fits that trend. The desire of states to acquire or maintain an empire 
nourished a new form of weaponry. Expansionist ambitions led to the invasion of Libya by 
Italian troops in 1911. After reconnaissance flights in late October, what had begun as a land 
campaign was definitively altered on 1st November when Giulio Gavotti – now flying a Taube 
monoplane – threw four grenades from the open cockpit down onto an Ottoman military base 
in Taguira. The significance of the attacks was far greater than the rather scant damage 
caused. Less than eight years since the Wright brothers had made their first flight, the era of 
aerial bombing was underway. Gavotti himself was evidently aware of the significance of his 
actions. In a letter to his father he wrote: “It is the first time that we will try this and if I 
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succeed, I will be really pleased to be the first person to do it.”73 Kennett speculates that the 
bombing “could hardly have been much more than a gesture” given the imprecision of the 
method and the very limited number of bombs a pilot could carry.74 Nonetheless it was a 
momentous first act. Whereas previously European powers had advanced over land, here was 
a weapon which subverted traditional military tactics and could be used to demonstrate 
superiority and supremacy. This principle was quickly adopted as a method of controlling 
existing colonial interests. In 1912 France dealt with rebellion in its colony French Morocco by 
recourse to the bomber. The effect of this attack highlights a theme which would run through 
multinational colonial bombing campaigns over the next two decades. Kennett writes that 
`bombing unruly natives: “gave a clear indication of the harsh character of this type of warfare, 
the purpose of which was to teach severe lessons”.75 According to the theories of a number of 
early airpower pioneers, to groups who had only previously experienced assaults from on land, 
from which to a greater or lesser extent they could defend themselves, bombing would be a 
terrifying new proposition which would hasten submission or collapse. Pursuit of this principle 
can be seen time and again, particular in British experiments with colonial bombing in the 
Middle East and India after the First World War. Yet at this early stage, a challenge was 
presented to those nations with access to this technology. How to turn a gesture into a 
militarily significant action would become increasingly important.76 
Against this background of aerial bombing becoming a reality, science fiction writers of the era 
had a new subject for their work. In 1908 H. G. Wells predicted in his book The War in the Air 
that civilians would soon experience aerial bombardment. Only four years passed before those 
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first bombs fell on Libya. His attention soon turned to the prospect of nuclear warfare in The 
World Set Free, and though he would have to wait longer for this nightmare vision to be 
realised, by the end of the Second World War he had again been proved correct.77 Military 
reality was certainly close to keeping pace with science fiction in the rapid development of 
aerial bombardment.78 
The early years of aerial bombing were not greatly successful. Italian and French attempts to 
harness the new techniques, while promising, did not yield startling material results. 
Nonetheless military strategists had seen enough to be convinced of the need to massively 
increase their aerial capacities by 1914.  
First World War 
The First World War was popularly expected to be short. The vast majority of those men who 
would physically contest the war had grown up during the period of relative peace in Europe 
from 1871 to 1914 and at least in the early days believed in the popular refrain that they 
would be “home by Christmas.” As A. J. P. Taylor writes: “All imagined that it would be an 
affair of great marches and great battles, quickly decided.”79 Ivan Bloch was one of the few to 
predict, a decade and a half before 1914, that “a war between the great powers would be a 
long and bloody stalemate.”80 In the event close to 10,000,000 soldiers were killed in a conflict 
which prompted George Duhamel to write, with specific reference to the Somme: “war has 
become an industry, a mechanical and methodical enterprise for killing.”81 Although persistent, 
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the idea of war as a “gallant” act fought by “the brave” and underpinned by “comradeship” 
was undermined by the bloody realities of 1914-1918.82 
To reiterate an earlier point, powered aeroplanes remained very much in their infancy in the 
early part of the twentieth century. Less than twelve years passed between the first flight and 
the outbreak of the First World War. The youth of powered aircraft ensured that they shared 
the skies with more primitive flyers: the Serb army used 192 homing pigeons for 
communications during the war.83 Britain entered the war in 1914 with two separate air 
forces, both subordinate to the traditional sections of the military. The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) 
was initially responsible for providing aerial support to the army in the form of reconnaissance 
work, while the Royal Navy Air Service (RNAS) served a support function in naval matters. 
Given the immediate use of bombs by Germany – less than a fortnight into the war Liège was 
attacked by Zeppelins – there was an abrupt need for a firm response. The RFC’s bombing 
campaign began in 1915, but before this the RNAS took the essentially defensive step of 
bombing Zeppelin sheds in Cologne and Düsseldorf in the autumn of 1914. At the start of 1915 
citizens of Great Yarmouth became the first ever civilians to be targeted by aerial 
bombardment (Liège had been the scene of fighting on the ground and was therefore 
legitimately part of the battlefield).84 By the end of the war bombing had developed to the 
point whereby it could play an important part in warfare. The different attitudes of those 
countries which experienced bombing during the First World War reveals the lack of 
international consensus over how it should be regarded within the course of war. The 
difference between Britain and France is worthy of brief discussion here. In France Kennett 
argues that captured foreign pilots would have been treated like any other prisoner of war: 
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that they had bombed the country would not be considered meritorious of harsher treatment. 
One German pilot who was shot down over France was killed, but only after first having 
opened fire himself when his plane crashed near locals on the ground. On the contrary in 
Britain First Sea Lord Baron John Fisher “proposed shooting a captured German civilian for 
each British civilian killed in a Zeppelin raid.” A combustible man, Fisher almost resigned 
following the rejection of this plan, and indeed did resign shortly afterwards following 
arguments with Churchill on another matter. Kennett goes on to state that in 1915, “coroner’s 
juries handling the deaths provoked by Zeppelin bombs brought in verdicts of “willful [sic] 
murder” against Kaiser Wilhelm.”85 There was an expectation that with further innovation and 
development aeroplanes could play a significant part in major war. This was not lost on 
military strategists, and as Richard Overy has argued, the character of war was changed by the 
First World War.86 A new form of warfare brought with it the necessity of assessing civil 
defence in the face of attack from above. While Great Yarmouth was the first British town to 
be bombed it had, like other seaside locations, always been more vulnerable to attack than 
locations inland. What was clear from the Zeppelin attacks particularly on London in 1917 was 
that Britain could no longer rely on its island character and powerful navy as a form of 
effective defence. In total the Zeppelin and Gotha raids caused over 1,200 deaths in Britain 
during the First World War. While they raised fears in Britain they did not result in a collapse of 
morale.87 
Although “Fortress Britain” had been breached by the German High Seas Fleet as early as 
December 1914, the use of powered aircraft opened up urban areas further inland to attack 
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and represented what Uri Bialer describes as a “loss of insular security”.88 Susan Grayzel notes 
further that the air raids broke down boundaries between the war and home fronts.89 This fact 
was recognised further afield than in Britain. As Peter Fritzsche has shown, the German 
councillor Rudolf Martin wrote as early as 1907: “To the extent that motorized air travel 
develops, England will cease to be an island.”90 That London could be targeted without the 
need for a land invasion was of great concern. General Jan Smuts with Prime Minister David 
Lloyd George was given the task of addressing the situation. The first part of the report was of 
immediate use, addressing as it did the implications of bombing for civil defence. Of greater 
long term importance however was the second part of Smuts’ report, in which he called for 
the creation of an independent air force. Air power, in his view, was the future of warfare.  
“And the day may not be far off,” he argued, “when aerial operations with their 
devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous centers on a vast 
scale may become the principal operations of war, to which older forms of military and 
naval operations may become secondary and subordinate.”91 
His conclusions were clear: the RFC and RNAS were already outdated, and should be replaced 
by an air force independent of the other sections of the military. He proposed the institution of 
an air ministry with control over all aspects of aerial warfare.92 
Italy and France led the way in their embrace of air power. Yet in the shape of the Royal Air 
Force (RAF) – founded on 1st April 1918 – Britain created the first air force which existed 
independently of army or navy control. Hugh Trenchard, who had ascended the ranks in the 
RFC before becoming Chief of the Air Staff, was greatly enthused by the potential of bombing 
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and championed the RAF over the following years. He recommended its use in the Middle East, 
as will be discussed later. Perhaps aware of the potential utility of air power in maintaining 
dominion and control over the newly enlarged Empire, the Air Ministry insisted that no 
German pilots be tried for war crimes pursuant to the attacks on London. To do so, they 
declared, would be to “place a noose round the necks of our airmen.”93 When the policy of 
aerial control was indeed adopted, first in Mesopotamia then the wider Middle East, there 
“was no sign of discomfort at the adoption of an approach to warfare which had so recently 
caused the Germans to be branded as barbarians.”94 Aerial bombardment was becoming an 
established practice.  
Theorists 
As discussed previously in the context of Futurism, a key figure in the development of the 
theory of aeroplanes as bombers was the Italian General Giulio Douhet. Best known for his 
1921 book Il Dominio Dell’Aria (later published in English as The Command of the Air) he was 
an early advocate of air power. From Gavotti’s bombing attack in November 1911 Douhet 
recognised the potential of aerial bombardment as a powerful weapon in future wars. That 
Douhet was a keen poet and playwright is evident from dramatic passages in his articles and 
lectures which he gave during the mid-1910s. In a lecture in Turin in January 1913, just over a 
year after the first aerial bombing took place, he referred to Gavotti and went on: “A new 
weapon arose: an air weapon; a new battlefield opened: the sky; so very present everywhere 
that a new event took place in the history of war: the principles of war in the air.” The 
following year, in an article entitled Futurism, Douhet wrote that: “All true geniuses of war ... 
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broke all past traditions, revolutionizing the present, anticipating the future.” By this stage the 
First World War was underway and Douhet continued through the war to call for large-scale 
investment in an independent aerial wing of the military. Largely ignored by a contemptuous 
army he was kept away from positions of real power during the war.95 
In his own words, Douhet had “been harping on this theme for years, and I intend to keep 
harping on it”. Il Dominio Dell’Aria promoted Douhet’s vision of a large air force as the focal 
point of the Italian military. The book and its significance have been much discussed 
elsewhere; it is useful though to restate the main arguments. Azar Gat succinctly sums up the 
key themes thus: “Air power is the offensive weapon par excellence. Whereas civilian 
populations had traditionally been protected by the army, air power now made it vulnerable to 
attack.” The second point is of particular significance. Douhet was certain that by targeting the 
enemy’s civilian centres from above it would be possible to quickly end their will to fight. This 
principle would become central to the bombing doctrine of Sir Arthur Harris, the man charged 
with leading the strategic bomber offensive on Germany in the second half of the Second 
World War. Douhet began to assert some influence in Britain during the 1930s before a 
translation of his work was published in 1942.96 Following Gavotti’s bombing attack in 
November 1911, Douhet recognised the potential of aerial bombardment and the importance 
in strategic terms of achieving supremacy in the air. He also noted, ominously, that aerial 
warfare would erase the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. By the time 
the second edition of Douhet’s book was published in 1926 the political landscape in Italy 
allowed his ideas more potential to be borne out in military strategy. Benito Mussolini became 
Prime Minister in 1922. Initially scathing of Futurism, he had later joined Marinetti in the push 
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for Italy to enter the First World War. They shared an enthusiasm for aeroplanes, and 
Mussolini was a keen supporter of the use of aeroplanes in warfare.97 
The following year the British military strategist J. F. C. Fuller published The Reformation of 
War. In it, he considered the prospect of aeroplanes playing a larger and more central role in 
future wars. He considered that air raids could only be considered immoral “if they cause 
greater harm than ground warfare”. Fuller though, crucially, while being in favour of bombing, 
did not believe that it could “produce an immediate victory”.98 
Douhet also found enthusiastic readers and contemporaries in Hugh Trenchard and Billy 
Mitchell, deputy director of the United States Army Air Service. Though Douhet’s work had not 
yet been published in English, Mitchell met the Italian in 1922 and soon after was quoting his 
work in internal Air Service papers. Trenchard and Mitchell had already met in 1917 and 
shared ideas on how to incorporate effective bombing into the prosecution of the war. By the 
start of the Second World War there was a clear philosophical difference between British and 
American bombing policy: while American doctrine held that precision bombing would be the 
focus, Trenchard supported the targeting of morale through civilian populations. “In practice”, 
writes Neillands, “the difference was small, but the difference in the underlying philosophy 
was considerable.”99 Indeed, according to Richard Overy, it was only the RAF that reached 
1939 believing that strategic bombing “would seriously act as a deterrent or, in the event of its 
use, so undermine enemy morale that it would force capitulation or the demoralization of 
enemy armed forces.”100 
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Other writers were less enthused than Douhet and Fuller by the prospect of greater use of 
aeroplanes in warfare. The British pacifist Helena Swanwick was worried by the developments, 
and foresaw a challenge. “The crime is in the total lack of international control which people 
have allowed to grow up: mankind is Frankenstein: science, especially the science of aviation is 
his monster. Can we learn to control it?”101 During the 1930s in Britain there were efforts, 
particularly from pacifists but with strong public support, to stop bombing. The book Challenge 
to Death edited by Storm Jameson was published in 1934. Among the more outlandish 
suggestions in it for ensuring an end to aerial bombardment was the proposal by Vernon 
Bartlett to ban the practise with the threat of transgressors being punitively bombed by all 
countries.102 In a psychological study Durbin and Bowlby argued that the only fast way to 
reduce the frequency and violence of war was to prevent aggression rather than cure the 
desire to kill. They prescribed action that was “immediate, coercive, and aimed at symptoms, 
the restraint of the aggressor by force.” The book also contained chaotic visions of London 
under attack from the air.103 Gerald Heard worried about “death in its most dreaded forms 
rushing down from the sky” and predicted a total societal breakdown. He warned, ominously: 
“One thing is clear : the nations are playing with fire to-day.”104 In the minds of those 
formulating military and colonial policy such questions were unimportant at the time. Not until 
the 1930s, with a second major conflict appearing to loom into view, did they begin to 
seriously consider how to combat attacks from above. In the meantime, the new type of 
warfare was too promising to ignore as a viable new way of controlling British colonies 
overseas.105 
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Imperial policing 
The end of World War One had seen the British Empire reach its greatest size and largest 
population. Yet the huge financial cost of the war, and the major defence spending cuts 
applied by Sir Eric Geddes, ensured that this would have to be managed on a reduced budget. 
With the new territory came the greater difficulty of how to maintain order cheaply and 
efficiently while simultaneously dealing with war-weariness accumulated by large-scale 
involvement on several fronts over the previous four years. Military and financial weakness 
placed particular strain on efforts to maintain control within the British Empire.106 Since the 
late part of the nineteenth century Britain had been fearful of being overtaken as the leading 
world power by Germany and the United States.107 The challenge of maintaining global 
supremacy with increased responsibilities and a decreased budget led to something of a power 
struggle as each wing of the armed forces sought primacy. Fewer people were joining the army 
in the post-war period, with reduced numbers at Sandhurst and Woolwich as parents became 
less keen for their sons to enlist. The army was in decline as the reality of a costly war and 
worldwide depression bit hard. According to Bond, “The atmosphere after 1918 was 
profoundly hostile to the very existence and purpose of soldiering.”108 These factors called for 
a new method of control; one which could put distance between British soldiers and the 
battlefield would be gladly welcomed. An opportunity to put air control to the test presented 
itself in early 1920, when the RAF was used to attack Mohammed Abdullah Hassan’s Dervishes 
in Somaliland. The swift success brought about by this exemplary action was also very cheap. 
Bond estimates that at a cost of £77,000 it ranks as “one of the cheapest wars in modern 
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history”.109 This can be contrasted with the mainly land-based response to revolt in the Arab 
world in 1920-1921. Led by the army with controlled support from the RAF, the cost of this 
campaign ran to £40,000,000.110 Other factors are at play here; it is not reliable for instance to 
extrapolate and say that the RAF alone would have achieved the same results for £77,000. 
Their campaign in Somaliland was, for example, on a smaller scale. Nonetheless the almost 
contemporaneous nature of these two put-downs of revolts reflected poorly on the ability of 
the army to contribute economically to imperial control. It is also representative of the times: 
financial constraints ensured that what might be seen as “closer” control that the army would 
offer was no longer possible. Fieldhouse writes: “The fact that the RAF was put in control of 
security in 1922 symbolized that this was a new situation in the colonial world, for aeroplanes 
could intimidate and punish, not rule.”111 Even champions of air power could not make that 
claim. The successful forays into aerial policing, coupled with the financial constraints of land 
campaigns, saw a move away from the “closer” control of the army to a more intimidating, 
punitive approach of air control.  
This success vindicated Trenchard’s faith in bombing as a policy and led to Churchill’s decision 
to hand the policing of Mesopotamia to the RAF. This was to be effective from October 1922. 
So successful was the move in controlling unrest that by 1928 the RAF was in charge of policing 
the whole of the Middle East.112 As Charles Townshend neatly observes, air power had the 
effect of “lengthening the arm of government while shortening its purse”.113 The policy was 
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not without its critics however. In 1921, shortly after the campaign in Somaliland, Secretary of 
State for War Sir Laming Worthington-Evans criticised Churchill’s use of air power. It was not 
possible, he argued, to win the minds of men while bombing their wives and daughters.114 But 
this sense of conflict with those being bombed was undermined by the more tangible conflict 
between the separate sectors of the armed forces. Flight Lieutenant Claude Pelly wrote a 
series of letters to his parents in March and April 1925 describing his involvement in the 
bombing of local tribes. “This is the first show that the RAF have done on their own here and if 
it comes off it’ll do us a lot of good – the army are frightfully jealous and are hoping we can’t 
do it. Well, we’ve practically done it.”115 The identity of, and impact on, the target of the 
bombing was subordinate to the power struggle within the British armed forces. 
The uncertainty surrounding bombing was not confined to the political arena. While Britain 
was able to use the bomber as one method of imperial control , at home the public remained 
unengaged with the new weapon. The RAF faced the challenge of how to sell air power to a 
hesitant public. Having been conceived in the midst of the First World War the reasons for its 
creation – the effort to counter raids at home and to take the fight against Germany to the air 
– were no longer present. With this in mind the Hendon Air Pageant was first held in 1920 to 
help convince the public. An annual event, there were several goals. The displays were 
intended to show the safety, value for money and power of the air force, as well as giving an 
opportunity to show off to foreign dignitaries. More abstract and harder to measure, 
organisers were also keen on, David Omissi writes, “making the public more ‘air-minded’”.116 
The aviation enthusiast George Holt Thomas had, before WWI, lamented as a “national 
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tragedy” the failure in Britain to embrace the new technology and despite the new found 
antipathy towards the army, it still had a greater profile than the RAF in public eye.117  
In terms of engaging a wider audience the pageant was hugely successful. Attendances were 
good: generally increasing each year and peaking at nearly 170,000 people in 1931. Many 
thousand more watched the display from the surrounding fields and hills in north London. 
Those in attendance either inside or outside the gates saw the pageant close each year with a 
set piece mirroring a real-life situation, such as the Somaliland campaign. With a notable 
current of racism, the natives under attack were depicted as underdeveloped and in need of 
British control, discipline and influence. David Omissi writes: “By turning Africans into objects 
the exhibitions made the subject races of empire seem less than human, part of an untamed 
wilderness which it was legitimate, even imperative, to conquer.”118 This echoes the attitude of 
Pelly who was more aware of the conflict between the air force and the army than discomfited 
by any notion of bombing civilians. Their emphasised “difference” reduced any potential wider 
outcry. The writer Gertrude Bell, watching a display, was impressed by the demonstration of 
potential:  
“They had made an imaginary village about a quarter of a mile from where we sat...and 
the first two bombs dropped from 3000 feet, went straight into the middle of it and set 
it alight. It was wonderful and horrible. Then they dropped bombs all round it, as if to 
catch the fugitives and finally fire bombs which even in the brightest sunlight made 
flares of bright flame in the desert. They burn through metal and water won’t extinguish 
them. At the end the armoured cars went out to round up the fugitives with machine 
guns. I was tremendously impressed.”119 
The pageant was staged for the last time in 1937 as the need for pilots to train for a potential 
real conflict became apparent. Omissi writes: “the public had become fearful of bombing, if 
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not exactly ‘air-minded’”.120 This was the year of Guernica, which as will be discussed shortly, 
helped bring home awareness of bombing to a wider audience in Britain. This new knowledge 
and fear helped confer greater legitimacy on the RAF which was now secure in its own right 
and guaranteed a part in future war, whenever that might begin. 
On the whole air control in the Middle East was considered a successful approach. Naturally 
these developments did not please those within the army, and this led to several years of cool 
relations between the two services. It was not until the latter stages of the Second World War 
that the army and the air force were genuinely cooperating with one another.121 The RAF was 
considered a young upstart which was diverting duties away from traditional methods of 
control. Bombing was also seen as a more brutal tactic than land campaigns, indiscriminately 
killing and therefore exceeding minimum force. Nonetheless, bombing native people was 
considerably cheaper than lengthier land campaigns, and the RAF defended bombing by 
arguing that it did in fact meet the legal criteria required. Mockaitis gives the example of a 
particularly successful “air blockade” on the Quteibi tribe in South Arabia. Air blockades were 
the practice of keeping tribes from normal life by bombing fields and disrupting daily life. The 
purpose was not to kill but to so disrupt daily life as to make surrender inevitable. In an 
attempt to force Quteibi leaders to give up suspected bandits the RAF dropped leaflets 
warning that air blockade would commence if those in question were not given up. When this 
did not yield results the air force bombed fields and a small number of buildings. By sustaining 
this approach daily life became impossible and ultimately the suspects were handed over. This 
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was cheap, and according to British records only seven people died throughout the campaign: 
all those fatalities caused by individuals tampering with unexploded bombs.122 
This changing atmosphere increased the RAF’s share of workload in military campaigns and, 
coupled with massively reduced funding, saw the army deteriorate through the 1920s.123 At 
the same time, accepting that the sites of the bombing attacks were too remote to arouse 
much attention back home, Townsend writes: “air control was a way of furthering such 
education [about what bombing could do] without impinging too sharply on civilized 
sensibilities.”124 Air power had its limitations however. Pretentions that the RAF could control 
the British Empire without ground support were swept away by unrest in Palestine. As Monroe 
argues, blockade and policing from the air “had worked in Iraq but was of no use in Palestine’s 
built-up areas.” This, and the fact that air control could not work to maintain order in Tel Aviv 
and Jerusalem, seems supportive of the contention that Britain was using aerial bombardment 
as a deterrent and without the intention of destroying civilian areas and their inhabitants.125 
Britain was far from alone in using aircraft to police its overseas territories. In the first half of 
the 1920s Spain – latterly joined by France – was involved in the second Rif War as they tried, 
ultimately successfully, to suppress the rebellion of Moroccan Berbers led by Abd el-Krim. It 
was during this period of war that American volunteer pilots (under French command) 
bombed the town of Chechaouen in northern Morocco. With the men of the town away 
fighting, the majority of those killed were women and children. Commentators have 
highlighted similarities between this attack and the one that followed twelve years later on 
Guernica. According to Sven Lindqvist, it was at Chechaouen “that the taboo against calling in 
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the air force of a foreign land to bomb one’s own territory was first broken – and the taboo 
against bombing a city full of defenceless civilians, as well. Chechaouen laid the foundation for 
Guernica.”126 Certainly the distinction between combatants and non-combatants was being 
eroded. In view of these links it is important to note that the young commander Francisco 
Franco – later to lead the Nationalist cause during the Spanish Civil War – was ascending the 
ranks in the Spanish army during this conflict. The spectre of racism was often found close to 
the heart of pro-bombing sentiment. King Alfonso XIII’s expectation that Abd el-Krim’s forces 
be suppressed as quickly and brutally as necessary to swiftly end the conflict is described by 
Balfour as “genocidal racism”.127 The charge of racism toward those bombed was also levelled 
at Arthur Harris and Hugh Trenchard with regards those living in the colonies Britain 
bombed.128 The words of one member of the RAF, Wing-Commander Gale, are particularly 
telling. “If the Kurds hadn’t learnt by our example to behave themselves in a civilised way then 
we had to spank their bottoms. This was done by bombs and guns.”129  
Unrest in South Africa 
With planes now increasingly used by states against civilians in colonies, the role of the 
bomber as a method of policing was becoming increasingly well established. Up to this point 
however states had only used bombing abroad. This changed in South Africa in the early 1920s 
with two particular events: the crushing of the Rand Revolt and the Bondelswarts Affair, both 
in the spring of 1922. Jan Smuts, by now Prime Minister of South Africa, was a keen supporter 
of aircraft as weapons; his report to the British Government having recommended their 
employment in future wars. He now turned to use aircraft against unruly South African 
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citizens. The Rand Revolt took place when, after several years of struggle for better pay and 
working conditions, miners took strike action in Johannesburg. After warnings in the press, air 
crews attacked with machine guns on a March morning and returned in the afternoon to drop 
bombs on those areas of the town populated by strikers. Krikler describes those on the ground 
as “hopelessly outgunned” by the “vicious exotica of aircraft” available to the authorities.130 
The targets were the striking white miners, but inevitably given the inaccuracy of the weapons, 
civilians suffered. The City Times described the scene thus: “It was a pitiful procession–panic-
stricken women hurrying along with their little children dragging at their skirts.”131 As Krikler 
further notes, bombing had an extra potency at this time: men shell-shocked by events in the 
Great War would be particularly scared by the bombers.132  
China and Abyssinia 
As the 1930s progressed the spectre of another European war began to loom large. Many 
expected another war to break out sooner rather than later and politicians and military 
strategists began to prepare more seriously for the outbreak of war. The Spanish Civil War was 
the event which brought the prospect of a global war to the British public. Yet other events in 
the 1930s also drew British observers and their views give an indication of increasing 
engagement with bombing. Through the 1930s Japan was aggressively pursuing expansion in 
China. By 1937 hostilities had escalated to outright war. Bombing planes were a key feature of 
the Japanese attack. Of bombing in the inter-war years, Richard Overy writes about the 
“mystique which made it both threatening and exhilarating at the same time.”133 W. H. Auden 
and Christopher Isherwood visited China during this period and their book, Journey to a War, 
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captures something of this paradox with appraisals of aerial bombing. They are explicit in their 
opposition to bombing as a policy. Yet the passages in which they address bombing that they 
witnessed do not give indications of outright fear. Rather bombing made them both nervous 
and excited. Isherwood writes: “It was as tremendous as Beethoven, but wrong – a cosmic 
offence, an insult to the whole of Nature and the entire earth. I don’t know if I was frightened. 
Something inside me was flapping about like a fish.” Later he describes being too distracted by 
books in the library of their host to watch (or presumably worry about) a big air-raid on the 
town. This indifference to the planes above them should not be read as acceptance of 
bombing as a legitimate form of warfare. A passage lamenting the dislocation, terror and 
perversion of normal life brought by war includes the line: “War is bombing an already disused 
arsenal, missing it, and killing a few old women.” Though evidently intrigued by the bombing 
they witnessed, here is a clear note of condemnation.134 
With imperial European powers already having used bombers in their colonies and in wars of 
expansion they had an idea of the potential of this new technology. As such the Italo-
Abyssinian war of 1935-1936 was not only important in Italian plans for colonial expansion into 
Africa. It also gave the Italian air force the opportunity to test the results of Douhet’s theories. 
In his biography of the journalist George Steer, Nicholas Rankin describes the war of 1935-
1936 as “the laboratory of air power.”135 I will return to Steer in more detail later as he was a 
key figure in the reporting of the Guernica raids, but his presence in Ethiopia during the war is 
also of significance. His time there produced a book, Caesar in Abyssinia, in which he describes 
the massive inequality between the respective fighting forces of the belligerent nations. Air 
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power gave Italy the opportunity to cause destruction and disarray with very limited risk to 
their own fighters.136 
Public opinion before the Second World War was hard to grasp and assess accurately.137 Yet 
the years preceding the Spanish Civil War had already given keener-eyed observers cause for 
great concern. If the bombing of Chechaouen went largely under the radar then there was an 
increasing awareness of foreign affairs – and of the use of aerial bombardment – in the years 
immediately running up to Guernica. Indeed, Daniel Waley saw the Italo-Abyssinian conflict as 
a marker on the path towards wider public consciousness of foreign affairs. He contends that 
the “general current of interested opinion in Britain can be diagnosed with some confidence. 
In the main it held that the Abyssinians were the wronged party; they were seen as victims of a 
stronger power and pitied as such.”138 We can also identify similar sentiments to those 
expressed by Auden and Isherwood in a published diary kept by J. W. S. Macfie of his time in 
the British Ambulance Service in Ethiopia. He writes dispassionately about the bombing and 
seems to exhibit little fear himself.139 Another member of the Ambulance Service, John Melly, 
was overtly scathing of both the Italians for their actions and the wider world for the lack of 
intervention. He wrote in a letter: “This isn’t a war, it’s the torture of tens of thousands of 
defenceless men, women and children with bombs and poison gas…and the world…passes by 
on the other side.”140 Sven Lindqvist has asserted that it was not until the bombing of Guernica 
that there came a new realisation amongst British people that they, as Europeans, could be 
targets. Guernica was indeed the event which sparked widespread public shock and outrage. 
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To others, more aware of world events, Guernica seems to represent a tipping point rather 
than a single isolated shock.141 
Whatever the criticism aimed at the aggression shown by Japan and Italy, the bombing which 
took place in China and Abyssinia respectively was not on a scale which would compare to 
another European war, were one to break out. This was recognised by the Chiefs of Imperial 
General Staff who predicted much worse for the increasingly likely Second World War. As Uri 
Bialer writes, there was an appreciation that neither conflict could be used an accurate guide 
as to what might happen in Europe: “neither these nor any other air raids of the second half of 
the 1930s had involved the huge concentration of aircraft that would be available in the event 
of an Anglo-German war.”142 Following the bombing of London during the First World War, the 
reports from Abyssinia and China ensured that anticipation of a war in the near future would 
include fear of heavy bombing in Britain. Bialer adds that by the early 1930s there was a 
growing awareness of an increased likelihood that Britain could be drawn into a European war, 
making this prospect “frighteningly real.” The awareness of a threat to civilians in Britain 
extended to “ordinary citizens”.143 These fears would soon increase given the larger number of 
international observers and much greater interest in the Spanish Civil War. 
Spain 
The Spanish Civil War aroused greater passions in Britain than any other conflict with an aerial 
element since the First World War. Geographical proximity to the theatre of war ensured 
comprehensive media coverage and high levels of public interest, while the presence of the 
International Brigades in Spain guaranteed strong political interest in Britain. Most people had 
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an opinion on the war and politicians, media outlets and members of the public chose sides 
quickly. Support for each side fluctuated with the fortunes of war. What is clear however is 
that the bombing of Spanish towns and cities, and Guernica in particular, carried more gravity 
than attacks in other parts of the world. With British attention already focused on Spain the 
April 1937 raids came both to symbolise the atrocities committed by Franco’s Nationalists (as 
the tide of public support turned towards the Republican cause Nationalist atrocities gained 
more attention, although both sides used terror during the war) and herald the real and 
terrifying age of aerial bombing.144 
In the early stages of the war photographic evidence of the material damage caused by the 
fighting was scarce. Susan Sontag has cast the Spanish Civil War as the end point of an era 
where war photography “seemed almost like clandestine knowledge.”145 She refers directly to 
Virginia Woolf’s 1938 essay Three Guineas, in which the author addresses the question of how 
war might be prevented. Referring to photographs sent to Britain by the Spanish government 
depicting the destruction caused, Woolf continually returns to the theme of dead bodies and 
ruined houses that are the feature of the photographs. These fit the mould that Bernhard 
Rieger describes of graphic reports on air accidents accompanied by photographs: the reports 
“noted the destructive violence of accidents and determined their impact on the human body 
and psyche.”146 In an early passage of Three Guineas Woolf describes a scene synonymous with 
war photography from WWII to conflict in the Middle East: that of a bombed house of which 
part still stands. The missing side of the house affords the viewer a glimpse of what life was 
like before it was torn apart by bombing: 
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“But certainly those are dead children, and that undoubtedly is the section of a house. A 
bomb has torn open the side; there is still a birdcage hanging in what was presumably 
the sitting-room, but the rest of the house looks like nothing so much as a bunch of 
spillikins suspended in mid-air.”147 
Again this is consistent with Rieger’s assessment of accident site reports and photographs: 
“Disaster scenes struck observers as disjointed sites of chaos.” In an echo of No Man’s Land in 
the First World War, the sites of accidents (and, presumably for Woolf, bomb sites) blur the 
borders “separating the world of the living and the realm of the dead.” Woolf continues later 
that our reaction to war binds us, for whatever the individual background we respond with 
“horror and disgust” to death and destruction. She writes that “our sensations are the same; 
and they are violent.”148 
Many of the themes of leftist concern for the events in Spain were voiced in the Duchess of 
Atholl’s book Searchlight on Spain which she began writing at the end of 1937. A firm 
supporter of the Republican cause, she notes the rapid change in General Franco’s spoken 
policy on bombing Madrid. In the middle of August 1936 the Nationalist leader “declared that 
he would never bombard Madrid on account of the innocent people living there.”149 Yet on 
30th October this policy changed with the beginning of “a period of air raids which hurled 
destruction on non-combatants, men, women and children, and spared neither churches, 
hospitals, nor even the Prado.”150 Another common complaint among British supporters of the 
Republicans was that in following a policy of non-intervention, the British government was in 
effect intervening on the side of the Fascists: by allowing evidence of German and Italian 
support for the Franco forces to go unchallenged the Republicans suffered. In a retrospective 
of Manchester Guardian coverage of the Spanish Civil War, the editors noted that the 
“majority of letters to the editor of the ‘Manchester Guardian’ were critical of the British 
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Government’s policy.”151 Atholl’s conclusion was bleak; she feared for the future of a 
Nationalist Spain: 
“General Franco’s complete disregard for international law or humanity brings home to 
us what the issues are for the Spanish people. His victory would mean the crushing of all 
the elements in Spain that stand for freedom, for peace, for culture, for human 
progress, and the handing over of a whole people to a reign of terror.”152 
It was during the Spanish Civil War that Nazi Germany, like other soon-to-be Second World 
War belligerents before them, had the chance to test their air force. Forbidden by the 
Versailles Treaty from producing or buying armed aircraft, they were unable to openly test the 
capability of those which were being built. With the Nazi government keen to ensure victory 
for Franco in the Spanish Civil War, German squadrons were sent to Spain to aid the 
Nationalist cause. Attacks were made against Madrid and Barcelona throughout the war and 
were focused on a number of Basque towns in the early months of 1937. Brett Holman wrote 
recently that the attack on Guernica was just one of a number during the Spanish Civil War 
which provoked fear of impending bombing back in Britain. Attacks on Barcelona aroused 
particular concern due to the perceived “large city” link between Barcelona and London.153 In 
1938 John Langdon-Davies, who worked as a war correspondent during the Spanish Civil War, 
suggested specifically that the air raids on Barcelona gave an insight into what an attack on 
London might be like.154 Yet the attack on Guernica in late April 1937 is most apt for 
consideration here for the outrage caused at the destruction of a small town. As Richard Overy 
writes: “No single event played as large a part in confirming for the European public that the 
bombing of cities and civilians was now to be an established part of modern warfare.”155 The 
number of people killed in the raid remains unclear: current estimates suggest a total of 
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between 200 and 300, with many hundred more injured. Much of the town centre was 
destroyed. The details of the attack have been comprehensively discussed elsewhere but it is 
worth discussing the key details.156  
An air base near to Guernica hosted German planes under the command of Wolfram Freiherr 
von Richtofen. On 26th April – market day in Guernica – German planes attacked the town. At 
this point in the war Guernica had not previously been bombed and, not considered a likely 
target, did not contain any air defences. The majority of the bombs fell on the centre of the 
town, and left the supposed target, the Rentería Bridge, untouched. There was theoretically a 
military rationale in targeting Guernica: it was a communications centre close to the front. 
Nonetheless this fact alone does not explain the severity of the attack. Stuka dive bombers, 
the most accurate planes then available to von Richtofen, were not used, and the Rentería 
Bridge was not damaged by the attack. Hugh Thomas argues that at least in part, civilian panic 
must have been an aim of the attacks. Much of the horror at bombing in this period and 
beyond often came from the realisation that bombers could not with any accuracy distinguish 
between combatants and non-combatants, nor were they intended to.157 Since Spanish 
citizens were the victims of new technology now available to bomb much more 
comprehensively than during the First World War, Esenwein and Shubert describe this as the 
first de facto area bombing of European citizens.158 
Guernica, by virtue of its location in a western European country, immediately caught the kind 
of widespread attention that escaped the Italian campaign in Abyssinia and the Japanese 
attacks on Manchuria. While Ethiopia and China were too remote to have a serious impact in 
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Britain, Spain was a relative neighbour.159 In a letter to the Manchester Guardian ostensibly 
about the realities of non-intervention H. Smalley from Chipstead in Surrey voiced the genuine 
fear that Guernica symbolised for the British:  
“The ‘front line’ of democratic civilisation was once in far Manchuria, but through the 
incompetence of our politicians and the perfidy of the diplomats it shifted to Abyssinia, 
and again, owing to the democratic countries being betrayed by their Governments, it is 
now in Spain – nearer and nearer it creeps.” 160 
The final five words chillingly echo the growing fear that British citizens would soon be the 
victims of aerial bombardment. 
The bombing of Guernica brought with it clear reason to evaluate bombing attacks differently. 
The circumstances and the aftermath highlight three key reasons why it has come to represent 
the unacceptable targeting of civilians and why an understanding of the bombing of Guernica 
can help inform attitudes to bombing during the Second World War. Several British 
newspapers picked up the story from Guernica but it is the reports in The Times which have 
become best known. Due to the on-going Spanish Civil War, the South African-born British 
reporter, George Steer, was in Bilbao when the attack was carried out. Paul Preston describes 
Steer as having become more “foolhardy”161 since the early death of his wife Marguerite in 
January that year; a contention with which Steer’s biographer Nicholas Rankin agrees: “Steer 
did take chances in the Basque war, running more risks than the other journalists because he 
felt he had less to lose than they did.” He drove immediately to Guernica upon hearing of the 
attacks to see the damage caused by the bombing. Recognising the severity of the damage he 
wrote a report on the raid which appeared in The Times shortly thereafter. In doing so he 
offered the British public a first opportunity to learn about the grim details of the bombing.162 
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These reports made the greatest contribution to the shocked response to the raids. Steer 
carefully described the history of the town before contrasting it with the effects of the raids. 
“[W]hen I visited the town the whole of it was a horrible sight, flaming from end to end.” Steer 
was also quick to set the attack into a broader historical narrative: 
“In form of its execution and the scale of the destruction it wrought, no less than in the 
selection of its objective, the raid on Guernica is unparalleled in military history. 
Guernica was not a military objective. Guernica was not a military objective. A factory 
producing war material lay outside the town and was untouched. So were two barracks 
some distance from the town. The town lay far behind the lines. The object of the 
bombardment was seemingly the demoralization of the civil population and the 
destruction of the cradle of the Basque race.”163 
Over the course of the next few days Steer continued to send reports from the scene. So vivid 
were the images he described – outlining the suffering of those under attack – and so damning 
of German involvement, that The Times’ “carefully built reputation” in Germany was damaged 
and their correspondent Norman Ebbutt was expelled from Germany.164 Steer’s first article 
was supported by an editorial which did little to smooth relations: 
It is a tragic story – the pitiless bombardment of a country town, the centre of Basque 
tradition and culture, by an air fleet which encountered no resistance and did practically 
no damage to the scanty military objectives beneath it. The planning of the attack was 
murderously logical and efficient.165 
Paul Preston ranks Steer’s first report from Guernica among the three most important articles 
to be written during the war, and as having “more political impact” than any other.166 Robert 
Stradling, meanwhile, argues that Steer’s reports turned Guernica into the key event which 
shifted British public opinion about the Spanish Civil War.167 
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Steer’s reports are certainly the most famous from Guernica, but The Times was not the only 
newspaper to pick up the story. The Manchester Guardian, which five months before Guernica 
had noted that: “For German airmen, Spain at war is regarded as an excellent training 
ground”,168 inadvertently previewed its own later coverage of the Dresden bombings with 
hard-hitting reports that did not dodge detail. After their initial report appeared under a 
headline calling the raid a “massacre”, the newspaper went on the following day to quote at 
length from a representative of the Basque Government in Paris. The statement was not 
intended to be nuanced: readers of the Manchester Guardian were given a frank assessment 
of the horror of the raids. Germany, supported by Italy, was, according to the statement: 
“conducting against us the most hideous and monstrous war of destruction that history has 
ever known.” It continues to allege that “their plan is to exterminate the civilian population of 
the Basque provinces so as to terrify Bilbao into surrendering to them.” The report also stated: 
“There is no escape from this horrible massacre. At Guernica, now a heap of ruins, they have 
destroyed the hospital, and all the wounded have been burned to death.” Incidentally, this 
report also describes the “greatest feeling of anger in Paris”; significant as this was where the 
artist Pablo Picasso was based at the time. His part in the story will be examined shortly.169 
Two days after this report the Manchester Guardian gravely reported the implications of the 
attacks. “Guernica may be regarded as the most glaring example – more glaring even than the 
Italian methods in Abyssinia – of the full application of the ‘totalitarian war’ principle in so far 
as such a war must take no humanitarian considerations of any kind into account.” The same 
piece carried a quote from a survivor of the raids, who ended by declaring it “nothing but a 
horrible bonfire”.170 
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As important as the presence of these reports are the letters to editors which appeared in the 
days and weeks following the Guernica attacks. Of the two major newspapers already 
discussed, the letters to the Manchester Guardian are most striking in their condemnation of 
the air raids. Peter Green, Canon of Manchester lamented what he saw as the epitome of 
“modern war”. It was an “awful massacre” of “innocent non-combatants”. Fearful of an 
unstable future, he warned: “If a European war comes, as seems all too likely, the scenes in 
Guernica will be repeated in every big town in Europe”. With reference to this letter a few 
days later, G. A. Sutherland voices succinctly the argument that Guernica marked the 
frightening new dawn of age of aerial bombardment. “This is not something horrible that 
happens in the uncivilised world; as Canon Peter Green says, it is modern war.” He was careful 
to point out too that though British people were rightly appalled by the events, their military 
was also building bombers. In the coming age of mass destruction from the skies, Britain was 
preparing for an active role. Basil Martin of Finchley Unitarian Church, north London, makes a 
similar point. “Why is it right for us to make bombs and wrong for others to use them? The 
horror I can understand, but not the righteous indignation.”171 
In The Times, A. Ruth Fry, the prominent pacifist campaigner, linked the attacks on Guernica to 
British attacks on India.172 Another correspondent focused on the threat aerial bombing 
carried to cultural centres.  
“Then we think of modern warfare. If a great war broke out, the loveliest cities in the 
world, such as Florence and Venice, and others which are storehouses of incomparable 
treasures like Paris and London, might, in a week or two, be lying as low as Guernica. 
The whole world would be the loser.”173 
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Less sympathetic to the plight of the citizens of Guernica was Hugh B. C. Pollard of 
Billingshurst, Sussex. Noting the arms industry in the town he argued that: “There need be 
little sentiment for them” before signing off: “They are simply reaping what they have sown.” 
The reference was to the arms factory in the town in which some local people worked. He was 
rebuked however on the letters page two days later by Frank Milton of the Reform Club, 
London. Milton, who stated that Steer’s report: “made one nearly physically sick”, highlighted 
the failure of Pollard to address the fact that while a small number of people in Guernica 
manufactured arms, the victims of the attacks were ordinary townspeople. His closing retort to 
Pollard raises a smile:  
“If it should ever happen (which heaven forbid) that the little town of Billingshurst 
should be razed to the ground and the excuse be given that certain persons in that part 
of Sussex were Communists, I hope that, as the avenging bombs fall on his house, Major 
Pollard will remember to take a realistic and not a sentimental view of the situation.”174 
The sentiments of Milton, not Pollard, were the norm: an indication of the effect of the 
Guernica raids on the British public. 
Soon after the attack Pablo Picasso, low on inspiration for a picture he had been commissioned 
to paint for the upcoming Paris World Fair, found his subject. He painted Guernica, which 
would become one of the most iconic artworks of the twentieth century. For Dietmar Süss, it 
was Picasso who brought the subject of aerial warfare to wide public attention, while for art 
historian Ellen C. Oppler, the painting would “make the name Guernica symbolise the barbaric 
destructiveness of war for decades to come.”175 In two separate exhibitions around the end of 
1938 approximately 18,000 members of the British public went to see the picture.176 Preston 
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states that: “with the aid of Picasso’s searing painting, it is Guernica that is now remembered 
as the place where the new and horrific modern warfare came of age.”177 
Guernica therefore had George Steer and Pablo Picasso to bring details of the events to a wide 
audience. They are two of the reasons for its prominence in the discourse on civilian bombing. 
While the physical detail of this attack is similar in nature to a number of other raids in the 
previous two decades, the works of a journalist and an artist brought considerably more 
attention to Guernica. As important however is the third reason, concerning the location of the 
attack: not Spain specifically but Europe. Hitler and Mussolini’s bombers had proved that the 
methods used to ‘police’ the ‘savages’ in far-flung colonies could just as easily by used on 
European civilians. Bombing, until recently a tool of control which elicited intrigue as much as 
it did fear, was thrust into the minds of a concerned public in Britain. As concerns that 
imminent world war was inevitable became more deeply rooted, they were entwined with the 
fear of bombs falling. Guernica had the effect of making bombing appear real to the British 
public, who were suddenly aware that they too could be targets. That planes could destroy a 
town so quickly seemed to support the words of then Lord President of the Council, Sir John 
Anderson. He described aerial bombardment as: “not a mere development of something 
already known. It is something quite outside all human experience; and this is only the 
beginning.”178 
The international outrage provoked by the story caused great discomfort within the controlling 
ranks of the Nationalists. While Franco had approved bombing as a policy and enthusiastically 
welcomed the support of German and Italian pilots, he was reported to be furious at the 
consequences of the Guernica raids. What followed over the next days and months was denial 
from the Nationalists that the town had been bombed, instead passing responsibility onto the 
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Basques themselves. This lie was maintained, if scarcely believed anywhere, until Franco’s 
death in 1975.179 
In so many ways Guernica represents not only the worst outrage so far but also a warning of 
much worse to follow. For Germany, it represented a successful experiment in bombing. Like 
the experiments in colonies in the Middle East earlier, which Geoff Simons describes as “useful 
laboratories for new weapons” for Britain, Germany had proved the power of the Luftwaffe.180 
Adding the activities of the French and Italian forces in their areas of colonial interest, these 
four major European powers had the results of experimentation with air power by the start of 
the Second World War. Another particular significance of the Guernica attack was the 
confirmation of British assumptions that in the next major conflict aerial bombardment would 
be an inescapable factor. Illusions to the contrary had been increasingly hard to maintain, and 
were definitively shattered by Guernica and evidence of German involvement. Initial noises 
from Germany had seemed to show willingness on Hitler’s part to negotiate over how to 
ensure civilian centres were not targeted by bombers in war. He later went on to speak of the 
possibility of gradually moving towards the total banning of bombing, to the extent that 
bombers would no longer be built. Quite apart from fact that Hitler was already rearming 
Germany in contravention of the Versailles Treaty, the suggestion in itself was disingenuous 
given Germany’s then weaker air force (although this gap was narrowing): a ban on aerial 
bombardment would on balance strengthen Germany in any conflict with Britain and 
France.181 Indeed, that air staff did not expect an agreement to materialise is evident from two 
key factors. First was the contention that from 1935 onwards, expansion to the RAF was 
reactive to the growth of the Luftwaffe: recognition that Germany was now a likely enemy in 
the short-term future. Second are the words from a memorandum of late the following year. 
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In it appears a passage which may have been interpreted as an appraisal of possible enemy 
actions, but could equally be a dose of realism as to how Britain would conduct another war.  
 “It is necessary to face the fact that in war ethical considerations in themselves have 
ultimately no force. Past experience suggests therefore that the sole criterion by which 
any method will ultimately be judged is “Will it win the war or at least avert defeat?””182 
Following the general success of British aerial policy above the Middle East, it does not seem 
far-fetched to think that at least to some extent, here members of air staff were already 
considering how a bombing offensive would be used in another conflict. If the comment was 
borne at least in part out of scepticism over the faithfulness of Hitler’s words, it was not 
misplaced. His pilots had destroyed Guernica, and in doing so, ensured that, in the words of 
the journalist Frank Pitcain: “International fascism was beginning to show its hand.”183 Hitler 
later used a speech in the Reichstag in February of the following year to backtrack from any 
possibility of air agreement. This supports what Carr states: the attack on Guernica showed 
what a war with Germany might be like. “[T]o those who felt the aggressor might be Hitler’s 
Germany, Guernica, as a Foreign Office official scribbled in the margin of a dispatch, ‘told us 
what to expect from the Germans’.”184 As David Edgerton writes: “In the 1930s the effect of 
bombing was assumed to be terrible and decisive.” Here at last was evidence of what it might 
actually be like.185 Indeed, as Terence O’Brien and Michele Haapamaki have shown, the effects 
of bombing in Spanish towns and cities offered lessons which were used in Air Raid Precaution 
planning in Britain to estimate the impact an attack on British cities might have.186 
There is some disagreement both over how aware the British public was of the conflicts in 
China and Abyssinia as compared to the Spanish Civil War, and also over how significant the 
bombing of Guernica would appear in Britain. Some historians have argued that British people 
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were, for the most part, unaware or at least largely unmoved by the battles further afield; that 
the Spanish Civil War woke many to the severity of wars overseas. Tom Buchanan for example 
contends that events in China and Abyssinia were too remote to have a notable effect on 
British opinion.187 Richard Aldrich suggests on the other hand that all these conflicts away from 
Britain, relayed home as they were on newsreels, were the stimulus for many people to keep 
diaries.188 Guernica has certainly now entered into a more popular conscience, and as Dave 
Boling wrote in the final pages of his recent novel, the raid “remains at the taproot of the 
assaults against civilian populations that the world still grieves on an all too regular basis.”189  
What is important to note here is that several commentators writing before the Second World 
War described the apparent stoicism with which civil populations dealt with aerial 
bombardment. The American correspondent H. Edward Knoblaugh reported citizens of Madrid 
being more scared by the constant air raid sirens than the actual raids and the Duchess of 
Atholl suggested that they knew worse would follow if they surrendered. “Neither bombs nor 
shells nor shortage of food or arms, therefore, could shake the defence.” She highlighted the 
fact that work continued in the city despite the conditions, and professed amazement at the 
“fortitude” of the Basques in the face of bombing in Durango, Eibar, Bilbao and Guernica.190 
Knoblaugh does paint a picture of panic and distress, but does not indicate that people were 
close to submission.191 Such a clear set of examples from different arenas of war may have 
appeared irrelevant to British military thought at the time, but they should not have been. 
That Arthur Harris would later concentrate so obsessively on landing devastating, knock-out 
blows from the air is jarring given these examples. No proof existed in all the varied bombing 
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campaigns from Libya in 1911 to Spain on the eve of WWII that a knock-out blow could be 
achieved from the air. Even the massive assault on Guernica did not bring about a speedy 
victory: the war would continue for almost two more years. 
What it did do was give British observers a clear demonstration of the power of aerial 
bombing. As Europe seemed inevitably headed for another major war the bombing of 
Guernica simultaneously raised awareness and fears of bombing in this country. Further, it cast 
a shadow over WWII which ensured greater scrutiny of the bombing campaigns which would 
play such a large and relentless role in the war. 
Uncertain future 
In January 1939 Winston Churchill wrote an article on the bombing of Spanish towns. A year 
and a half before his ascent to the position of British Prime Minister he used this opportunity 
to denounce the usefulness of such attacks. In Spain, as in China, he wrote that the effect of 
bombing had been “to animate and exhilarate the whole people.” It was a point he would 
repeat in another article later that year. The impact bombing had upon morale was, rather 
than dampening, one which created unity and resistance within the bombed communities:  
The citizen who sees his cottage, his tenement, his home wrecked and his small 
belongings destroyed; who sees his wife maimed or child killed or worse, does not, in 
the virile races of the world, react toward surrender. He reacts towards resistance. He 
rises into fury. And fury in a righteous cause against intolerable wrong has not always 
proved vain. Therefore, in this dire strait to which the once-hopeful world of the 
nineteenth century has been reduced, we may, if the worst comes to the worst, say: 
“Let the tyrant criminals bomb.”192 
Churchill’s views upon this matter would evidently change as the Second World War took hold 
in Europe. Answering a question he posed on whether mass aerial bombardment could be 
used to “conquer a great nation”, he was dismissive. “I do not believe it will be tried because I 
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do not believe it would succeed, and because intelligent men, however inhuman their mood, 
probably realise that it would not succeed.”193 
The shattering of Guernica roused the west to the possibility that they too could be targeted in 
aerial warfare. The fear of bombing through the 1930s seems to have led to an overestimation 
of German capabilities. Bond describes the widespread “obsession”, and indeed “delusion”, of 
“an immediate all-out German air attack”. He argues that:  
“[M]ost of the Cabinet ministers believed in September 1938 that war would begin with 
a massive German air attack on Britain…No one, it seems, seriously questioned whether 
Germany even had the intention, let alone the capability, of beginning a major war in 
this fashion.”194  
George Orwell, writing at the time, feared that the British population would not be fully 
alerted to the danger of aerial bombardment until the first bombs fell on Britain. Having 
returned from Spain, where European citizens had first experienced terror bombing, he 
describes an England far removed from the Spanish turmoil; a peaceful and slow-moving 
country untouched by conflict. From this state Orwell “fear[ed] that we shall never wake till we 
are jerked out of it by the roar of bombs.”195 He does however appear to be writing about 
traditional Arcadian England: the green and pleasant land comfortably removed from the 
hectic pace of London. In this section of the country Guernica was the event which translated 
fears into reality. Tom Buchanan writes: “British opinion, already in a subdued panic due to the 
fear of mass destruction from the air, now for the first time witnessed the reality in terms 
easily transferrable to British towns.”196  
In either case, there would not be long to wait. Although in the early years of the war Britain 
and Germany engaged in mutual destruction by aerial bombardment, the course of the war 
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diverted German effort away from the bombing of Britain. Bomber Command continued to 
destroy German cities until the final months of the war. How this was received in Britain would 
be determined by several factors, including knowledge of bombing during the period described 
in this chapter. It is to Germany that the focus of this thesis will shortly turn, and to how British 
people responded to the early raids on Germany. 
This chapter has charted a rapid development of aerial bombardment in less than thirty years. 
From Gavotti’s ad hoc experiment through campaigns of colonial control by imperial powers, 
bombing developed to the point in 1937 that showed how a town could be effectively and 
quickly destroyed from above. It was at this point, with the devastating raids of Guernica, that 
the fearful possibilities of aerial warfare became more widely understood in Britain. With the 
outbreak of war in 1939 the portents were clear, and citizens of countries across Europe would 
quickly come to witness first-hand the effects of aerial bombardment. 
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Chapter 2 – Coventry, Mannheim, and the Question of Reprisals 
On the night of 16th December 1940, RAF Bomber Command attacked the south-western 
German city of Mannheim. 34 people died in the raid, a fraction of the number killed in 
German cities on a regular basis later in the war. Damage was limited by the inaccuracy of the 
bombing. Yet the symbolic significance of this raid far outweighed the meagre results. This was 
the first British experiment in area bombing: the move from targeting pure military 
installations to the deliberate attempt to destroy the larger part of a built-up area.  
The bombing of Mannheim took place during the height of the Blitz on British cities by the 
German air force. In the middle of November Coventry was attacked on a huge scale. 568 
people were killed in the raid and major damage was caused to buildings across the city. One 
in twelve houses were destroyed.197 The attack on Mannheim was, officially, a response to the 
attack on Coventry.198 The Blitz would continue until the second half of May 1941. Two months 
later the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill addressed a large audience at County Hall in 
London. He told them of the desire to strike back at the Reich on an even greater scale. To 
applause, he told the audience that this was what the British people were calling for: 
“We ask no favours of the enemy. We seek from them no compunction. On the 
contrary, if tonight the people of London were asked to cast their vote as to whether a 
convention should be entered into to stop the bombing of all cities an overwhelming 
majority would cry, “No. We will mete out to the Germans the measure, and more than 
the measure that they have meted out to us.””199 
This chapter will examine in particular the level and nature of the response to the raid on 
Mannheim. More widely, there will be a focus on the extent to which the shift from latent 
fears to first-hand experience of bombing during the Blitz translated into coherent views on 
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the simultaneous bombing of Germany, and the ways that it was manifested. The chapter will 
also show that the early experimentation with area bombing was approved by Churchill and 
the War Cabinet. Churchill’s statement, that British people favoured a robust and expansive 
bombing campaign against German cities will be tested with regards to evidence of British 
opinion on reprisals at the time. 
Guernica to Mannheim 
By 1939 war loomed large on the horizon. The previous chapter showed how events 
particularly in Spain made science fiction predictions of mass destruction from the air appear 
real, and Uri Bialer has demonstrated how the increased use of air power impacted on politics 
during the 1930s. Stanley Baldwin’s famous claim in 1932 that “the bomber will always get 
through” took the form of a grim warning rather than a threat.200 The bombing of Guernica 
and other civilian centres in Spain brought the spectre of mass destruction from the skies into 
sharp focus. Richard Overy describes the “raw nerve” touched in Britain by the fusing of 
knowledge about the effects of aerial bombardment in Spain and the increasing certainty that 
war would soon break out in Europe. Around the world a terrifying new form of warfare was 
being used against civilians, and there was now a very real prospect of this being experienced 
by the British population. Overy writes: “of all the elements of modern warfare bombing 
promised an apparently swift and irrevocable end to the civilised world.”201 Following the 
Munich crisis in 1938, 38 million gas masks were issued to British homes.202 The atmosphere of 
“gloom” was mirrored by the press around the time of the declaration of war.203 
                                                          
200 Bialer, The Shadow of the Bomber. For discussion of the Baldwin speech, see pp. 14-15. 
201 Overy, The Morbid Age, 334. 
202 Süss, Death from the Skies, 43. 
203 Curran and Seaton, Power Without Responsibility, 128. 
78 
 
Yet in his autobiography the historian Eric Hobsbawm describes how on his return to England 
in mid-1939 a form of acceptance had taken hold. Michele Haapamaki describes a “quiet 
resignation” with which war was met after the uncertainty and fears of the 1930s. Such fears 
of war had necessarily given way to material preparations for aerial attack. By 1939 the British 
people were, according to Hobsbawm, “surrounded by the visible landscape of aerial warfare, 
the corrugated iron of shelters, the barrage balloons tethered like herds of silver cows in the 
sky. It was too late to be afraid.”204 Indeed, the new visual, political and technological 
landscape often brought excitement. This has already been highlighted in the work of Auden 
and Isherwood in the previous chapter, where they describe the bombardment they witnessed 
as being “as tremendous as Beethoven”.205  It can be seen again in the early war years as 
Britain adapted to life under the threat of aerial bombardment.  
After an early flurry of bombing activity by both Britain and Germany subsided there was little 
similar action into the winter of 1939-1940 as both sides settled into the Phoney War. As this 
continued into 1940 the inactivity had a corrosive effect on home front morale: according to E. 
S. Turner this period had “all the exasperations of war, but no war.”206 Webster and Frankland 
outline British policy during this period as being one of caution. During the autumn “lull” in 
direct hostilities between Germany on the one side, and Britain and France on the other, the 
RAF was to hold fire. The policy would change in the event of German action which “looks like 
being decisive.” This would provoke heavy attacks on the industrial heartland of the Ruhr. The 
near-certainty of heavy civilian loss of life meant it would have to have been preceded by 
similar loss of life caused by German bombing or land advance.207 In any case air conflict was 
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not extensive at this stage and pre-war fears of immediate massive aerial attacks proved 
unfounded. In April 1940 Air Minister Sir Samuel Hoare stated the government’s position on 
bombing German cities: “We will not bomb open towns. We will not attempt to defeat the 
Germans by terrorising their women and children. All that we will leave to the enemy.”208 
On the night of 16th March 1940 the Luftwaffe carried out an attack on a major British naval 
base located in Scapa Flow. The location, a body of water in the Orkney Islands off the north 
coast of Scotland, had been bombed the previous autumn. Like the raids on Mannheim which 
would take place at the end of that year, the actual damage caused by the March attack at 
Scapa Flow was outweighed by its significance. The raid caused the first British civilian death 
and provoked a response by the RAF three nights later. Fifty bombers were dispatched to 
bomb a seaplane base at Hörnum, on Sylt, an island close to the Danish border. The damage 
was minimal but these two attacks marked the beginning of a pattern of attack and counter-
attack; action and counter-action: a pattern into which the bombings of Coventry and 
Mannheim also fell.209 
It was not however until September, and developments in what would later be termed the 
Battle of Britain, that the intensity of night attacks on cities was increased. As Richard Overy 
writes, the Battle of Britain was one of a number of German tactics of aggression towards 
Britain: it was not to be the one single factor intended to force Britain to “give up”.210 Stephen 
Bungay argues that it was Hitler’s fear of the Royal Navy, rather than the achievements of RAF 
Fighter Command, which ultimately proved to be the bar against the invasion of Britain. 
Against a backdrop of high fighter losses on both sides in late August and early September, 
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German tactics were shifted to favour night-bombing of industrial cities from 7th September.211 
Both sides were now increasing the weight of their bombing attacks and wheels were fully set 
in motion for the attacks on Coventry and Mannheim. Over a period of eight months British 
cities endured the Blitz as the Luftwaffe carried out raids night after night. London was 
bombed on 76 consecutive nights; half of the 40,000 who died did so in London. It was a raid 
on Coventry on the night of 14th/15th November which was pivotal in setting the future course 
of the bombing war. The city was undoubtedly a military target, housing as it did munitions 
factories. It had air-defences and had been bombed before. Yet the ferocity of the attack, 
which destroyed much of Coventry city centre, marked it out as qualitatively different to 
attacks on other cities. The scale of destruction and chaos was such as to give the RAF a 
blueprint for attacks on German towns – and the air chiefs soon set about planning a reprisal. 
A month after the raid on Coventry the RAF carried out its first area bombing of a German city. 
Though not greatly successful, the raid on Mannheim on 16th December 1940 marked a change 
in the nature of a bombing campaign which continued until the very closing stages of war. 
Robin Neillands writes: “The high ideals with which the RAF and the British government had 
entered the war were being rapidly eroded by the realities of the conflict”.212 The city – not 
what was in it – was now the target. The destruction of Hamburg and Dresden were the 
ultimate expression of area bombing, built on the back of methods of colonial control; of 
attacks on Chechaouen and Guernica. In Mannheim the RAF, having developed its techniques 
in control of the British Empire, made its first wartime contribution to area bombing . 
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Historiography 
Mannheim occupies a curious place in the historiography of the bombing offensive against 
Germany. In the Official History of the campaign, published in 1961, the communications sent 
between the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet in London and Bomber Command in High 
Wycombe ahead of the Mannheim raid are probed. The authors Charles Webster and Noble 
Frankland describe the attack, clearly, as “the first ‘area’ attack of the war”; “a new 
departure.”213 Later the authors state that the raid on Mannheim became a model for attacks 
on Berlin, Hanover, Bremen, Cologne and Hamburg in the early months of 1941.214 This book 
has served as a starting point for historians of the bombing campaign, yet only occasionally is 
the raid on Mannheim addressed. Even Frankland, in an individually authored book on the 
bombing offensive published four years after the Official History, chooses not to mention 
Mannheim when addressing the decision to shift towards area bombing.215  
In 1979 Max Hastings wrote that “[t]he Mannheim operation was an isolated episode that 
winter, but it was a foretaste of much that was to come.” This highlights an important issue in 
the story of the area bombing campaign. The December 1940 attack on Mannheim was, 
plainly, an exercise in area bombing. Hastings traces its importance in the build-up to a full 
area bombing policy, noting it as a marker Churchill used when assessing the bombing 
campaign through the winter of 1940-1941. Yet it was at that stage an experiment. Area 
bombing as a fully adopted policy did not come into being until 1942, and this may explain (if 
not really justify) the reluctance to place Mannheim squarely within the narrative.216 In 
histories of the period in which the aerial bombardment of Germany is tangentially relevant, 
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the general consensus is to depict area bombing as having begun in 1942. As an approved 
policy this is true, but by default it writes out of history the earlier experimentation.217 Hastings 
and Norman Longmate both buck this trend, at least to a degree. Longmate, writing in 1983, 
describes the new tactic of aiming at a built up area in Mannheim. “Area bombing, though still 
not acknowledged as such, had arrived.”218  
In line with a wider historiographical trend of considering the impact of the Second World War 
on German civilians, the bomber offensive has come under increasing scrutiny in recent 
years.219 Mannheim retains its position as a touchstone for commentators but there is a sense 
of either reluctance or ambivalence towards full engagement with the significance of the raid. 
Even Jörg Friedrich, whose book The Fire is highly condemnatory of the Allied bombing 
campaign, is reserved in his judgment of the Mannheim raid. He does not mark the event 
explicitly as a step on the road to Hamburg and Dresden.220 Two books which have contributed 
to the growing dialogue about the bomber war, but which typify the muted interpretation of 
Mannheim, are A. C. Grayling’s Among the Dead Cities and Nicolson Baker’s Human Smoke. 
Baker addresses the bombing and the preparations for it, and in doing so ensures his work 
departs from the work of other historians who do not reference the raid at all. Yet in spite of 
the evidence cited Baker does not present the raid as a decisive moment in the history of the 
aerial war.221  Equally surprising is Grayling’s approach. With reference to the Official History 
he discusses the impact of the raid on Coventry: explicitly, as shall be detailed below, the 
precursor to Mannheim. Further, Grayling includes an appendix listing the schedule of RAF 
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bombing attacks on Germany. The vast majority of these are presented with no comment: 
merely the date and location of the raid along with the size of the force sent on the mission 
and the number of aeroplanes lost. Casualty figures are presented for some of the more 
sizeable raids in the second half of the war, but of the raids in 1940 and 1941 only Mannheim 
is afforded any greater detail. In brackets after the name of the city, Grayling writes: “first RAF 
area bombing”. The significance, considering the aim of the book,222 should be great, yet this is 
the only mention this attack on Mannheim is given throughout the work.223 The raid on 
Mannheim should be seen as the beginning of the area bombing campaign, rather than a 
precursor to it. Patrick Bishop begins to touch on why this should be case in his book Bomber 
Boys, without seemingly asserting that it is the case. He highlights the significance of the 
bomb-loads on the planes sent to attack the city, containing as they did a greater than normal 
proportion of heavy bombs and incendiaries. It was, he argues, “the shape of things to 
come.”224 It is important that we start to place greater emphasis on the intention of the attack. 
The lack of material damage ran contrary to what had been hoped for and speaks instead of 
the inability at that time of the RAF to accurately aim their bombs, even when precise and 
specific military installations were not the target. Air Chiefs hoped the attack on Mannheim 
would match the massive destruction seen in Coventry.  
By considering the area bombing campaign as one of longer duration, we can also in some way 
lessen the share of blame which has been apportioned to Arthur Harris. It is not the intention 
of this paper to absolve the then soon-to-be Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command of 
blame for the scale of destruction wrought across the Reich in the later stages of the war. He 
has rightly been criticised for an unwavering belief in the value of area bombing even into the 
very final stages of the war when Allied victory was no longer seriously doubted. Yet at the 
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time of the Mannheim attack, when the RAF first experimented with area bombing in 
Germany, Harris had been Deputy Chief of the Air Staff for less than 3 weeks. His subsequent 
promotion to leadership of Bomber Command was still over a year away. By this stage, faith in 
the bomber had already been stated at the highest level. “The fighters are our salvation,” 
claimed the new British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in a memorandum to the War 
Cabinet on 3rd September 1940, “but the bombers alone provide the means of victory.” 
Churchill did not at this time make clear the way in which he envisaged bombers being used, 
but it would put to the test the statement made almost exactly a year earlier by his 
predecessor, Neville Chamberlain. “[W]hatever be the lengths to which others may go, His 
Majesty's Government will never resort to the deliberate attack on women, children and other 
civilians for purposes of mere terrorism.”225 This position was echoed by Sir Samuel Hoare nine 
months later, as mentioned above. Throughout this thesis it will become clear than the policy 
of area bombing was enthusiastically approved at the very top of British high command. 
Harris’s notorious place in the history of the Second World War is assured, but he should not 
shoulder the responsibility alone for the initiation of area bombing. 
Viewed individually, sources which do not consider the Mannheim raid worthy of inclusion in 
the story of the bomber war do not tell an especially unusual story. As a collection of works 
however, the absence or minimal inclusion is surprising. The overall impression is that the 
small number of casualties on that December night in Mannheim precludes it from featuring 
prominently in the story of the aerial campaign. I would argue that this ignores the symbolism 
of the attack: the British were now prepared not only to consider direct attempts to obliterate 
cities, but to begin carrying it out. The authorisation of the Mannheim raid set the parameters 
of area bombing and ensured it became a written policy; one which would be developed and 
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effectively codified later in the war. The official switch to area bombing in February 1942 was, 
as Peter Gray has shown, an “incremental process”, the roots of which stretched back into the 
years before the Second World War.226 In terms of relative losses, the period of 1940-1941 saw 
a higher number of deaths to RAF personnel than to German civilians.227 But it set the tone for 
the second half of the war during which the balance would be thrown dramatically in the other 
direction. Without the willingness to attack Mannheim in the manner in which it was targeted, 
it is doubtful whether the far more devastating raids later in the war – those which have 
received the greatest attention from historians – could have taken place at all. 
Operations 
As early as 16th October 1940, the War Cabinet had realised the need to ensure that the British 
reply to German bombing was seen to be proportionate: that is to say that it should seem 
appropriately stern in response.228 On 2nd December the Air Ministry contacted Bomber 
Command and the British response to the raid on Coventry was officially underway. Explicitly, 
the nature and scale of the raid would be decided by the attack on Coventry: “as reprisal for 
concentrated attack on places like Coventry and Southampton…you should select and attack 
suitable similar objective in Germany”. The note continued: “With object causing widespread 
uncontrollable fires”.229 
Two days later Bomber Command Operation Order No. 126 was circulated, its intention clearly 
stated: “To cause the maximum possible destruction in a selected German town.” The planned 
raid was given the code name ‘Abigail’ and expected to be carried out by over 200 planes. The 
operation order goes on to outline plans to first raise fires with incendiary bombs, before 
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dropping high explosives into the fires.230 Already the move away from precision bombing was 
taking shape – the aiming point for the bombers arriving later would be already burning 
buildings.  
Through the course of the following correspondence – up the days immediately before the 
attack – the plans took further shape, gained authorisation from the War Cabinet, and saw a 
long list of German towns and cities evolve into a shortlist.  
With the Operation Order complete Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, wrote to Winston 
Churchill informing him of the plan and proposing, in order of preference, Hanover, 
Mannheim, Cologne and Düsseldorf as potential targets. He advised that the attack would 
proceed once the Prime Minister gave his authorisation. Churchill’s role in giving ultimate 
authority for specific air raids is important to note, and will be returned to throughout this 
thesis. His approval and subsequent denouncement of the devastating February 1945 attack 
on Dresden is regularly cited as evidence of his central involvement in the bombing campaign; 
it can be seen much earlier in the run up to the raid on Mannheim.231 
Portal’s request for Churchill’s authorisation was made on 4th December. When, eight days 
later, he had still not been given permission to proceed, he wrote again. “It is very important”, 
he argued, “that authority for this operation should be given immediately”. If adopted as new 
policy, such raids would be guided by existing fires rather than moonlight. However, the first 
raid was to be carried out in moonlight to ensure success. Since the raid was a response to an 
attack already four weeks past, Portal was concerned about losing the opportunity for another 
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month. In a tone of urgency, he ends his letter: “Would you please let me know whether I have 
authority to go ahead?”232 
Whether or not this letter directly sharpened Churchill’s mind is unclear. Certainly the 
intention to raise the weight of bombs dropped on Germany chimed with the Prime Minister’s 
own feelings at that stage. He had expressed a month earlier, in a minute to the Chiefs of the 
Air Staff, his disappointment and regret that more bombs were not being dropped on 
Germany.233 Whatever the trigger, the War Cabinet met that same night and discussed 
Operation Abigail. Though Churchill himself was absent, the Lord Privy Seal, Clement Attlee, 
stated that the Prime Minister “was in favour of a modification of our bombing policy against 
Germany.” Portal told the meeting that it was “widely appreciated” that the German attack on 
Coventry represented a similar change in their approach to bombing Britain, and went on to 
say: “The Prime Minister had given instructions for plans to be prepared for retaliation in 
kind.” It was now for the War Cabinet to decide whether the response would have “the object 
of causing the greatest possible havoc in a built-up area.” Of the considerations outlined, two 
in particular stand out as important here. It was proposed to select a town with no or limited 
damage to date, “where the A. R. P. [Air Raid Precautions] organisation was unlikely to be in 
good trim.” Not only the scale of attack but the potential for dealing with the consequences 
was, clearly, a decisive factor. Also of note, making clear the fact that morale was to become a 
target in itself, is the following: “Since we aimed at affecting the enemy’s morale, we should 
attempt to destroy the greater part of a particular town.”234 
It was noted in discussion that what was being proposed amounted to a change of policy – 
“the diversion from strictly military objectives to a political objective, namely, the effect on 
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German morale.” In the event it was decided that the original bombing policy should be 
upheld, but that an experimental attack should be approved. Two caveats were applied. 
Outwardly this attack was not to be deemed a reprisal for the attack on Coventry, and “no 
special publicity should be given to it afterwards.”235 
The War Cabinet had met at 9.45pm on 12th December. At 8.00am the following morning the 
Air Ministry passed on the conclusions of the meeting to Bomber Command. One of the 
decisions passed on, given greater weight than in the conclusions of the War Cabinet, was: “No 
repeat no special publicity to be given to the operation afterwards”. Bomber Command drew 
up Operation Order No. 127 including the final list of three potential targets: Bremen, 
Düsseldorf and Mannheim. Mannheim – like Coventry, an important industrial centre – was 
given the code name ‘Rachel’.236 After the rapid confirmation of the plans, there followed two 
nights of precision attacks on other targets as the bomber crews waited for the correct 
weather conditions. When these arrived on the night of 16th/17th December, Operation Abigail 
Rachel took place.  
It was not a major success. 134 planes were used in the raid. This represented the largest force 
sent to a single target at that stage, but well down on the suggested number of over 200. 
Many of the bombs missed the city centre. In total, there were 34 deaths and 81 injuries. What 
the raid lacked in major material damage though it made up for in significance. The operation 
showed that it was possible to concentrate a large force of aircraft on a single objective. The 
weekly situation report did in fact report the raid in positive terms. “The outstanding event of 
the week was the heavy and successful attack on Mannheim”, the report confirms. Later the 
report adds: “Aircraft visited the town on the two following nights and reported many fires still 
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burning after the previous attacks, and smoke hanging over the town.”237 Whether or not the 
raid itself was a success in terms of destruction caused to the town, as an experiment in area 
bombing (the objective the War Cabinet had approved) it was successful enough ultimately to 
form the blueprint for what would become the enduring symbol of the bombing campaign. 
Any uneasiness about the nature of the attack (as manifested in the requests for authorisation 
from Churchill; the framing of the proposal as an experiment rather than a direct change in 
policy; the order for the attack to be treated like any other in reports) seems to have lifted 
over the following weeks. On 30th December Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command, 
Richard Peirse, wrote to Portal. He quoted from a translation of a German news bulletin from 
that morning which included reference to the resumption, after Christmas, of the “systematic 
destruction of English towns”. Peirse took the opportunity to press Portal for permission to 
continue the assault on Germany. Hannover had lost its place at the top of the preferred list of 
targets for Operation Abigail for a number of reasons. It had long links with Britain and it was 
considered that bombing Hannover might lead to a German attack on Oxford or Winchester. 
Peirse ended his letter to Portal with a plea: “I hardly think the Cabinet need longer feel soft-
hearted towards Hanover or any other German town for that matter.”238 This calls to mind a 
passage in the memoirs of John Colville who, when talking about the later raid on Dresden, 
thought: “the accumulated horrors of the war hardened all our hearts”.239 Peirse’s reaction to 
hearing the German news bulletin suggests that this process may have begun much earlier in 
the war than Colville suggests. Indeed, Colville himself suggested in a diary entry on 13th 
December that Mannheim was a point of departure for the government. “The moral scruples 
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of the Cabinet on this subject have been overcome.”240 Although Portal told Peirse in reply that 
he could not at that stage attack Hannover, he did give him permission to repeat the 
Mannheim experiment. It was not long before the stance on Hannover changed: it was 
approved as a target on 9th January 1941. When Portal approached Churchill on 4th January for 
permission to go ahead with plans for another “similar operation”, there was no delay in the 
response. Written in red ink on the letter above the Prime Minister’s initials (before a typed 
reply was forwarded to Portal) are the words – “Yes certainly”.241 
What remains at this stage is to consider how effective the order was for Operation Abigail to 
be reported as any other raid. By chance, hours before the raid the Secretary of State for Air 
Archibald Sinclair had presented the Reports on the Effectiveness of the Royal Air Force 
bombing operations. He found that while reports in the press sometimes exaggerated the 
extent of bombing missions, crews returning from operations over Germany usually 
underplayed their role. He quoted from a Commanding Officer within Bomber Command, who 
said: “I cannot recall ever having had occasion even to suspect deliberate exaggeration by the 
crews. Quite the reverse, in fact. They are the first to criticise and belittle their own 
achievements.”242 With this in mind and remembering the condition that no special attention 
should be given to the operation, the following comment from one pilot which appeared in 
newspaper reports undermines the attempt to keep reports restrained. “The biggest show I 
have ever seen…I got tired of trying to count the fires.”243 That such an account was able to 
reach published copy is surprising, more so given that those reports were pulled directly from 
the Air Ministry News Service (AMNS). Accepting that in a sample of one, the conclusion 
cannot be anything more than indicative, this does still suggest that the Mannheim attack 
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stood out. This quotation from the pilot managed to evade the stated concerns of the War 
Cabinet. 
There is little else recorded on what was said about the raid on Mannheim by the RAF crews 
who flew in the raids. Nevertheless a number of sources from around this time can enable an 
understanding of how these people viewed this part of the war effort. Two Mass-Observation 
File Reports from the period give an insight into the mind-set of the crews in relation to 
attacking German civilians. One week before the raid on Mannheim in December 1940, a 
report for Home Intelligence discussed two RAF bases which, independently of one another, 
had organised debates amongst the volunteers. One ran with the motion: “Should we bomb 
Berlin?”; the other asked: “Should reprisal measures be carried out against civil populations?” 
Neither motion passed. Little is recorded of the main content of the debate but among the 
arguments against “included a kind of humanitarian outlook”: this was not simply a rejection 
based on military efficiency.244 Two months later an investigator posted observations of the 
habits and attitudes of airmen based on a year and a half of war. Suggesting that there was 
“slightly less “reprisal feeling” than amongst civilians”, the report goes on to note a very 
practical reason for why airmen might favour the precision bombing of military targets to the 
area bombing of cities. “[T]here is the craftsman’s delight in a well-aimed bomb.” Discomfort 
with the idea of bombing civilians is evident from the nature of the debates, but besides this, 
successfully identifying and striking a target seems to have been more satisfying to airmen 
than dropping bombs into already burning fires.245 There is evidence of this in the diaries of the 
airmen engaged in the bombing war. Flight Sergeant Peter Yeoman Stead was a young man 
during his time in service. When 21 years old he wrote in his diary: “I never expected to reach 
such an old age.” Early in the war he showed a keenness for precision in the execution of his 
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duties, and chided his co-pilot, who he considered: “very careless and [he] seems to have no 
interest in accurate flying”. His diary entries are largely cool and lacking in explicit displays of 
emotion. When another crew survived a crash landing only for one of the pilots to suffer a 
broken leg, he rather philosophically wrote: “Well such is life, luck for some bad luck for 
others, and work and danger for everyone.” His barometer for a “splendid” mission was the 
successful locating of targets. A raid on Duisburg in May 1943 was described as follows: “The 
attack appeared to be very successful. Fires were very well concentrated around the aiming 
point and there was no sign of wide bombing.” Stead rarely commented on the nature of the 
raids in terms of the conditions for those under bombardment, instead focusing on the level of 
accuracy and concentration of the bombing, although there are exceptions. On a mission to 
Mannheim in February 1942 he describes the fires as “angry sores in the heart of a trembling 
city.”246 Flight Sergeant Jamie Dunlop was far more conflicted by his role in the bomber 
offensive. He wrote a letter to his parents which was only to be opened in the event of his 
death – Dunlop was killed in October 1941. He asked that his parents did not mourn him since 
he saw his role as the defence of morality and religion. Yet he still expressed deep misgivings 
about his work. “I hate killing and suffering with all my soul yet I have killed and caused 
suffering. If I am to be excused it must be on the grounds that I killed the few to save the 
many.”247 A Mass-Observation diarist, who would later join the RAF as a Flight Officer, records 
in his diary the details of an argument he had with a friend about the possibility of bombing 
Germany. He takes his friend to task over comments about “teaching [the Germans] a lesson.” 
He writes that he told his friend that this would be ineffective; that evidence of bombing 
around the world didn’t suggest it led to a lowering of morale. Further, he challenged the 
reasoning his friend had given. “I told him, and I still believe it, that his urging of such 
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vandalism and inhumanity springs only from feelings of revenge – from a desire to hurt 
someone because he has been hurt.”248 
The content of a number of interviews with air crews conducted around this time are also 
instructive. These were made for the BBC for public consumption. Admittedly this is a small 
sample, but at this stage of the war the most telling interviews are those with Czech volunteers 
in the RAF. In an interview with a Flight Lieutenant Coleman made on 15th November 1940, the 
day after the raid on Coventry, he discusses a recent raid on Munich where Hitler “and some of 
his boyfriends” were thought to be celebrating the anniversary of the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923. 
He goes on to describe the low height at which they were flying, coupled with the moonlight 
making houses and streets easily visible, as “a bomb-aimer’s dream.” The interview appears to 
be with a man confident of the RAF’s ability to strike at German cities, but he neither baulks at 
nor glories in this knowledge.249 By contrast, interviews with four Czech crew members 
recorded the following summer exhibit far more enjoyment of the treatment meted out to 
German cities. Two explicitly state that their joy at seeing Germany in flames is directly related 
to their nationality. One Czech pilot realised on flying towards Berlin to bomb the city that the 
target was already in flames. He described the feeling as “very comforting to my heart as a 
Czech.” Another describes it as “a real pleasure for me as a Czech to see Berlin on fire.” A raid 
on Münster in North-West Germany is described as “something like Coventry” due to the scale 
of the fires, and the pilot expresses his hope that the attacks “will even increase in the future.” 
The starkest expression of satisfaction at the bomber offensive comes from a Czech wireless 
operator. In his interview he discussed a raid on Kiel in the very north of Germany. Despite 
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lamenting the “terrible war”, he describes the scene below his plane as follows: “It was 
lovely…in all the towns it was fire: fire, fire, fire. It was very good.” 250 
Air Vice Marshal Sir Hugh Pughe Lloyd kept a brief diary during the winter of 1940-1941, during 
which time he was Senior Air Staff Officer for 2 Group, Bomber Command. In it, he records in a 
warning tone his thoughts of the use of bombers around a month after the attack on 
Mannheim. The intended size of the attack seems at odds with his own views on how the 
bomber offensive should be conducted. As early as September he had indicted deep concern:  
“It may be war to the crew in the air as they are in deadly peril of their lives from attack 
– so are the people on the ground – the civilians – but they are defenceless. It seems we 
have all gone mad. It is amazing to think in this 20th century that we should seek to 
destroy each other in this way.” 
After what he calls a “lull” in his diary, he wrote in January:  
“We must only use the Bombers as the bait and the sting and not as routine. We must 
stick to our object. 
But already the Prime Minister has gone big on it. The Press made too much of a song on 
the “offensive”. So instead of one Squadron we now have two Squadrons for the next 
show. This was never intended. One extra Squadron means one less for our nights on 
Germany already very little and very very disturbing.”251 
The attack on Mannheim was not just another attack on military installations in Germany. That 
fact is clear from the documents sent during the planning phase of the attack, as described 
above, and the changing nature of bombing policy is seemingly confirmed by a remarkable 
speech given by Sir Richard Peirse in November 1941. Peirse was Commander-in-Chief of 
Bomber Command at the time, although he was soon to be replaced by Arthur Harris, whose 
appointment roughly coincided with the official shift to area bombing. Peirse’s speech was 
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given at a private dining club in London. It is worthy of lengthy quotation here. After discussing 
the use of bombing as an instrument of blockade, Peirse continued:   
“But, complementary to all these methods of material destruction, is the attack on the 
people themselves; the disruption of normal life; the annihilation of homes; the 
disintegration of public services. In fact, the demoralisation of the people and the 
workers; the undermining of the Will-to-Win. This attack on morale which, as I have 
said, is complementary to any phase of bombing, is relentlessly pursued, and has been, 
to my certain knowledge, for the past year. [This takes us back to the time of Coventry 
and Mannheim] I mention this because, for a long time, the Government for excellent 
reasons has preferred the world to think that we still held some scruples and attacked 
only what the humanitarians are pleased to call Military Targets. But what is a military 
target? Did not Hitler teach the world long ago that in total war there is no distinction 
between combatant and non-combatant, church and arsenal. I can assure you, 
Gentlemen, that we tolerate no scruples – where the Nazis pointed the way, we lead. 
Our civilian population has suffered every monstrous thing the enemy can do, and you 
can take it from me that there is no false sentiment in Bomber Command. Everything 
which they have suffered is given back to the enemy, and with interest.”252 
This final line certainly calls to mind Churchill’s remark about meting out more than the 
measure of what the Luftwaffe had done to British cities and demonstrates the intended scope 
and weight of the bombing campaign. Area bombing was, decidedly, being brought into play. 
Press responses 
Keith Williams describes the Spanish Civil War as the “first fully modern media conflict”.253 
According to Caroline Brothers, it laid down a challenge to media outlets covering future wars. 
The low level of censorship coupled with the availability of a range of ground-breaking 
photographs and the widespread popularity of newsreels allowed for a more holistic approach 
to reporting war than had previously been possible.254 How the media responded to this 
challenge, which was intensified by much tighter censorial controls and a greatly increased 
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area of warfare, would have a direct impact on how the public formed their opinions on the 
course and the conduct of the war. 
The Ministry of Information (MoI) was formed almost immediately after Britain’s declaration 
of war. The name, in contrast with its more sinister sounding German counterpart, the 
Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, highlighted the British “squeamishness 
about the business of propaganda”.255  Not until July 1941 and the appointment of Brendan 
Bracken as Minister of Information did the body gain stability, or “find its feet”.256 In the two 
preceding years it functioned in a chaotic fashion and drew criticism from the National Union 
of Journalists which claimed that the public were not getting accurate news about the war.257 
In the first half of 1940 the RAF Press Corps had protested “the decision to replace 
independent newsgathering with official communiqués”.258 The raid on Mannheim, in 
December 1940, must be seen through this fog. The work of the MoI was primarily concerned 
with censorship. Since most media outlets, at least at the start of the war, got their 
information from either the Press Association or Reuters and that both were based in the 
same London office, censorship could be more easily applied by the MoI.259 Beyond this, 
censorship was officially a voluntary process. If an editor was unsure about whether they could 
print a certain story or editorial, these could be sent to the censors for approval or rejection. 
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Prosecution was possible for printing stories which could, for example, aid the enemy, and 
censorial approval was a complete defence.260 
In the opening phases of the bombing campaigns, both Allied and Axis, Michael Balfour argues 
that the propaganda battle centred on which side had made the first forays into bombing of 
civilians. This issue was clouded by incidents of wildly inaccurate attacks: non-military targets 
mistakenly hit in what were supposed to be precision raids. In September 1940 for example a 
hospital in Bielefield was hit by British bombs, while German bombs intended for military 
targets in August landed in central London.261 
A bigger issue for the media to wrestle with was the quantity and quality of information 
coming back from the armed services. On neither count was it considered adequate, 
particularly at the start of the war, and Phillip Knightley writes that the British media 
complained that their news services were poorer than those available to their German 
counterparts.262 This led, according to John Taylor, to “wide distrust” of the news at a public 
level, fed by an awareness that censorship prevented a full picture from emerging.263 Yet Kevin 
Williams argues that many people were unaware of the “total control” the government 
exercised over the output of the media.264 In the early days of the bombing campaign there 
was, according to Ian McLaine, a “delicate path” to be trodden; one which at once showed that 
German civilians were suffering like those in bombed areas of Britain but also that Bomber 
Command’s intentions remained strategic. McLaine quotes a note sent to Regional 
Information Officers in early February 1941 which demonstrates the image being produced. It 
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highlights the utility of continuing to target military installations before noting that civilians will 
have suffered as a by-product of this policy. “Some of the targets which we have attacked are, 
in fact, situated in thickly populated towns and districts . . . and, consequently, the enemy 
civilian population has by no means gone unscathed.”265 The message was clear: Britain was 
still targeting military installations, but British civilians were not alone experiencing aerial 
bombardment. 
Before considering the press responses to the Mannheim raid itself it is important to assess 
both some key articles which reported on the Coventry attacks and articles which raised the 
question of reprisal attacks on German cities. The Daily Express and the Daily Mail both printed 
articles in the aftermath of the Coventry attacks reporting on a public demand for reprisal 
attacks on Germany. As will be demonstrated later in this chapter this was much exaggerated 
and not consistent with public opinion across the country according to widespread research by 
Mass-Observation. Indeed, a report by Mass-Observation the week before Coventry was 
attacked found a “tendency for the Press and others to exaggerate the mass extent of reprisals 
feeling.”266  
The Daily Express ran a story under the headline ‘A very gallant city’; ‘Stricken, but keeps its 
courage and sanity’. Of particular note though is the line which appears above the headline (it 
is also the final line of the article): ‘It is time now for our deepest, most inspired anger. 
Coventry cries: Bomb back and bomb hard’. Yet there is nothing in the article itself to support 
this line. The writer, Hilde Marchant, had walked among and talked with those affected by the 
bombing and described the heroism of the civil defence. “There is no means of describing the 
spirit of these people, or the spirit of the civilians of Coventry. This England, in November 
1940, is not helpless.” Further she adds, “it is useless to try to find heroes in this city. Every 
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one, from the children to the chief constable and mayor, has been a hero.” Nothing in the 
article, with the exception of its final line, suggests any kind of widespread call for reprisals on 
Germany.267 There is a similar if not so polarized story in the Daily Mail. On the back page of 
the Saturday edition is a “Picture tribute to the unnamed heroes of Coventry who, like these 
citizens turned themselves into fire-fighters to save something of their home.” This is the focus 
of the main article on the attack.268 Yet an editorial under the headline “Hitting Back – our 
reply” stated: “The nation calls for the appropriate reply to Goring. SIR CHARLES PORTAL, Chief 
of the Air Staff, is just the man to give it. Our incomparable R.A.F. were pounding Berlin and 
numerous other objectives while bombs were being showered on Coventry.” Again, however, 
this suggestion of a nation calling for reprisals isn’t supported by even the newspaper’s own 
evidence. Indeed, it is hard to square the sentences above with one particular line in the 
report: “The aftermath of death and suffering has been a wave of warm humanity.” The 
discussion focuses on civic heroism rather than calls for revenge.269 The Daily Herald is a more 
moderate example: the newspaper condemned the attack on Coventry but made no call for 
reprisals.270 The articles printed in the Daily Express and the Daily Mail reported demands by 
the population of Coventry for reprisal attacks on Germany – demands which at best were 
much overstated. How reprisal feeling differed through the country at this time will be 
examined later in this chapter. Mass-Observation reports suggest a far more complex picture.  
While there is no duty for media outlets to follow public opinion (rather, for example, than 
attempting to drive it) it is reasonable to expect newspaper reports purportedly focusing on 
popular feeling to reproduce this accurately. This failure raised the ire of the editorial team of 
the Coventry-based Midland Daily Telegraph, a fact manifested in an article on 22nd November 
1940. The newspaper took issue with a “leading morning national newspaper” which it 
                                                          
267 Daily Express, ‘A Very Gallant City’. 16th November 1940, 1, 6. 
268 Daily Mail, ‘Homes for all in smitten city’. 16th November1940, 1, 6. 
269 Daily Mail, ‘Hitting Back’. 16th November 1940, 2. 
270 Daily Herald, ‘Coventry’. 16th November 1940, 2. 
100 
 
accused of being “gravely concerned as to the attitude of Coventry’s heavily “blitzed” 
population towards the question of reprisals.” Dismissing the suggestion that the people of 
Coventry were calling for revenge strikes against Germany, the article goes on to counter-claim 
that the focus was on “the sheer task of living” rather than striking back. The grievance is with 
the lack of protection afforded to the city rather than with those carrying out the attack. 
Arguing though that “morale is sky high”, there is a tone of defiance in the following: 
“Coventry feels that Hitler has done his worst, and Coventry knows now that it can “take it.”” 
The people of Coventry are cast as civilian victims of an attack by a foreign air force as opposed 
to combatants, an important theme in the history of bombing.271  
As the Midland Daily Telegraph grappled with the story of destruction in its home town what is 
noticeable is the absence of malice from all reports. The tone is one of solidarity rather than 
anger. This is true in the immediate aftermath and becomes more vehement as time passes. In 
response to a message vowing that H.M.S. Coventry would “endeavour to repay” the Germans 
for the attack, the Mayor of Coventry carefully phrased his response. “The city is deeply 
grateful…and we know H.M.S. Coventry will carry out its work.” There is no endorsement of 
revenge violence, of the promise to “repay.” The implication instead seems that the mayor 
thanks the ship’s crew for showing solidarity and for their efforts, but does not expect their 
focus to be dictated by events in the city. He went on say: “We have had a hard knock but are 
in good heart and will play our part on land as your brave lads are playing their part at sea.”272 
Over the next few days there continues of course to be heavy coverage of the bombing, but 
these reports remain free of anger or calls for reprisals, even when under a headline alleging 
German “boasting”.273 
                                                          
271 Midland Daily Telegraph, ‘Reprisals’. 22nd November 1940, 4. 
272 Midland Daily Telegraph, ‘World sympathy with stricken city’. 19th November 1940, 5. 
273 See e.g. Midland Daily Telegraph, ‘Coventry’s thanks’. 20th November 1940, 4 and Midland Daily 
Telegraph, ‘Coventry “dead,” boast Germans’. 22nd November 1940, 2. 
101 
 
The story was similar in Southampton after the series of attacks on the city in the final week of 
November and on 1st December 1940. The campaign for reprisals based, apparently, on local 
feeling, that the Daily Express and Daily Mail had made in the wake of the attacks on Coventry 
was not followed up after the attacks on Southampton; there was no cause for the editorial 
team of the Hampshire newspaper the Southern Daily Echo to rebut such suggestions. Nor, 
however, was there any call for reprisals: either in reports of the attacks and on the local 
reaction or in editorials. As in the Midland Daily Telegraph there was a strong emphasis on the 
spirit of the people in the face of adversity. One headline lamented the savagery of the 
bombing attack and betrays a sense of anger at the ordeal Southampton had to endure. The 
reports spoke of the carnage and dislocation brought about by the raids, but always of the 
presence of the people of Southampton, who had not been laid low by unhappy circumstance. 
The effect was to show a population whose spirit was unbroken by bombardment. The main 
report on the front page of the Southern Daily Echo after the first attack carried the story of 
people gathering in “a partly wrecked church” for the Sunday service. “This was 
characteristic”, wrote the paper, “of the way the townspeople met their ordeal.” 274 Four days 
later the newspaper reported that Southampton, along with Birmingham and Bristol which had 
also been attacked, was still functioning. “[T]he Germans would be bitterly disappointed if they 
could walk among the people they tried to terrorise.”275 Signs of defiance were evident, 
though these were dismissive of the Nazis’ ability to defeat the people of Britain, rather than 
advocative of retaliatory action. A newsagent sold newspapers under the slogan: “Hitler comes 
and goes, but we go on for ever.” More dismissive still of the German bombing campaign was a 
“perky little note” propped against a damaged house. “You can’t win this way, Adolf!” it read. 
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About the town there was, according to the local newspaper, a “spirit of stoical optimism”.276 
There was also a prominent focus on the importance of humour in response to the situation. 
The newspaper painted a series of amusing vignettes in the days following the raids on 
Southampton: of the fireman who, “begrimed from head to foot after 18 hours’ non-stop duty, 
picked up a pair of gloves blown into the street by an internal explosion and, pulling them on, 
commented, “Mustn’t spoil my lilywhite hands!””; of the woman who told a policeman she 
couldn’t sleep – not because of the bombs but because of the mouse running around on the 
floor of the church where she and others who had been bombed out were staying.277 In 
Coventry the Daily Telegraph and Morning Post reported on the visit of the King to the city. “A 
shout of defiant laughter went up when a man called to a woman leaning out of a half-
wrecked upper room: “Hi! shut that window!” There was, of course, no window to shut.”278 
The News Chronicle reported the “staggering normality” with which the people of Coventry 
carried on.279 
These jaunty tales of people carrying on as before, unaffected by the inevitable death and 
devastation around them, had a clear propaganda value: downplaying the extent to which 
bombing could break morale both to stoke British stoicism and dampen German celebration. It 
is important therefore to guard against any assumption that this was the unique stance, or 
that there was an absence of real hardship under the weight of German bombardment. Juliet 
Gardiner writes of the tendency in the British press to artificially inflate the spirit of British 
people; indeed that there was a resentment of “the image of the wisecracking Cockney 
emerging from the ruins whistling”.280 Angus Calder too has challenged the extent to which the 
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popularly-remembered ‘Blitz spirit’ existed during the period.281 There was anger in Coventry, 
as expressed by the Mayor, that the city had been bombed through the night without respite 
from fighter planes or anti-aircraft guns. Yet two key points remain. First, Mass-Observation 
reported that though panic and the desire to flee was a common response in the immediate 
aftermath of the raids, this “usually passed within a few days, to be replaced by a re-
emergence of stoicism and defiance.”282 Second, this initial phase of panic was not, according 
to the evidence collected by Mass-Observation and supported by local news reports, attached 
to calls for reprisals on German cities. 
The New Statesman and Nation immediately struck an anti-reprisals note in the aftermath of 
the attack on Coventry. ‘A London Diary’ – a regular feature posted by ‘Critic’ – argued that 
“people who have really been bombed do not want a similar misery for others.” This is in line 
with many of the findings of Mass-Observation around this time.283 In the following issue a 
reader, Arnold Hyde from Manchester, wrote to criticise this stance. He said he had 
experienced bombing and argued that not wanting reprisals was contrary to human nature; 
the thought-process of only an “Oriental Philosopher” or “Inveterate Masochist”. Elevating the 
level of attacks on Germany was necessary, he wrote, to cure “the German nation of its love of 
militarism”. Yet this letter sat alongside one signed by six residents of Coventry disputing the 
level of reprisal feeling as reported in the Daily Express. In full, the letter reads:  
“Many citizens of Coventry who have endured the full horror of an intense aerial 
bombardment would wish to dispute statements made in the Daily Express as to the 
effect that all the people of Coventry expressed the opinion that they wished to bomb, 
and bomb harder, the peoples of Germany. 
This is certainly not the view of all or even the majority of the people of Coventry. The 
general feeling is, we think, that of horror, and a desire that no other peoples shall 
suffer as they have done. Our impression is that most people feel the hopelessness of 
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bombing the working classes of Germany and very little satisfaction is attained by 
hearing that Hamburg is suffering in the same way that Coventry has suffered.”284  
Hyde’s letter received no support from readers in subsequent editions of the publication, and 
plenty of criticism. Archibald Robertson suggested Hyde had forgotten lessons of the last war. 
He did not favour reprisals, nor he said, referring directly to Hyde’s letter, was he either an 
“Oriental Philosopher” or “Inveterate Masochist”. Fred Hughes, from Walton-on-Thames 
wrote that his own morale – having been bombed out of home and office – was not comforted 
by the knowledge of German civilians being attacked. Bombing may be “necessary” and 
“inevitable” he wrote, “but not for the sake of “reprisals,” in Heaven’s name: We have 
something better and greater to do than avenge our personal injuries.”285 The following week 
A. Mercott, of Birmingham, who also challenged Hyde’s opinion, raised the issue of class in 
relation to reprisal attitudes. The middle classes, this correspondent wrote, “have mostly, 
owing to the facilities afforded them by their means, escaped.”286 
Into the spring as the Blitz continued the newspaper dedicated a full front page article to 
discussion of reprisals: tellingly under the headline “The Reprisal Folly”. Anger at the German 
bombing raids on British cities was, according to the article, “natural”, but “ignorant” when it 
manifested itself as reprisal talk: 
“This cry is taken up by the less scrupulous kind of journalist and the less responsible 
type of politician. It is not the view held by statesmen, nor by experts, by the Staff or by 
most of the men who are asked to do the bombing. The R.A.F. would agree that 
bombing civilians could not end the war anyway.” 287 
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Rather than clamour for such action, which the article suggested had largely been absent from 
British policy thus far, British people should show “that we are sanely anxious to end the 
madness of competitive destruction.”288 
Elsewhere in the left wing press there was a lack of engagement with bombing; rather there is 
a greater tendency to consider the conditions of war as a whole. The Socialist Standard typifies 
this position, lamenting the conduct of war. An article in the November 1940 issue, 
contemporaneous with the bombing of Coventry and before the attack on Mannheim, 
considers “the nightmare of the beleaguered city” and the destruction of “the poor man’s 
home”. Both quotes could refer to the impact of bombing but this is not clear. The magazine 
used this article as an opportunity to call for the maintenance of support for socialism even in 
“this blackest hour”.289 In March the following year the magazine’s editors took issue with a 
description in the Daily Mail of fears that Abyssinian tribesmen would have “little regard for 
the niceties of civilisation”. The response was damning of the major players in World War Two, 
if not by name. “Niceties is hardly the word we would apply to modern war between “civilised” 
countries.”290 Again, this could be read as a critical response to the bomber war, but it is not 
explicit in the text.  The Fabian News, organ of the Fabian Society, does not address bombing 
at this time. R. S. W. Pollard used an article in the January 1941 issue to consider how war 
allows for the possibility of change – similar in vein to the Socialist Standard’s call for solidarity 
with the socialist movement.291 However, the same author also wrote to the Tribune, another 
left-wing mouthpiece, with a question specifically about both sides’ conduct in relation to 
bombing. “Has the war already so deadened our consciences,” he asked, “that we ignore the 
fact that every bomb dropped by either side may mean individual desolation and tragedy?” 
This is a rare example at this early stage of the war of publication of a sentiment which seeks 
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to undermine the validity of bombing as a policy. Yet the letter went on to call for an 
immediate end to hostilities, and this undermined the possibility for a valuable discussion of 
the policy of aerial bombardment. It was the call for peace which was met with a stern rebuke 
by the editors, taking attention away from the criticism of bombing.292 
The details and appraisals of the raid on Mannheim vary from publication to publication as is 
to be expected. None condemn the raid or, standing alone, indicate that this was a 
considerable departure from other previous bombing raids. A wide-ranging study of 
newspaper reportage in the weeks following the raid however begins to reveal piece by piece 
a picture of something out of the ordinary. In the Times the initial reports do not reveal 
anything of note – they quote almost exclusively from the Air Ministry communiqués and the 
AMNS. The pilot’s quotation is not included. The Manchester Guardian report from the first 
day quotes only from the AMNS. As well as the pilot’s observation quoted above, another 
surprise inclusion in this report is the observation that the fires in Mannheim were “of unusual 
intensity.” The headline in the Manchester Guardian is perhaps the only editorial indicator of 
the scale of the attack: “7-hour raid on Mannheim”. In both the Times and the Manchester 
Guardian there is a concession to the German reports on the events. These noted that a 
hospital and a castle were hit in the attacks.293 In the Scotsman the population of the city is 
given – 247,000. This is perhaps a hint towards the possibility of civilian casualties – absent in 
other newspapers – although it is not added to in the body of the article. The report does 
mention the “great havoc” caused by the raids.294 
The first report from the Daily Express is the one mentioned above in relation to the pilot’s 
comment. The Mannheim attack is not deemed worthy of an article in itself and indeed is not 
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the main raid discussed: the headline and first portion of the report concern a raid on 
Bordeaux. The Daily Mirror leads similarly with Bordeaux in a tiny article at the bottom of page 
12. Their passage on Mannheim could almost have been included only to fill a final sentence: 
“Meanwhile, other R.A.F. bombers were blitzing Mannheim.” The following day the article is 
again short, but this time appears on page 3. And here the results of the raid begin to become 
apparent. The article describes the bombers returning to Mannheim to find that “some of the 
fires started in the raid the night before were still burning.” Then, bluntly, the report 
continues: “They started some more.”295 
On 19th December several papers carried an annotated aerial photograph taken by No. 115 
Squadron of the RAF during the raids.296 It was the Daily Express that gave the image greater 
contextual significance and again calls into question the effectiveness of the order to keep 
reports of Mannheim in line with other attacks. Under the headline “This picture breaks a 
speed record”, the Air Reporter notes: “No official picture of this kind has ever been issued 
more rapidly by any of the fighting services.” A week earlier the newspaper had made a 
request to the Air Ministry to make aerial photographs of raids available. “The appeal is having 
results.”297 
In the forthcoming days and weeks Mannheim remained in the news. On the front page of the 
Daily Express on 28th December came a translation of a German radio broadcast on the 
severity of the raid. “We freely admit that this was the most severe raid made on German 
territory so far.” Playing down the effect on industrial output, the report focused instead on 
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“the destruction of Mannheim Castle…and the residential districts.” There also came the claim: 
“British pilots have shown their callousness by attaching to some of their bombs tags with the 
inscription ‘Merry Christmas.’”298 Readers’ letters to the editor do not, in those publications 
surveyed, respond to the Mannheim raid. This may simply indicate that the raid did not 
register widely with the public; certainly it is not the aim of this paper to show widespread 
indignation about the Mannheim raid when this was not the case. Helen Reid proposes a 
different interpretation. She suggests there was a fear that criticising aspects of the war effort 
would lead to the correspondent being labelled subversive. A respondent to a December 1943 
Mass-Observation Directive (which is discussed at length in chapter three) expressly mentions 
the fear of being imprisoned as a result of speaking out against bombing.299  
Perhaps most intriguing are the Times and Manchester Guardian reports from 3rd January 1941 
reporting a large raid on Bremen. Both reports borrow from the AMNS and include the same 
quotation from a report on the Bremen raid. “Much greater than Mannheim”, is the view of an 
unnamed source (and is used as a sub-headline in the Times). On the face of it this may seem 
interesting but hardly damning; not likely to interfere with the order for: “No repeat no special 
publicity to be given to the operation afterwards”. It casts Mannheim as the smaller attack. Yet 
both newspapers highlight the quotation as a moment of colour in otherwise fact-based 
reports. The Manchester Guardian sets the quotation against the observation that such 
reports “are usually couched in the most unemotional language,” while the Times notes that it 
sits beneath “many dry particulars”. There is no explanation in either article of what happened 
in Mannheim, or where it happened: it is simply left as a place name. This is of greatest 
significance here. Mannheim has been set up as a reference point. The attack is set apart from 
the list of towns and cities already attacked during the war. In the days after the raid the 
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Manchester Guardian had printed an article by their Air Correspondent highlighting the scope 
of the bombing campaign. “A mere recital of the places bombed by Royal Air Force aircraft 
during the week would show the great and constantly expanding scope of this arm”. In a 
growing campaign both newspapers felt able to reference Mannheim without any further 
background.300 
An article in the International Labour Review considered ‘Economic Organisation for Total War’ 
and wrote presciently on the new technology employed by the belligerent powers. 
“Aeroplanes immensely superior to those used in the war of 1914-18 are playing a leading part 
and will probably in the end play a decisive part in the present war.” This prediction came in 
passing however, and did not detail how the role of the aeroplane would play out. The focus 
moved by the end of the article to the threat posed by the war to social ideals.301  
Whether due to the strictures of censorship or because the raid on Mannheim did not arouse 
any great suspicion, there is no outright criticism in any of the newspapers surveyed here. For 
the most part the extracts discussed here are likely to have aroused concern only for 
particularly perceptive readers at the time, and it is mainly with hindsight that the reports can 
be seen to raise issues for discussion. Yet the trends remain important as contemporary 
sources. They will later be compared with the journalistic response to the attacks on Hamburg 
and Dresden, and they begin this story of the relationship of the media with the bombing 
campaign during World War Two. 
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Public responses 
Mass-Observation prepared a series of weekly reports for Home Intelligence. The question of 
reprisals was of significant interest in these. A week after the attack on Coventry the report 
found “the demand for reprisals in decline, and certainly in Coventry it was slight as compared 
with the press versions of opinion there.”302 For the following report observers in London 
sought to obtain how widespread the call for reprisals was in London. Two different questions 
were used: the results from the first question having been considered compromised by the 
investigators’ concern that people did not fully understand what the word ‘reprisals’ meant. 
For some, it seemed to refer to any bombing action against Germany, rather than specifically 
seeking to strike back in the manner of the Coventry attack. Thus, when asking simply: “Are 
you for or against reprisals?” 51% stated that they were; 32% that they were not; and 17% had 
no opinion. Even based on these results, the idea of widespread calls for reprisals – as claimed 
by some sections of the media – seems not to be on stable ground. But with a more subtly 
worded question, the results were even less clear cut. Following the wording of a poll by BIPO, 
observers asked: “In the view of the indescriminate [sic] German bombing of this country 
would you approve or disapprove if the R.A.F. adopted a similar policy of bombing the civilian 
population of Germany?” Even this wording was not deemed entirely satisfactory by Mass-
Observation, with some respondents unclear on the meaning of indiscriminate (believing it to 
mean accidental) and others not agreeing that the German policy was, in fact, indiscriminate. 
Nevertheless, this time those who would approve numbered 47%, slightly down on the 
number who said they were in favour of reprisals. What is more striking is that the section of 
those interviewed who had no opinion drops by over half to 8%, with 45% disapproving of the 
suggestion. Overall, this leaves those approving of “a similar policy” in a slight minority. The 
report later states that “many” of those responding to the survey were now indicating pros 
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and cons of such a policy: “which they did not do to any marked degree a couple of months 
ago.”303 The BIPO surveys through the course of the Blitz add valuable further data. In October 
1940 the nightly bombing of British cities was well underway: this was as yet though before 
the attack on Coventry and the response on Mannheim. When asking the same question as 
used above by Mass-Observation, 46% of those surveyed stated that they would approve of 
the RAF bombing the civilian population of Germany, the same percentage as those who 
would disapprove.304 In November those surveyed were asked about “the most important war 
problem the British Government must solve this winter.” Concerns focused most heavily on 
securing the Home Front. Finding a salve to the problem of night bombing was the problem 
most respondents gave (12%) while the third-most highly placed answer was the issue of night 
shelters (12%). The bombing of Germany was twenty-third on the list – out of thirty – with less 
than one per cent of those surveyed considering it the most important problem.305  
The evidence offered by Mass-Observation shows a mix of public opinions on how to respond 
to attacks on Britain; certainly among some people surveyed there was a desire for attacks on 
German cities. In January 1941 nearly 23% of people surveyed said that their first thoughts 
after hearing of a very heavy air-raid (the answers clearly show that the question implies a raid 
on a British town or city) was to “[b]omb German civilians in retaliation”. This desire was, 
however, slightly subordinate to the hope that there would be an intensification of attacks on 
German military targets; both of these responses scored lower than the answer “Wonder how 
the bombed people are getting on”.306 The question of whether the R.A.F. should adopt a 
policy of bombing the German civilian population drew a more supportive response in April 
1941 as compared to the previous October: 54% now said they would approve of such a policy 
with 37% saying they would disapprove. Yet this is far from the “overwhelming majority” 
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Churchill spoke of in his speech in July. Many of those who would support such a policy added 
a comment which spoke of retribution and reprisal: giving the Germans “a taste of it”; “an eye 
for an eye.” There are also however a range of comments to support those disapproving of 
bombing German civilians. These range from the procedural – keeping to military objectives 
for greatest effectiveness – to the moral – killing women and children was on a par with Hitler 
and we should “keep our hands clean”.307 
In the wider context of the war as a whole the bombing of Germany remained a very low-level 
priority for the British people surveyed by BIPO. In March the organisation repeated the 
question from November about the most important war problem to be solved by the British 
Government – this time during the spring. Again “Bombing Germany” scored less than one per 
cent, with the highest scorers – “Submarine warfare and shipping losses” and “Maintaining 
sufficient food supplies” – both scoring comfortably over 20%. A key point to raise here is that 
while BIPO recorded several different answers to the question, this did not dilute the results to 
an extent which would render them nearly meaningless. The answers scoring above 20% 
suggest a kind of consensus on some matters; still other answers scored far more highly than 
the bombing of Germany.308 
The BIPO finding which most powerfully undermines Churchill’s original assertion comes from 
the survey of June 1941, just a month before he gave his speech. To reiterate, Churchill had 
spoken of a hypothetical convention between Britain and Germany to “stop the bombing of all 
cities”. There would be little support for this, he had suggested. Churchill hypothesised that if 
asked to vote on such a convention, the “overwhelming majority” of the people of London 
would respond: “No. We will mete out to the Germans the measure, and more than the 
measure that they have meted out to us.” BIPO had asked almost exactly this question: 
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“Would you approve or disapprove of an agreement between England and Germany to stop 
night bombing?” There was in fact a majority who were in support of the proposal, as Churchill 
had suggested. This majority, however, was only slight. 46% replied that they would approve; 
43% replied that they would not. 11% stated that they did not know. This shows far less 
consensus on the issue of aerial bombardment, and suggests a population considerably less 
fixed in their ideas about the conduct of war.309 
Another myth which could be challenged by Mass-Observation was that which suggested calls 
for reprisals rose in areas of the UK which had received heavy attacks. A report from Coventry 
in the days following the attack found evidence of “vague futility” but “very little feeling in 
favour of reprisals.”310 Leicester, 25 miles north-east of Coventry, was bombed heavily on 19th 
November 1940, just days after the major attack on its neighbouring city. A file report 
describes how a clamour for reprisals for Coventry disappeared once Leicester had suffered 
under bombardment: “Before their own raid, the people of Leicester…were very belligerent, 
demanding reprisals. But since the raid this has dropped entirely; investigator heard no 
mention of any demand for violent action.”311 This trend was noticed around the country. In 
December in Southampton, “[t]here was very little reprisal talk, and even when investigator 
asked people whether they wanted reprisals, the usual answer was “What good would that 
do?”” The observers noted that anger, where it was expressed, was directed towards German 
bombers rather than German civilians.312 Here there is a strong echo of the diary of Colin 
Perry, a teenager who recorded his experience of war. After seeing bomb damage near to his 
home in South London he records his wish to become a fighter pilot to shoot down the 
aeroplanes sent to attack Britain. He is specific here: he does not want to be associated with 
attempts to bomb Germany in revenge. “I will not be a member of a bomber crew – never! If I 
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thought for one moment I was a cog in bringing about such terrible tragedy I would rather be 
shot.”313  
Further reports from cities around the country found the same thing: in the aftermath of 
bombing there was no particular call for reprisals from the bombed civilians. The research was 
wide-ranging, taking in up to the end of January 1941, along with those cities already 
mentioned, Liverpool, Manchester,314 Bristol, Cheltenham,315 Portsmouth and Plymouth.316 
Aside from the lack of “reprisal feeling” noted in these areas, observers were able to start 
noting some variations according to gender, class and proximity to the raids. According to a 
report for Home Intelligence, “women showed more violent feelings than men.”317 The issue of 
class and proximity to the raids can be tied together: as at least one report noted, those 
interviewed who were described as middle or upper class tended to live away from the urban 
centres which received the heaviest bombing. Mass Observers showed how working class 
people often bore the brunt of aerial bombardment and yet were less likely to favour 
reprisals.318 In villages close to Southampton which had not experienced any bombing 
whatsoever, observers reported “violent reprisals reactions”; versus “no expressed demand 
for reprisals” in the city itself.319A report collating information from several areas advised that 
feelings in favour of reprisal bombing was “strongest in places which have never been bombed 
at all and among people with reasonable incomes”.320 In an article written in April 1941 Tom 
Harrisson echoes the sentiment of the file reports used here. He argues that having spent time 
in Coventry in the aftermath of the bombing he “heard no demand for reprisals there.” 
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Further, Harrisson described how the proportion of people in favour of reprisals rose steeply in 
areas that had received the least amount of bombs, while in London, where most bombs fell, 
there was a slim majority who were against bombing German civilians. This was enough for 
Harrisson to write: “it is exactly wrong to state…that the blitz-towns rise up as one man and 
scream for reprisals.” Harrisson himself was not pushing a humanitarian agenda: he states that 
he is not against the bombing of German civilians per se, but would only support it if to do so 
was “in the best interests of winning the war and the peace.”321 
The overall trend seems to show that direct experience of being bombed, and having fewer 
means to deal with the consequences, correlated with less of a push for similar treatment to 
be returned to Germany. Empathy with fellow civilians seems to be evident here, rather than a 
desire for others to suffer in the same manner. What should be made very clear is that at this 
stage of the war Mass Observers had to seek out and ask for opinions on reprisals. This is 
mirrored in the majority of the diaries kept at this time. The focus of the diarists is largely on 
their daily life and, when they come under bombardment, on how to adapt. Later in the war 
diarists start making clearer comments about the Allied bombing campaign, but this is not the 
case to any notable degree in late 1940 and early 1941.  
Conclusion 
What is unarguable in the light of what Mass-Observation and BIPO surveys show is that the 
national newspapers which reported the public calls for reprisals – and later Churchill’s speech 
– were well out of step with public opinion. The overall impression is that there was no 
widespread call for reprisals in the wake of the attacks on Coventry and other bombed British 
cities. On a day to day basis the focus of most members of the public was on attempting to 
restore a semblance of normality to their homes. Quite apart from this, as Harrisson 
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anonymously (and quite pointedly) told the BBC European News Service: “They buried two 
hundred dead in Coventry yesterday, in a common grave. The whole town mourned for these 
dead, most of them women and children, all of them civilians and citizens. They did not shout 
about reprisals.”322 When Mannheim was bombed four weeks after Coventry, it was neither 
driven by nor supported by popular opinion. The following chapters in this thesis will show 
how British people responded to a massively expanding area bombing campaign as the war 
progressed, through the devastation of Hamburg and Dresden. The early experiments with 
area bombing during the war – which paved the way for the far heavier raids to come – were 
not subject to the widespread approval that Churchill and some sections of the press spoke of. 
Throughout the Second World War there existed a voice of dissent against this particular 
aspect of Allied war conduct: a voice rooted in Britain’s own experience under aerial 
bombardment. 
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Chapter 3 – A turning point? 1943 and the bombing of Hamburg 
After the attack on Mannheim the Blitz continued for a further five months. In early summer 
1941 German forces had occupied much of continental Europe and they remained in the 
ascendancy. Yet by the summer months of 1943 the global picture looked very different. The 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 drew the United States into the war and 
German resources were thinned by the decision to declare war on the Soviet Union. 
Coincidentally the plans for Operation Barbarossa were drawn up in their initial phases in the 
week following the RAF raid on Mannheim in December 1940.323 The invasion of the USSR got 
underway six months later. The failure of the attempt to quickly and decisively defeat the 
Soviet Union via the Blitzkrieg strategy gave way to a lengthier conflict on the Eastern Front. 
This signalled the start of what would ultimately prove to be a significant turning point in the 
war. By February 1943 the Soviet Union had gained a victory at Stalingrad; one which 
irrevocably damaged Hitler’s ambitions on the Eastern Front. This, along with the earlier Allied 
victory in the Second Battle of El Alamein, represented a decisive shift in fortunes.324 “Black 
May” saw major U-boat losses and a turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic, and July and 
August brought another round of setbacks for the Axis powers. The Battle of Kursk 
represented another major victory for the Red Army. Winston Churchill later described the 
significance of this battle: “Stalingrad was the end of the beginning, but the Battle of Kursk was 
the beginning of the end.”325 While the Wehrmacht and the Red Army were locked in battle on 
the Eastern Front, the Allies secured a foothold in Italy with the successful invasion of Sicily. On 
25th July Benito Mussolini was removed as Italian leader. Against this background of growing 
Allied strength came a devastating series of attacks on the northern city of Hamburg at the end 
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of July and the beginning of August. The resultant firestorm was a significant factor in swelling 
the death toll to over 42,600 people. Intense, wide-ranging fires rapidly sucked in air and 
created a self-sustaining wind system. This lead to an approximation of hurricane conditions in 
the city.326 The ‘Battle of Hamburg’ was a one-sided affair, amounting to one of the most 
deadly series of raids on Germany during the whole of the war.327  
With Luftwaffe bombing of Britain now greatly reduced and major raids on Germany an 
established part of Allied strategy, the outlook for British people was very different to how it 
had been in the face of nightly attacks and rapid German expansion in 1940 and 1941. This 
chapter will examine how the bombing of Germany was viewed under these new conditions of 
war. The response of the campaign group the Bombing Restriction Committee will be 
discussed in detail. It is also important to consider here the Archbishop of Canterbury, William 
Temple. This chapter will show that the Archbishop’s conservative reaction to protest about 
the bombing campaign had the effect of blocking voices of concern in the middle years of the 
war. 
As discussed in the introduction, Mark Connelly has argued that public controversy 
surrounding the bombing of Germany developed and grew after the end of the war, and that 
public opinion “remained firmly in favour” of the bomber campaign while it was being carried 
out. Further, he challenges theses such as that of Stephen A. Garrett for taking the views of a 
small group of public figures and using them to draw conclusions about the wider British 
public.328 Connelly proposes that Bishop George Bell, Vera Brittain and others formed a 
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minority viewpoint and were not in line with the British public. I hope to use this chapter to 
explore the nature and extent of this viewpoint in the mid-point of the war, and to show that a 
proportion of the public did not support the manner of the bomber campaign, yet nor were 
their views expressed in a public forum. Those who were more vocal in their protest would 
find that their voices of dissent were in effect muted by a lack of support from the Archbishop 
of Canterbury. Bell’s anti-bombing stance is widely known; here therefore the purpose is to 
offer a greater weight of consideration to Temple’s role at the time. 
Mannheim to Hamburg 
The Allied bomber offensive had grown hugely to bring the realities of conflict to the German 
people. After the experiment with area bombing that was carried out against Mannheim there 
were a number of other similar attacks in 1941. Two documents produced that summer would 
hasten the move towards an official area bombing campaign. On the basis that limited visibility 
above target areas would not allow for precision bombing around 75% of the time, a directive 
was sent to Bomber Command on 9th July requiring 75% of capacity to be focused on sustained 
bombing of “working class and industrial areas”.329 The following month the Butt Report 
confirmed fears that British bomber crews were not successfully striking their targets with 
anywhere near a satisfactory degree of reliability. Analysis of aerial photographs showed, in 
short, the paradoxical imprecision of precision bombing. Crews were unable with any certainty 
to hit their intended targets. Only a third of bomber aircraft surveyed during June and July 
1941 dropped their bombs within 5 miles of their target. Two years before Hamburg – the 
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“high tide” in the bomber war – Bomber Command was, in Hastings’ words, at its “low-water 
mark”.330 
The findings of the Butt Report brought area bombing – as a fully adopted policy – closer to 
reality. On 14th February 1942 General Directive Number 5 was presented to Bomber 
Command and made official a policy of area bombing in all but name. The document required 
the aim of Bomber Command’s work to be: “to focus attacks on the morale of the enemy civil 
population, and, in particular, of the industrial workers.” The growing confidence in Bomber 
Command capacity is reflected in the following: “You are authorised to employ your forces 
without restriction.” Shortly afterwards Bomber Command was brought under the control of a 
new Commander-in-Chief, Arthur Harris, and now had both the ambition and the capability to 
regularly carry out devastating attacks across Germany.331 
At the end of the following month Lord Cherwell, the government scientific advisor who 
requested the Butt Report, used its findings to lobby for a policy of ‘dehousing’: seeking to 
destroy houses as a means to breaking German civilian resistance. He directly called for this 
approach, arguing: “Investigation seems to show that having one’s house demolished is most 
damaging to morale. People seem to mind it more than having their friends or even relatives 
killed.” An estimate based on damage caused during the Blitz and current bomber production 
suggested one-third of the German population could be made homeless by targeting built-up 
areas. The Cherwell paper elicited much debate. This debate though, as Ronald Clark writes, 
was on “strategic and not humanitarian grounds”. Chief among Cherwell’s opponents was the 
scientist Sir Henry Tizard, yet the former’s influence held greater sway with Churchill, Sinclair 
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and Portal.332 As the official historians write, Cherwell’s paper gave the air offensive its “design 
and theme”. Civilians were now under direct attack.333 
On 28th March Bomber Command raised what was then the highest German death toll in a 
single attack with a heavy raid on the port city of Lübeck. Lübeck was not a modern city and 
contained a large number of wooden houses. Harris was keen for his crews to experience 
success, and this raid offered a prime opportunity to get it.334 Operationally the raid was a 
went well. A number of military targets were destroyed, along with over 15,000 homes. 312 
civilians were killed.335 This was the primary motivating factor for the ‘Baedeker’ raids by the 
Luftwaffe on the English cities of Exeter, Bath, Norwich and York.336 At the end of May the first 
‘Thousand bomber raid’ was carried out on Cologne. It was intended by Harris not only to 
cause massive destruction but also to be a daunting display of British air power. Incidentally, 
but for poor weather conditions, Hamburg would have been the target of this attack.337 
The fleet dispatched was well over twice the average size of that which Bomber Command 
could muster during the spring of that year. The attack was considered “an amazing 
success.”338 Yet as Grayling points out, the Thousand Bomber Raids (two further such missions 
were run – one to Essen on 1st June and another to Bremen on 25th June – with neither 
achieving the levels of destruction caused in Cologne) ultimately proved to have been a 
greater propaganda success than actual military successes. Even in Cologne, where the 
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greatest damage was done, the number of civilian deaths – 486 – was lower than the death toll 
that would be inflicted on several cities Germany by the following summer. In spite of the huge 
number of planes dispatched and the high proportion of these which reported hitting their 
target, the defences were still able to function. Nevertheless, Harris thought it worth 
persevering with as a model for future Bomber Command operations.339 
The attack on Cologne provoked a second Baedeker phase, with three raids on Canterbury 
spread over the course of week: the first on the night immediately after the first Thousand 
Bomber raid. Taken together the Baedeker raids were not hugely successful for the Luftwaffe. 
Though over 1,600 people were killed in the British cities targeted, the potential capabilities of 
both air forces, as evidenced by the contemporaneous Baedeker raids and the Thousand 
Bomber raids, appeared starkly different. Attacks on Bury St. Edmunds, Cambridge, Lowestoft, 
Great Yarmouth and Ipswich were all smaller than the main Baedeker raids.340 
By the start of 1943 the war had been going on for more than three years. The war on the 
eastern front had been going on for nearly half of that time and the first anniversary of 
American involvement had just passed. From 14th to 24th January 1943 Western Allied leaders 
met at the Casablanca Conference to agree on strategy for the next phase of the war. In terms 
of the war in the air, an important result of the conference was the Casablanca directive which 
outlined the intended combined bombing policy of the United States and Britain. Agreed at the 
conference and issued on 4th February by the Air Ministry, the directive required that targets 
of military and industrial importance were a priority of bombing campaigns, but maintained 
morale as an equally important factor. Bomber Command and the United States Army Air 
Forces should seek: “The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, 
industrial and economic systems and the undermining of the morale of the German people to 
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a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.”341 According to Overy, 
Harris did not read this “as anything more than a statement of intent.”342 Now with a more 
powerful force of aircraft at its disposal, Bomber Command would still pursue the aims of 
General Directive Number 5 into the spring and summer of 1943. After Allied success in the 
Battle of the Ruhr during the spring – which saw sustained targeting of industrial targets – 
attention turned to Hamburg at the end of July.  
Historiography 
Two books published in the early part of the 1980s took the 1943 attacks on Hamburg as their 
subject. In 1981 Gordon Musgrove, a former Bomber Command navigator, wrote Operation 
Gomorrah: The Hamburg Firestorm Raids. A more thorough study of the attacks is The Battle of 
Hamburg by Martin Middlebrook, published in 1984.343 The latter takes in the planning phase, 
as well as comprehensive details of the attacks themselves and the conditions they caused in 
the city. While this was a significant addition to scholarship on the area bombing campaign, 
the author does not pass explicit judgment on the raid, instead leaving the reader to decide 
based on the wide-ranging testimony included. Middlebrook admitted to the difficulties of 
reaching a conclusion on whether the bombings could be considered acceptable. “Even after 
the post-war years of hindsight, and more than two years of personal study, I cannot decide 
upon a private answer to that question.”344 
Twenty years later the controversy over the bombing of Hamburg increased with the 
publication of two books in particular: The Fire by Jörg Friedrich and Among the Dead Cities by 
A. C. Grayling. Both have been mentioned already in other contexts; it is worth here 
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considering their relevance to Hamburg. Unlike Middlebrook, the authors were far from 
reticent as regards casting a judgment. Grayling’s book was published in 2006, the first year in 
which Friedrich’s became available in English. Before this Der Brand had already gained 
widespread attention in Germany where it had been serialised in the tabloid newspaper the 
Bild. The book caused controversy by raising the possibility of Churchill being labelled a war 
criminal. Friedrich was praised for having pried open a discussion of the catastrophic loss 
caused by the Allied Bomber Offensive, yet his book was also criticised for its apparently 
deliberately provocative stance: one which took the language of the Holocaust and applied it 
to German victims of air raids.345 Neo-Nazi factions have drawn succour from the book and 
appropriated anniversaries of bombing attacks, particularly that of the destruction of 
Dresden.346   
Friedrich did not play down this position, saying in an interview that “Churchill was the 
greatest child-slaughterer of all time.”347 With the rhetoric of war criminality resonating 
through the pages of the book, some sections in particular made provocative links to images of 
the Holocaust. For example, Friedrich writes that a large proportion of those killed by fire in 
Kassel and Hamburg “had been gassed to death in the cellars.”348 Elsewhere he describes in 
detail the fate of those caught up in the firestorm: “the quick, deadly breath with which life 
was taken from the world.”349 Though reaching similar, if less sensational conclusions to 
Friedrich, Grayling sought to put the cases both for and against area bombing in his book, and 
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to pass judgment accordingly. He did so at length but also with brevity, summing up his 
judgment of the area bombing campaign as follows:  
In short and in sum: was area bombing wrong? Yes.  
Very wrong?: Yes.350 
As well as describing the conditions on the ground in the city, Grayling uses the bombing of 
Hamburg as a critical test. It is his focal point through the book for the reason that the attacks 
took place at the height of the war when it was, despite what may have been a turning of the 
tide, “by no means securely won.” With a hint to what his ultimate judgment would be 
Grayling argued that if the area bombing of Hamburg was unjust, and potentially criminal, then 
so too must be the attack on Dresden for it took place at a point where the outcome of the 
war could no longer be seriously doubted.351 In 2007 Keith Lowe’s Inferno: The Devastation of 
Hamburg, 1943 was published. Lowe uses oral history – along with archival sources – to tell 
the story of the events from the perspective of those carrying out the attacks as well as people 
in Hamburg who experienced the bombing. It offers a wide-ranging account of the build-up to 
the bombings, as well as reflections on the events as they took place and their aftermath. 
Lowe does however under-represent the extent to which voices of concern or even dissent 
existed in Britain at the time. Away from the well-known figures of Bishop George Bell and the 
MP Richard Stokes, he identifies a tone of “pure triumph”, which as this chapter will show, 
needs to be assessed more carefully.352 
Hamburg does not conjure quite the same level of controversy as Dresden due to the time at 
which it was bombed, yet the scale of the damage and the high death toll ensure its prime 
place in the story of aerial bombardment during the Second World War. 
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Operations 
The Battle of Hamburg was, in the words of the official historians of the bomber war, “the high 
tide of Bomber Command’s achievement throughout this arduous campaign. No other town in 
Germany felt the weight of war in this period as Hamburg did in the last week of July and the 
first of August.” Hamburg represented the ultimate expression of what had first been tried in 
Mannheim two and a half years previously. And it was only part of the “path of destruction” 
Bomber Command planned to forge over the coming months which would lead to Berlin, and it 
was hoped, to an end to the war.353 
The build-up to, plans for and execution of the Battle of Hamburg have been covered in great 
detail elsewhere, but it will be useful here to discuss some of the key facts about the attacks. 
The city was attacked by both British and American aircraft from 24th July to 3rd August 1943. 
Though fires burned in the city throughout the period the most damaging attack came on the 
night of 27th/28th July. A firestorm took hold and was a major reason for the death toll of over 
18,000 people on that night alone.354 The bomber crews attacking Hamburg used, for the first 
time in the war, a particular radar countermeasure, the use of which had been placed on hold 
until that point. Code-named Window, the simple technology comprised bundles of small 
strips of aluminium foil which, when separated and dropped from a plane at one minute 
intervals, would effectively replicate the echo of a bomber on enemy radar. The effect was to 
entirely confuse the radar picture: creating false echoes where no bombers were; a sky full of 
noise without definition. Luftwaffe night-fighter planes, which were directed to their targets by 
radar, were sent out but could not provide any guarantee of finding the bombers. As Gordon 
Musgrove wrote in his history of the Hamburg raids, “[t]here was no lack of targets on 
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[German radar] and as [the Luftwaffe fighters] closed in for the kill they found themselves 
flying through clouds of paper reminiscent of a New York ticker-tape celebration.”355 With 
ground defences and fighters thrown into complete disarray, more Bomber Command planes 
were able to reach the target and drop their full bomb loads, and only twelve planes out of 
nearly 800 were lost on the first night of the attack: around 1.5% of the total force.356 Prior to 
the introduction of Window, Bomber Command losses had been on the increase. By way of 
comparison, twenty bombers had been lost during a raid on Aachen in mid-July. Less than half 
as many planes were used in this raid as were sent to Hamburg.357 Air Chiefs were delighted 
with the resulting low losses. A weekly report on Bomber Command activities contained the 
satisfied response: “[Window has] forced the German High Command to unstinted lying as to 
the number of British aircraft brought down by the defences.”358 
The simplicity of Window was, in fact the reason why it had been previously held back. There 
were fears, voiced particularly by the Minister for Home Security, Herbert Morrison, that the 
Germans would quickly replicate the technology and use it in attacks on Britain, increasing the 
danger to British civilians. In fact, German researchers had already prepared much the same 
system. Again, it had been held back for fear of leaking the secret.359 Until Window was 
dropped during the Hamburg attacks, there was the odd situation of both sides delaying the 
use of the same tool for fear of the other side copying it. Even in early 1943 the case against 
the introduction of Window was weakening. Morrison remained concerned about the greater 
dangers which German use of Window would pose to British civilians. Yet German bomber 
strength had been massively reduced and could no longer pose the same threat to British cities 
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as it had in 1940 and 1941. Max Hastings argues that even by the autumn of 1942 Luftwaffe 
bombers posed a “negligible threat” to Britain.360 And British bomber losses were rising – this 
could be challenged by the use of Window. Morrison eventually relented when the Chief of the 
Air Staff, Charles Portal, made clear the changed dynamic in the skies. In the summer of 1943 – 
far removed from 1940 – Window could more confidently be introduced. The introduction of 
Window was held back until after the invasion of Sicily in order to prevent the possibility of it 
being used defensively against the landing parties.361 Yet the decision, when it came, to finally 
allow the use of Window in the summer of 1943 indicates a clear judgment by the Air Ministry 
and the War Cabinet that where the air war was concerned, a turning point had been reached. 
The use of Window was authorised by Churchill on 15th July 1943 with effect from 23rd July.362 
Yet although Window helped confuse German defences, and therefore allowed more 
aeroplanes to reach their target, it could not increase the levels of damage per se. The attacks 
were not otherwise radically different to many other large raids on the Reich. The key factor in 
the creation of the firestorm was the remarkably hot, dry weather in Germany; the plans 
themselves were not exceptional. Sven Lindqvist writes: “In Hamburg, the [sic] Bomber 
Command succeeded in doing what the heavy bombers tried to do every night when they took 
off for Germany.” Window did not cause greater devastation; rather it allowed Bomber 
Command to get closer to achieving the full extent of their ambition.363 
The Operational Record Book for No. 83 Squadron reveals the vast extent of the fires created 
in Hamburg by the attack. The comments recorded for the raid on the night of 24th-25th July do 
not seem out of the ordinary: it is even suggested that the attack “seems scattered”.  Those for 
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the night of 27th-28th July though are dominated by notes on the firestorm. Among the more 
lurid observations are the following. “Large mass of fires with huge pall of smoke.” This image 
of one enormous fire raging out of control – also described in the record book as “one big 
mass of fires” – strongly indicates the firestorm which was raging through the city. New fires 
were observed to be starting within those already burning. And the impact of the fires was not 
just seen by the crews. “The heat of the fires could be felt in the aircraft”. The record of two 
nights later is less violent but clearly indicative of a stricken city. Fires “covering a large area” 
were still burning from previous attacks; they were seen as “large and extensive” across a wide 
area. Clearly the crews attacking Hamburg were seeing the results of an especially powerful 
and destructive series of attacks.364 
The first use of Window, coupled with the size of the fleets sent to Hamburg, reaffirm the 
significance of this attack. If these factors weren’t a clear enough signal to the crews involved, 
according to one of the men’s diaries, this was made clear in the briefings. Of Hamburg, he 
wrote in his diary: “It is impressed on us that this is the big one.” When smoke over the city 
prevented the collection of a clear sense of the success of the attack, the message was 
redoubled ahead of his next involvement. “Ops were on again that night and the briefing was 
much more serious. Crews are told that they must put HAMBURG out of action and we will 
keep going night after night until we do.”365  
In the previous chapter there was evidence of pilots’ diaries focusing on the technical nature of 
the raids. This is again visible at this stage of the war. The diary of A.L. Bartlett offers a great 
deal of detail on the nature of the raids but no personal comment; similarly Sergeant John 
Kevin Kilgary and Roy Moore record the raid on Hamburg with basic technical details and no 
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comment.366 AC1 L.J. Wilson found the first attack on Hamburg “exceptionally interesting” for 
the chief reason that Window was used for the first time. He was disappointed to discover, in 
advance of the attack of 2/3 August, that Hamburg remained a target.  Press reports had 
encouraged him to believe that “the town had literally been wiped off the map.”367 Other 
evidence shows that there was at times a tendency for flight crews to approach their work 
coolly; with a sense of duty rather than enthusiasm. In a letter to Charles Portal in the summer 
of 1942 Squadron Commander Donald Simmons wrote that within his crew:  
“[T]here is a great lack of urgency amongst them. They do their job conscientiously but 
without enthusiasm. They have not the desire to bomb Germany and hurt the Hun that I 
should like them to have, but I must admit, lethargic as they are on the ground, when 
they are in the air they settle to their job with more vigour, and the nearer they get to 
the target the more thorough appears to be their attitude.”368 
At this stage of the war Sergeant T. Kimmett is rare in that among the diaries found in research 
for this thesis in that he does pass comment on those under attack. Describing the “vast mass 
of fire” engulfing Hamburg he speculated: “It seemed impossible that any human being could 
survive in that inferno!”369 Flight Lieutenant Maurice Fordie Colvin acknowledges some level of 
impact on Berlin civilians during bombing raids in early 1944, yet this is framed in terms of the 
inconvenience – rather than terror – that the attacks would bring. “The Berliners must be 
getting a bit peeved”, he wrote in one entry at the end of January; a few days later he 
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suggested they would be “well and truly browned off”.370 At this point he reserved his greatest 
ire for colleagues who dropped unused bombs on the return flight:  
“Some bloody idiots will persist in jettisoning incendiaries on the track home and oh! lay 
[sic] would I like to get my hands on them. It gives the fighters all the gen they need. 
Namely the TRACK Home. Here’s hoping the B…..s get knocked down first it will serve 
them damn well right.”371 
One way to account for the general lack of comment on the fates of those under 
bombardment is the quite understandable fact that these men had very legitimate fears for 
their own lives. The rate of attrition within the ranks of Bomber Command was high: 55,573 
members of aircrew were killed during the war. And this figure does not, of course, account for 
the narrow escapes many had. Flight Engineer Albert Edward Lambert gives a particularly clear 
account of this. Like others, he comments on the “pleasing” nature of an operation to 
Frankfurt in terms of the success it had. His plane narrowly avoided detection by German 
searchlights though he witnessed others come under heavy fighter attack. Of the experience, 
he wrote: “I am pleased to say that I have been to Frankfurt but I wouldn’t say that I would like 
to go again. I doubt if any human being could stand up to those searchlight belts often. On Sep. 
12th every year I suppose I shall breathe a small prayer to thank God that I stood the strain.” 
Flight Engineer George W. Stevens is frank about his fears on the final attack during the main 
assault on Hamburg in the summer of 1943: “the worst and most terrifying [trip] I have ever 
experienced.” Electrical trouble beset a significant number of the aircraft used in the attacks. 
Where individuals such as Lambert and Stevens experienced such nerve-wracking operations, 
it is of no real surprise that they chiefly recorded thoughts on their own survival.372 
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At this stage it is also of value to return to Churchill’s views on the moral question of bombing. 
At no point in the war does he give a clear statement, yet evidence seems to suggest some 
level of conflict in his thoughts. In the previous chapter, discussion showed how Churchill’s 
speech to a County Hall audience inflated the level of public support for reprisals on German 
cities. In a letter to his brother in November 1941, Clement Attlee (whose private papers 
reveal no strong personal views on the nature of the bomber offensive) described Churchill’s 
“extreme sensitiveness to suffering”.373 This side to his character is evident in a fairly-often 
repeated anecdote from the early summer of 1943, shortly prior to the attacks on Hamburg. 
Watching footage from raids on the Ruhr, Churchill was recorded to exclaim: “Are we beasts? 
Are we taking this too far?” It was an example of, according to Paul Addison, one of Churchill’s 
“qualms of conscience”. Yet as Henry Pelling notes, there was always a pragmatic undertone: 
however unedifying the footage was, this was a direct source of help to the Russians.374  
Yet beyond pragmatism, Churchill clearly derived pride from this specific part of the work of 
Bomber Command, and he played the role of enthusiastic cheerleader in correspondence with 
Stalin. Through 1942 and 1943 Stalin gratefully received news of successful attacks on German 
cities and Churchill promised more to come. In a telegram to Attlee after meeting with Stalin in 
August 1942, Churchill wrote: “We then passed on to the ruthless bombing of Germany, which 
gave general satisfaction. Monsieur Stalin emphasised the importance of striking at the morale 
of the German population, and I made it clear that this was one of our leading military 
objectives.”375 Indeed, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt at the end of October 1942 – ahead of the 
Combined Bomber Offensive – arguing that: “An ever increasing weight of bomb discharge 
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upon Germany and Italy must be our unrelenting aim. In our view night-bombing has already 
yielded results which justify it being backed by the United States, at any rate as a follow-up to 
your day bombing.” This demonstrates Churchill’s commitment to an increasingly heavy 
bombing campaign.376 The following spring the mutually supportive correspondence between 
Stalin and Churchill continued.377  
While Churchill certainly appears to have been affected by viewing footage of aerial attacks, 
around a month after his “Are we beasts?” query, and just a week after the end of the Battle 
of Hamburg, Churchill maintained his hard-line approach when sending Stalin a series of 
photographs showing damage to German cities:  
“I hope you will find half an hour in which to look at them. This we know for certain, 
eighty percent of the houses in Hamburg are down. It is only now the question of a short 
time before the nights lengthen and even greater destruction will be laid upon Berlin. 
This subject only to weather. This will be continued for several nights and days and will 
be the heaviest ever known.”378 
David Reynolds notes that Churchill did need “to sound particularly bellicose when Stalin was 
accusing the British of inertia and even cowardice.” Yet he observes further that this expressed 
satisfaction with the achievements of Bomber Command was certainly not limited to his 
correspondence with Stalin.379 
As I will show elsewhere in this thesis, it is difficult to offer a definitive appraisal of Churchill’s 
views on the area bombing campaign, for he himself left no clear statement in private papers 
or in his history of the Second World War. What is evident here is that whatever qualms he 
experienced on particular occasions, he enthusiastically endorsed the campaign in his 
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correspondence with Stalin, and did not seriously attempt to moderate the level of bombing 
until after the attacks on Dresden in the final months of the war.  
Bombing Restriction Committee 
The national mood in the inter-war years supported anti-war sentiment. The cataclysmic loss 
of life in the trenches of the Western Front during the First World War undermined support for 
the military and during the early 1920s numbers training at Sandhurst and Woolwich 
decreased.380 Vera Brittain’s 1933 volume Testament of Youth became a best-seller (selling out 
its original 3,000 copy print-run on the first day of publication) and sought to challenge the 
notion that the story of the First World War should be told by those who had experienced 
trench warfare.381 In 1921 the No More War Movement was initiated and this body merged 
with the Peace Pledge Union in 1937. Among its members were many prominent public 
figures, including Brittain, as well as a large number of members of the public. The onset of the 
Second World War though forced many committed pacifists to consider whether their beliefs 
were compatible with the nature of the conflict, and pushed some into adopting a more 
pragmatic position in the face of the threat from fascism. Martin Ceadel addresses the 
challenge which the rise of the Nazi party presented to pacifists in Britain. How, practically, 
could peace achieved or maintained in these times? Indeed, according to Ceadel, the early 
years of war helped fracture the pacifist movement.382 As A. C. Grayling has written, the widely 
held assumption that the war against Hitler was a just one ensured that there were fewer 
conscientious objectors in Britain during World War Two, and among many pacifists, there was 
a recognition that their pacifism would have to manifest itself in line with the realities of the 
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conflict.383 In his article ‘Pacifism and the Blitz, 1940-1941’, Richard Overy shows how the 
transition to war, and particularly a movement against the aerial bombardment of civilians, 
presented an opportunity for pacifists to define their beliefs and, further, to involve non-
pacifists who did not support that method of waging the war. The fragmenting of a wider 
pacifist movement, hastened by the growing tensions in Europe in the 1930s and by the 
outbreak of the Second World War, forced those with pacifist beliefs to defend, to refine, and 
in some cases to redefine, how they understood this faith. For some, as Overy outlines, the 
result was a shift towards helping protect civilians facing new dangers, rather than to renounce 
war entirely.384  
Journalist Thomas Foley and economist H. Stanley Jevons were the driving forces behind early 
campaigns against the bombing of civilians. In the summer of 1941, Foley and Corder 
Catchpool, a British Quaker Pacifist, set up the Committee for the Abolition of Night, 
formalising and consolidating approaches for challenging both Allied and Axis powers to 
actively end attacks which endangered civilian life.385 The committee counted among its 
members not only pacifists, but also those who were opposed to the bombing of civilians. 
After the area bombing campaign began in earnest in February 1942 the organisation was 
replaced by the Bombing Restriction Committee.386 The bombing of Cologne was, according to 
the committee, the trigger for the creation of the latter body. The original members had 
“divergent views on the moral aspects of warfare [but] were united in their horror” at the 
attack on Cologne.387 
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The Quaker community more widely had not sought reprisals earlier in the war when Britain 
was coming under nightly attack. In several letters to the Editor of the Friend, the Quaker 
newspaper, which describe the bomb damage caused to Friends Houses around the country, 
there are no calls for reprisals against Germany. Mary H. Lee, from Prescot, Lancashire, wrote 
to say that her and her husband had found comfort – after seeing the aftermath of an attack 
on Liverpool – in “pray[ing] for the slayers and the slain”.388 At the annual meeting of the 
Peace Committee of the Society of Friends in 1942 the argument against bombing was still 
being made in non-partisan terms. Rather, this was an opportunity to challenge both sides’ 
willingness to bomb cities; a chance to mourn “innocent victims” in both Britain and Germany. 
Bombing, those present agreed, “implies a lowering of man’s moral standard.” The continued 
bombing of cities was evidence that “men’s minds and tempers were changing for the 
worse.”389 
There is a discernible change in outlook around the time of the bombing of Hamburg and this 
can be seen in the publications of the Bombing Restriction Committee. Prior to the attacks 
Jevons and Catchpool wrote a pamphlet (having discussed the content in committee meetings) 
calling on the Government “to abandon its present policy of area bombing and of night 
bombing under unfavourable conditions, and to reduce to the minimum the incidental killing 
of civilians in their homes.” They referred to a series of press reports of mass destruction in 
German cities and to photographs which showed that Allied bombing had destroyed civic 
buildings and residential areas. As well as casting doubt on the assumption that the war could 
be won, or even shortened, by bombing, the pamphlet warned of a lowering of “the moral 
standard of the whole world.” What was at stake is most clearly outlined in the following 
statement: “This Committee is as anxious as anyone to see an end to the horrors of Nazi rule, 
                                                          
388 LSF: Box L 23/01, Mary H. Lee to the Editor of The Friend. 
389 LSF: 051.56 [Peace Cttee 5/48], ‘Will hatred help?’ Society of Friends. London Yearly Meeting. Peace 
Committee (1888-1965) (London : Society of Friends. London Yearly Meeting. Peace Committee (1888-
1965)). 
137 
 
but strongly objects to the inhuman and un-English practice of making war on defenceless 
civilians.” The BRC supported (certainly in its public pronouncements) the war against Hitler 
but was adamant bombing civilians was not the right way to carry out the war.390 
The BRC published a pamphlet in the autumn of 1943 entitled “Bomb, burn and ruthlessly 
destroy” – its title taken from a quote attributed to Minister of Information Brendan Bracken. 
Setting up the argument to be made, the pamphlet asked: “Is the British nation, while winning 
the war, in danger of losing its own soul?” It was, the authors stated, “impossible to reconcile” 
the words of Clement Attlee and Archibald Sinclair in parliament, to the effect that no 
indiscriminate bombing of Germany was taking place, with the press reports from German 
cities. It is important to state here that, as with the wording of the poll carried out by Mass-
Observation with regards to reprisals (discussed in the previous chapter) the word 
“indiscriminate” could be open to interpretation. Nevertheless the juxtaposition of the press 
reports and particularly Bracken’s words is striking. Bracken had told the press: “Our plans are 
to bomb, burn and ruthlessly destroy in every way available to us the people responsible for 
creating this war. The Government is already pledged to bring to trial those responsible for the 
war.” The contradiction in this statement seems to be glaring: the authors of the pamphlet 
made this clear. Again, it drives at the heart of the matter, showing that it was quite possible 
to support the war effort without supporting all the methods employed to try to win it. 
Bomber Command’s policy was, according to the BRC, ““to bomb, burn and ruthlessly destroy” 
without trial, those who are not responsible for creating the war, including many thousands of 
children.” (original emphasis). The authors called on the Government to clarify its position with 
regards to the bombing campaign.391  
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A. C. Grayling has examined in detail the impact of the Hamburg attacks on Vera Brittain’s Seed 
of Chaos and for this reason I will not address this publication at length. It should be noted 
however that Brittain made careful use of the lurid foreign press reports in Seed of Chaos to 
highlight the bleak situation in Hamburg. The book was also an attempt to systematically 
unpick those arguments in favour of area bombing; Brittain concluded that even beyond the 
moral case for avoiding the bombing of cities, there was no procedural evidence that it could 
shorten the war.392 Y. Aleksandra Bennett notes Brittain’s frustration at the way in which her 
book was received by critics; specifically for a failure to see “that the protest was not against 
bombing, but against a type of bombing, namely area or saturation bombing.”393 
As the attacks on Berlin continued into 1944 the poet Winifred Rawlins wrote ‘An open letter 
to followers of Jesus”. The letter is grounded in its author’s faith, and laments the images of 
“distraught, fear-racked mothers of terrified children”, and the “grief and shame” that this was 
now the way in which the war was being carried out. That the scale of the bomber war was 
increasingly dramatically, with German people bearing the brunt, was again emphasised. 
Rawlins references the blitzed British cities: “memories of London, Coventry, Exeter rush into 
our minds” but makes clear that the nature of the bombing had now changed. “[T]he scale of 
the horror is growing week by week”, she wrote, quickly demonstrating the diminishing sense 
of a shared horror.394 
Although the Bombing Restriction Committee had a staunch ally in Bishop George Bell, their 
wider impact and ability to shape or challenge bombing policy was limited.395 Like Bell, they 
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recognised that the Archbishop of Canterbury had a more powerful voice in the public arena. 
The influence of the leader of the Anglican Church will now be considered to demonstrate that 
despite a strong will of a significant group of people to challenge the bombing policy, this 
strength was undermined by lack of support from an influential figure.  
The Church 
Stephen Lammers has argued that the Church in the United States was “generally silent” on 
the issue of area bombing in Germany and Japan. A similar story can be told in Britain.396 The 
official silence of the Church of England can be considered here in terms of how it was 
challenged from beneath. Indeed the story is one which sees engagement with the issue 
reaching a blockage in the form the Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple. After 
becoming Archbishop of Canterbury in April 1942, Temple received, in the months before and 
after Hamburg was bombed, letters from people raising serious concerns about the way in 
which the bomber war was being carried out. As I will outline in this section, any reservations 
he did have were eroded through the course of his tenure. 
Temple was seen by many Christians in this country – not just by Anglicans – as, in the words 
of A. E. Baker, an “inevitable leader and spokesman.” Temple had been involved in the 
formation of the British Council of Churches as well as the Council of Christians and Jews. 
Bishop George Bell – a vocal opponent of area bombing – tried to defer to Temple (and indeed 
Cosmo Lang before him) the task of protesting the campaign in parliament, and many of 
Temple’s correspondents told him that his influence made him the right person to question 
the policy.397 Despite a decline in religious observance through twentieth century Britain, 
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Callum G. Brown writes of the Second World War: “there is clear evidence that Christian 
culture remained at the forefront of the national reaction to wartime emergencies.”398 As will 
be apparent in the discussion of Mass-Observation directive responses – discussed later in this 
chapter – a number respondents alloyed their concern about bombing to disappointment at a 
lack of religious protest. The Church of England remained the most obvious body for that 
protest. 
Temple did not share the same concern about the bombing of Germany. He was though 
generous with his time and regularly gave reasoned responses to those who wrote to him. In 
December 1942 – the winter before the major attacks on Hamburg – Temple outlined his 
thoughts on area bombing in a letter to Ashley Sampson. Sampson, of Kensington, London, had 
written to Temple hoping to secure support for a manifesto, the central tenet of which was to 
propose a “formal or informal” pact between the warring nations to end the bombing of cities. 
The sentiment was in line with the feeling that the war was perhaps starting to turn in the 
Allies’ favour. Sampson’s manifesto outlined how Christians believed: “that a time has come in 
which our superior strength should enable us to set an example to the world by humanising 
warfare instead of increasing its horrors.”399 There is a certain naivety to the contention that 
Hitler would agree to the proposal on the grounds that Nazi aerial prowess was now weaker 
than that of the Allies. Nevertheless by outlining the rationale Sampson gave Temple the 
platform to sketch his views on how Allied policy should be formulated. He argued that 
restricting bombardment to purely military objectives would have three key advantages. It 
would ensure the British cause retained a sense of “humanity”; thousands of “innocent lives” 
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would be saved; and, with a view to the future, it would “remove that growing sense of 
bitterness” which would impede any hopes for “a just and lasting peace”.400 
Temple was largely unmoved by the proposal. In his reply he noted that while he agreed that 
residential quarters should be avoided in bombing attacks, he believed this had been adhered 
to by the RAF. Though still eight months before the massive attack on Hamburg, Temple’s faith 
in this aspect of bombing policy was misplaced. The official switch to area bombing was 
approaching its first anniversary. Temple outlined his thoughts on bombing policy (and military 
policy more generally). It is worth reproducing at some length here for his central argument 
was one which he returned to regularly in correspondence with many other people who wrote 
to him, even as the scale of bombardment increased. He wrote: 
“The fundamental consideration in my mind is this. We have no business to be at war at 
all unless by fighting we can, or believe we can, serve the purpose of God. If believing 
that we enter upon war it becomes a primary duty to fight effectively. Indeed, this 
consideration then takes precedence of nearly all others. The worse of all things is to 
fight and do it ineffectively.”401 
The argument was clear: Temple was satisfied that the Allied cause was just. This being the 
case, it was unacceptable to constrain attacks in a way which reduce the effectiveness of the 
campaign against Nazi Germany. Before signing off his letter Temple conceded that Sampson 
may find his thoughts “very shocking. I know that some good Christians do.”402 Here is a clear 
indication that even at the time, there was an acknowledgement from the very top of the 
Church of England that the issue of area bombing was divisive within the religious community. 
Sampson accepted the response from Temple cordially, but not without disagreement. Indeed, 
he argued that the failure to condemn area bombing would create division within the Church 
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when the “appalling reaction comes”.403 As Andrew Chandler writes of this exchange, 
Sampson’s letter was “a firm invitation to the State to take the moral high ground.” It was not 
an invitation which Temple accepted.404 
In correspondence with other writers in the early summer of 1943 Temple continued to argue 
both that fighting effectively was the only viable course, and that he believed the RAF was 
seeking actively to strike military targets.405 The persistence of those who wrote to him on the 
subject (and perhaps the volume of letters) seem to have contributed to Temple’s rather curt 
tone when he replied to a request by the Anglican Pacifist Fellowship for him to receive a 
deputation who would make the case for a Church protest in early July 1943. Temple replied 
that he was very busy and advised that he saw no reason why the case could not be made in 
writing.406  
Very soon afterwards Karlin Capper-Johnson of the Bombing Restriction Committee wrote to 
Temple with a direct request that he contact the Air Ministry to ask officially whether a change 
in bombing policy had taken place. A similar request was made by the British Council of 
Churches.407 Temple did write to Archibald Sinclair; he did ask whether a change of policy had 
taken place. Yet the phrasing of his question is far from interrogative; his tone cordial, collegial 
and revealing of Temple’s apparent exasperation towards opponents of the area bombing 
campaign. The letter is a gentle query which does not suggest that there is any intention to 
probe too deeply. After outlining the nature of the letters he had been “bombarded” with, 
Temple told Sinclair:  
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“I have continued to say that I see no evidence of this [a change in policy to “deliberately 
destroying cities irrespective of military objectives”] and believe the Government’s 
former statement holds the field. But I should be very grateful if you could let me have a 
line to assure me that this is correct.”408  
The lack of any real intent in Temple’s enquiry afforded Sinclair the chance to merely agree 
that no change in policy had taken place. Sinclair told Temple that: “it is no part of our policy 
wantonly to destroy cities”. Given the switch to area bombing and the ‘dehousing’ discussion 
in the previous months, perhaps only the interpretation of the word “wantonly” can be at 
issue here. Sinclair’s response though was one which Temple was happy to confirm to Capper-
Johnson.409 On this point Chandler is clear: Temple accepted – and passed on to his 
correspondents – a judgment on the bomber offensive which was not compatible with the 
material effects of the campaign. He writes: “Temple was increasingly guilty of expounding a 
morality in defence of obliteration bombing which did not correlate with the effects and 
realities of British military policy.”410 And on the eve of the commencement of the Battle of 
Hamburg, Temple answered a letter written to him by George Bell, the Bishop of Chichester, 
which further underlines his position. Bell was one of a small number of public figures who 
challenged the bombing of cities and their civilians. He was prepared to speak out publically 
about the bombing of Germany but, like others, saw Temple as the better positioned to do 
so.411  
Bell had written to Temple the previous day to request that the Archbishop of Canterbury ask 
a question on the subject in the House of Lords. Bell told Temple that he was prepared to ask 
such a question but thought it would be better coming from the more senior man. Temple 
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rebutted the request: it is unsurprising given the content of his letters described here that he 
told Bell it was not a concern he shared.412 
So it was that the destruction of Hamburg began on 24th July 1943 with a good deal of concern 
amongst many Christians, but no authoritative word of protest. The level of damage and the 
high loss of life in the city had an evident impact on the pitch of the letters Temple received in 
the months that followed.413 Indeed his correspondents appear increasingly frustrated by the 
Archbishop’s stance following the attacks on Hamburg. He received a letter from a Mrs 
Roberts [sic] in which she both called for protest but also acknowledged that Temple’s 
“standards of what is justifiable have changed”.414 In his reply Temple accepts that the attack 
on Hamburg was more destructive than other raids but places it within the context of the 
wider campaign. His underlying justification for the attack remained the same, but had evolved 
from what he wrote to correspondents earlier in the year. He continues to argue that fighting 
effectively is essential in a just war, but adds the following: “now that aviation has been 
invented you cannot in fact avoid such attacks upon military objectives, including industrial 
equipment, as involve very large-scale destruction of civilian houses.” Where before Temple 
had justified area bombing and the fact that occasionally civilians would unfortunately be 
killed, he now justified the “very large-scale” destruction of residential areas and with it, the 
death of civilians. Hamburg was, according to Temple, a “vast” example of the “occasional 
disasters” which came with area bombing, but was not a reason to alter the strategy.415 The 
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letter then does not represent a wholesale change in Temple’s attitude; rather a minor 
adaption to take into account the level of destruction at Hamburg. 
Another correspondent, Denis Riley, from Horsforth, West Yorkshire, appalled by reports in the 
Yorkshire Post about Hamburg, wrote to Temple: “I am puzzled that you as leader of the 
Church have made no public pronouncement on the matter, as I can hardly conceive that you 
can approve.” Temple acknowledged in his reply the “peculiarly dreadful” nature of reports of 
thousands of civilians drowning after the Elbe Tunnel was hit. This was though, he wrote, “in 
the nature of a colossal accident.” Here Temple’s reply receives an angered response. The 
correspondent read the reply with “incredulity”, he writes, telling Temple that “if the R.A.F. 
decide that air war on centres of civilian population is good policy, you toe the line; moral and 
religious principles must take second place.”416 
Ian and Dorothy Dryden from Finchley approached Temple from a different angle. Grudgingly 
accepting that the Church had missed its chance to take a firm stand against area bombing, 
they offered Temple the opportunity to support a “less revolutionary suggestion”. Arguing that 
“the bombing question has scarcely been honestly faced at all” they proposed one of two 
courses of action for two controversial policies: the lack of adequate food relief in occupied 
countries and bombing policy. Either, the Drydens argued, those in government should assume 
individual responsibility for the policies, or referendums should be held giving people a chance 
“to place on record that a not inconsiderable minority in Britain repudiates one or both of 
these policies.”417 As with the letter from Ashley Sampson containing his manifesto, there may 
be a naivety here if the authors thought either proposition would be seriously considered. It is 
perhaps more likely that this was simply a different attempt to get Temple to engage with the 
discussion and justify the silence of the Church. In either case, the reply was unsubstantial. 
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Indeed, Temple entirely omits any discussion of the Drydens’ proposals in his letter to them, 
content instead to repeat his previously made argument on the need for effective fighting.418  
Several correspondents thus found that rather than their concerns feeding into a broad shared 
movement which could be escalated and mobilised, the person who they saw as a natural 
voice for protest did not support their views. Temple remained unmoved as Berlin began to 
feel the increasing weight of aerial warfare.419  
The evidence collected by Mass-Observation will be discussed in greater length later in this 
chapter. It is useful here though to include the thoughts of some of those people who 
responded to a December 1943 Directive concerning the bombing campaign. Their words 
demonstrate a clear sense both of an inability to effectively protest, and of anger at the failure 
of the church to intervene in the face of an “unchristian” campaign.420 One wrote: “I just wish 
it were possible to make some effective protest, not just a gesture calling attention to myself 
and of not the remotest benefit to the victims.” He goes on to write: “what strikes me as 
amazing is the grotesque way in which our churchleaders (“Crusaders against barbarism”) turn 
their consciences over to the military authorities – if bombing helps “victory”, then bomb, 
whatever the Gospel may suggest.”421 This second quotation has echoes in another 
respondent’s thoughts. He wrote: “I also feel depressed that so few of our so-called “leaders”  
in Church and State raise their voices against this kind of thing.”422 This disappointment in the 
general silence of the Church is evident in another respondent’s words – this time with a direct 
comparison of the unparalleled reaction to German and British bombing respectively. “I 
remember our attitude to the destruction of Warsaw and Rotterdam, outcry by Archbishops 
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etc. But now our turn has come the leaders of our Christian Churches are strangely silent.”423 
Clearly not everyone who opposed the bombing wrote to their Christian leaders. Yet this is 
clear evidence that the lack of official protest was regarded as an unacceptable omission by 
some of those who were concerned about the conduct of war. 
Press responses 
At the beginning of July 1943 Winston Churchill had sent an ominous message to Nazi 
Germany. During a speech at the Guildhall in London where the Prime Minister was made a 
Freeman of the City, he made clear the fervour with which Bomber Command would now 
attack the Reich. There was, according to Churchill, “no industrial or military target in Germany 
that will not receive as we deem necessary the utmost application of exterminating force.”424 
This public pronouncement, with its emphasis on “industrial” and “military” targets, was in 
keeping with the attempt to hide information about attacks on civilian areas. As Richard Overy 
writes: “Bomber Command maintained this strategic objective throughout the war, while 
veiling its deliberate attack on civilians from the wider public.”425 
In an editorial in the Times just three days before the opening of what would soon be termed 
‘the Battle of Hamburg’, the author addressed the subject of a USAAF attack on Rome. The 
bombing of Rome remained a controversial topic and much speculation arose over whether it 
could be deemed an open city. Supporting the attack – “a military operation pure and simple” 
– the author went on to both affirm the policy of targeting military installations and to play 
down the significance of damage caused to the wider metropolitan area. “To that purpose [the 
striking of military and/or industrial targets] bombing policy has conformed and will continue 
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to conform, and from it it must not be diverted by fear of unintended damage incidental to the 
main necessity.” The sentiment is that the RAF and USAAF should not worry unduly about 
collateral damage, so long as military targets remain the key focus of bombing policy.426 It was 
with this article that Desmond MacCarthy took issue in a letter to the editor on 22nd July, two 
days prior to the first sorties to Hamburg. His issue specifically concerned the morale of 
citizens in nations at war, for whom, he argued, a secure knowledge that hostilities were being 
waged in a justifiable manner was vital. Morale, he contended, “depends upon the conviction 
that one’s own country stands for the right, for desirable life, for civilisation, which is 
enormously intensified by evidence that the enemy, on the contrary, cares for none of those 
things.” MacCarthy’s lament is indicative of that section of the British public, whose views 
probably account for most of those presented through this thesis, which supported the war 
but was not happy for it to be waged without restraint. Continuing the argument for the 
importance of morale, MacCarthy argued for the possibility “that bombing Rome has been 
good for Italian morale and bad for ours.”427 The flaw in this reasoning was explained in a reply 
by the author A. A. Milne two days later. Milne was a pacifist but, like a number of others, saw 
clear justification within the parameters of his beliefs for supporting the war against Hitler. 
Describing the fact of the precautions taken by the Allies before the bombing of Rome, Milne 
drew a contrast with the failure of the Axis Powers to do so before “Guernica, Rotterdam, 
Belgrade, London, Coventry, Exeter and Abyssinia. This [the bombing of Rome] cannot fortify 
Italian morale.”428 As the adopted policy of area bombing reached new levels of destruction 
with the repeated assault on Hamburg, questions began to be raised as to how this fitted in 
with British policy. 
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The Times on the whole wrote fairly soberly about the raids on Hamburg. Bernhard Rieger has 
written: “The coverage of the large air raids on Hamburg in 1943 and Dresden in 1945 in The 
Times contained virtually no triumphalism.”429 Although the report of the first attack does 
mention the “record” weight of bombs dropped, this is secondary in focus to the effects of the 
raid on the city. The article tells of “vast fires in Germany’s biggest seaport”; and states that 
“[d]ense black smoke rose four miles into the air, and there are many reports of violent 
explosions.” As was customary, the article highlighted that the raid had targeted military 
installations, in this case the submarine building industry. A Lancaster navigator is quoted from 
the AMNS report (also reproduced in the Manchester Guardian). Flight Lieutenant J. D. 
Henderson said: “A yellow light lit up the whole aircraft. I looked down at the fire below; it was 
like a huge mushroom of flames.”430  
In the lead article on the bombing in the Manchester Guardian that day, the mention of 
Hamburg’s importance to the Nazi war industry does not come until after the article notes the 
city’s “population of 1,150,000 people.” Although this provides detail to the statement that 
Hamburg is Germany’s “second largest city”, the inclusion of the number of people living there 
does give the reader an opportunity to consider the civilian population. As the extent of the 
devastation became more widely known over the coming days this factor would be critical.431 
The newspaper’s coverage was augmented by the use of reports from Germany. This was 
presented under a sub-headline ““Heavy damage” – Berlin” and was quoted without criticism. 
“A strong formation of British bombers last night carried out a terror raid on the town of 
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Hamburg which caused heavy losses among the population and great destruction to residential 
quarters, cultural monuments, and public buildings.”432 
As the days passed and Bomber Command continued to attack the city, the Times and the 
Manchester Guardian coverage remained initially focused on the huge fires that had engulfed 
Hamburg. The Times made mention of the observations by flight crews that the fires had been 
visible several miles away as they approached the city, fires which were already “so much out 
of control”.433 A focus on the massive nature of the fires is apparent throughout the Times’ 
reporting of Hamburg. On 2nd August for example: “great fires were still burning in the port, 
and smoke extended for 50 miles. Hamburg had then been on fire for eight days and nights.”434 
The Manchester Guardian referred to the reconnaissance photographs taken by American 
planes which “showed the city still burning after the R.A.F. raid on Saturday”, and later to flight 
crews on a mission to Kiel, 100km north of Hamburg, noticing “two large clouds and fire” rising 
above Hamburg.435 
On 29th July there is a shift, particularly in the Times, to addressing those carrying out the raids, 
rather than those under the bombs. The media were in part driven by what information the Air 
Ministry News Service provided, and this understandably aimed to focus on the efforts of the 
bombers rather than on conditions for those in the city.436 Both newspapers noted two days 
later that Hamburg had now received more bombs than any city before it.437 There remains in 
the newspapers however a sense of restraint, with no celebration of the new scale which 
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aerial bombardment now operated on. The closest is perhaps the Times’ admission that while 
the attack had been a “severe test”, it represented a “conspicuous success”. “Air bombing”, 
the article informed, had “reached a new intensity”.438 An editorial written two days later gives 
further clarity to the Times’ position. Here the policy is endorsed, but, it would seem, with a 
degree of reluctance, and squarely on the grounds that it could bring the war to a close. “It is a 
bleak outlook and there can be no doubt of the contribution that strategic bombing has made 
to the cumulative result. The essence of the bombing policy is the crescendo, which is 
assured.”439  
The Manchester Guardian continued to use foreign sources to tell the story of the bombing. A 
front page article, using information from Danish radio, told on 1st August of how “streams of 
refugees are leaving the burning city.” Later the article continued: “Eyewitnesses say that it is 
impossible to have any idea of how terribly the city has been mauled. Every district has been 
hit and enormous damage has been caused by fire.” A story in the Swedish press, based on 
Swedish sailors who had seen the destruction, claimed “the Hamburg population was not 
prepared for such violent attacks.”440 The following day this was supplemented with 
quotations from the Stockholm correspondent of the Associated Press. “It is a place of 
smouldering dust and rubble…and is virtually deserted.”441 Reports from Zurich then added a 
figure of 30,542 killed, wounded or missing in the city.442 Wounded and evacuated citizens 
taken to Berlin fed the rising sense of panic that the capital would be the next target of such a 
heavy raid, according to the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter, a source for the Manchester 
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Guardian.443 Already a dramatic story was emerging of mass death and chaos in the city – one 
which could not be told without reference to foreign media outlets.  
Three articles in the Manchester Guardian published on 4th, 6th and 8th August continued to 
add detail to the picture already created of death, destruction and disorganisation in Hamburg. 
They are all relatively sizeable articles, each giving further indications of the size and 
significance of the attacks. Reference to foreign media sources is important, but the 
newspaper goes further than merely relying on these.  
The first article gives context for the British reader as to the size of the area affected: “an area 
equal to almost seven times that of the City of London.” This was, the paper reminded readers, 
“the most concentrated battering in history”. As before, it is when using foreign sources that 
the article gains most colour. In Washington there was now an awareness of what was 
described as the “unparalleled horror” in Hamburg. An eyewitness speaking to the German 
press said: “The town, after being paralyzed by the preceding raids, became a howling inferno 
on Monday night…A wind rose during the attack and spread the flames.” This was the 
firestorm, and its effects are made more chilling by the words of a Danish consular official. 
“District after district was literally razed to the ground. When you drive through Hamburg you 
drive through corpses.”444 
The second article, two days later, was an editorial under the simple and bleak headline “Black 
summer”. It painted Hamburg as a turning point in the war. After years of “confidence in 
victory”, Nazi Germany was now showing “internal strain” and “desperation”. The story also 
touches on the links to the First World War, saying that: “A new legend is already in creation.” 
“[I]f the air war brings demoralisation…it will be another “stab in the back”; it will be the civil 
population that has let the glorious, invincible army down.” If this opened the idea that the 
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bombing of Hamburg could lead to an Allied victory sooner rather than later, there was no 
revelry in that fact. The author makes clear not only that the bombing of Germany was worse 
than that which British people had had to withstand – Bomber Command’s activities were on 
an “immensely vaster scale” – but also, crucially, that it took in housing as well as military 
installations and industrial plants. “The physical destruction, both of industry and homes, is 
many times greater, but [due to the greater scale on which Bomber Command operated] the 
psychological effects are also greater.” Any remaining illusions that the RAF was only striking 
targets that made a direct contribution to the Nazi war effect were undercut simply by a short 
sub-clause. The article notes that while Britain’s “evil days” of evacuation soon ended, 
“Germany’s are only just beginning.”445 
The final article of the three gives greater detail on the growing chaos in Germany, particularly 
around Hamburg and Berlin. The disorganisation is encapsulated immediately in this front 
page story by the observation that as Berliners were evacuated in expectation of massive raids, 
refugees from Hamburg arrived in the city. Swedish reports linked the scenes on the outskirts 
of Hamburg to evocative images from elsewhere during the war. “The roads leading out of 
Hamburg,” according to these reports, “presented the same picture as the French roads in 
June, 1940: endless streams of refugees, pushing prams and hand carts, aimlessly wandering 
away from the stricken city.” Further confirmation of the grave conditions came in the form of 
testimony from the secretary of the Danish Consulate in Hamburg, who thought that “the city 
appears to be dead”. References to the evacuation of “mothers and small children” and to 
“bombed out families” sit alongside the reference to “homes” in the “Black summer” article to 
once again make this a story of civilian suffering.446 
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From this point, the scale and importance in the German mind of the series of huge attacks on 
Hamburg were emphasised. “The reverses at Orel, Bielgorod,447 and in Sicily,448 grave as they 
are, are completely overshadowed in the public mind by the impression created by the 
immense destruction at Hamburg.”449 Reports in the British press after the end of the Battle of 
Hamburg showed the deep impression the raids had left in the minds of the German people. In 
a news article on 17th August the Times described how Hitler was “steadfastly refus[ing]” to 
acknowledge the suffering of those living in bombed areas. Yet it was the bomber offensive – 
and its increasing ability to strike at will throughout Germany – that had become the “greatest 
preoccupation of the German civilians”. Commenting on the “desolation and disorganization” 
caused by attacks on the Reich, the article placed Hamburg at the centre of the new fears of 
bombing. “Hamburg has become a nightmare which is spreading fear even to the remotest 
areas of Germany.”450 In fact, as the same newspaper had already reported, the worst fears 
stretched even beyond the remotest areas of Germany. An article in the Times in mid-August 
reported on the claims in the Hungarian newspaper the Pester Lloyd which sought to place 
distance between Hungary and the Luftwaffe.451 
During the Battle of the Ruhr, and just a month before the opening raids on Hamburg, the 
News Chronicle painted a picture of the escalating destruction caused by Bomber Command. 
The paper’s Air Correspondent Ronald Walker wrote leading articles on consecutive days. The 
first accompanied a photograph of the damage in Düsseldorf, an image that according to 
Walker showed “a dead city. It was killed in a night.” Later he described the new silence in the 
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city: “miles of once-busy street where there is no traffic, no sign of life.”452 The following day 
Walker relayed the Berlin outcry at the damage to Oberhausen, where survivors “look like 
walking shadows”.453 This willingness to show the true nature of the bombing campaign 
continued into the Battle of Hamburg. Like many newspapers, the News Chronicle led with the 
news of Mussolini’s departure on July 26th, but another front-page article also opined that the 
opening attacks on Hamburg demonstrated, in relation to Allied air power, an “extension of its 
influence”.454 Three days later the paper reported that the raids had been “raised to a pitch 
never before attained.” Following the earlier description of Düsseldorf as a “dead city”, 
Hamburg in the midst of its firestorm was given a similar appraisal. “Great parts of the city 
have simply ceased to exist.” Ronald Walker also considered the implications for the bombing 
campaign in general, and how this form of attack fitted in with the current policy. He 
foreshadows the massive area attacks carried out later in the war, culminating in the 
destruction of Dresden, and is clear that Arthur Harris is directing the policy. The attacks so far, 
Walker wrote, “probably came nearer than any other series of attacks in Germany to the 
Harris aim of blotting out a target.” The euphemistic tone of the words “blotting out” might sit 
more uncomfortably in an article more celebratory of the scale of the raids. Here though, in an 
article which could leave its readers with little doubt as to the terror caused by the bombs, it 
seems to allude to the thinking of those planning the attacks, rather than attempting to 
downplay their effects. A similar impression is created by a quotation which ends the article 
with a sense of emptiness. Another News Chronicle reporter, Stanley Baron, who had been at 
an R.A.F. base, wrote: “When the bombers had passed, the area had been erased – just 
that.”455  
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The absence of a triumphant tone was maintained as the bombs continued to fall, but the 
News Chronicle did not produce the kind of direct challenge to the bombing policy which could 
have led to closer attention from the censors. An article on the final day of July described, 
factually, the non-stop fires in Hamburg and noted that this was the biggest ever bombing 
attack. “The obliteration of Hamburg goes on.”456 A separate article the same day collated 
testimony from a number of sources which would alert readers to the human cost of the 
attacks and their not exclusively military or industrial nature. One eyewitness describes the 
bleak scene of civilians fleeing the city to escape the fires and the continue bombing. “Masses 
of humanity, including many injured, are fleeing towards the east, not only along the roads, 
but along paths through the fields.” A Swedish sailor suggested that the district of St. Pauli, 
close to the port area of Hamburg, “was as good as wiped from the face of the earth.” The 
significant damage to residential areas was also evident. “Whole rows of houses in the Altona 
district, around the main railway station, are now rubble.”457 The Daily Telegraph’s Stockholm 
correspondent Ossian Goulding gave an especially graphic account. “The heat from the new 
British incendiary bombs was so intense that “burning asphalt made the streets look like rivers 
of fire.”458 
The reporting in the News Chronicle of the bomber war cannot be described exclusively as 
following a line of implied concern about the human cost in Germany. A more pragmatic 
position was adopted, for example, in an article in mid-August concerning the question of 
open cities. The Military Critic Major Philip Cribble considered the potential targeting of Rome 
and noted that in an era of total war it was necessary to recalibrate the understanding of the 
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term “open city”. Tactical issues clouded thinking. “Today, in practice to exempt the strategic 
centres from aerial attack would be to play directly into the enemy’s hands.”459 
The previous chapter showed how Mannheim – which was explicitly not to have received any 
special news coverage – became a reference point in reporting of further bombing raids. Much 
the same thing can be observed in press reports following the Battle of Hamburg. Indeed, the 
effects of the bombing of Hamburg are presented as a benchmark for the subsequent attacks 
on Berlin, for example, to be measured against. The “Hamburg scale” becomes almost a refrain 
which runs through a number of articles written by the Observer’s Air Correspondent Frederick 
Tomlinson in the weeks and months after the attacks. This is first evident on 8th August 1943 in 
relation to fears in Berlin about what could happen there, and is used again months later to 
assess the progress so far in the attacks on the capital. “Berlin people apparently expect their 
city to be the next to be attacked on the Hamburg scale” ran the line just days after the final 
sorties to Hamburg.460 The Battle of Berlin did not commence until mid-November that year, 
and was not as concentrated as the series of strikes on Hamburg. Although Bomber Command 
made more large-scale attacks on Berlin, these were spaced out until March 1944, with the 
largest attack taking place in mid-February. In January Tomlinson advised patience while 
Bomber Command attempted to cause the same level of damage in Berlin as had been 
wrought in Hamburg. “[T]o expect [Berlin] to have already suffered damage on the Hamburg 
scale is palpably absurd” he wrote, making Hamburg the exception where the Battles of the 
Ruhr and Berlin were far more sustained affairs.461 Tomlinson had also used the term on 
another occasion prior to the opening of hostilities above Berlin, predicting the continued used 
of massive area bombing attacks through the rest of the war. “Heavy bombing on the Hamburg 
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scale may remain the basic Allied weapon in the war in Western Europe if the programme of 
attack begun by British-based bombers a week ago can be taken as a guide.”462 
The Daily Mirror began reporting on the bombing of Hamburg from almost a quantitative 
angle. A short article on the front page of the 26th July 1943 issue called the initial attack “the 
R.A.F.’s biggest ever raid”, while inside the paper the more substantial piece ran with the 
headline: “War’s heaviest raid: Hamburg’s 2,300 tons”. Having reiterated much of what the 
front page article said, it continued: “The attack was a record for speed as well as weight.” As 
expected, the paper places a clear focus on the importance of the city to Germany in industrial 
and military terms. “Hamburg is Germany’s biggest port and vital U-boat building centre.”463 
The superlative tone continued the next day, as the newspaper coupled the first attack on 
Hamburg and the following night’s mission to Essen, stating that these amounted to “the 
worst weekend Germany has known”. On successive days articles made reference to the fires 
in Hamburg – which had themselves acted as a guiding light for the bombers – having been 
“stoked up” by further attacks.464 On 31st July the Daily Mirror called the cumulative strikes on 
Hamburg a “world record”, a result of “the heaviest and most concentrated hammering any 
target in the world has ever received.” The article also made comments about the fires still 
burning in the city. “Fires have now been raging in Hamburg without intermission for six 
days…[t]hey were burning when Thursday night’s great force started huge new fires.”465 What 
is notable about these articles is that they tend to use the Air Ministry communiqués as a 
starting point – the writers’ then editorialise and create their own phrases to highlight the 
story. This changes when Hamburg is next found in the news. There seems to be a shift away 
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from the bombastic tales of destruction caused by Bomber Command; rather the paper subtly 
shifts its focus to the effects of the raid. Where before the number of bombs or aeroplanes 
used in a raid became a part of the headline, here it is: “Hamburg hit again – worse than Ruhr”. 
The description of the fires seems almost mournful where before it was dramatic: “fires still 
smouldered after the terrible raids of last week.” Any qualitative statements about the nature 
of the attacks are quoted directly from the Air Ministry communiqué: Bomber Command had 
“attacked in great strength”; this had been a “shattering night attack”. Gone are the 
references to world records or of ranking Hamburg at the top of the list of attacked cities 
during the war.466 Over a week passes before the next time the city is found newsworthy, and 
again it refers to conditions in the city. “An epidemic of typhus has broken in Hamburg, 
according to travellers reaching Zurich from the devastated port.” This is the entirety of the 
report; there is not even a direct reference to the fact that it was a series of Bomber Command 
night attacks – coupled with day strikes by the USAAF – which caused the devastation.467 Cecil 
King, editor of the Daily Mirror, does not mention Hamburg in his diary at this time, but after a 
two week break from writing, he does consider the bomber offensive as a whole. He wrote on 
19th August 1943: “Bombing will reduce German production and cause much hardship and 
dislocation, but I have not seen any evidence that it will produce decisive results, or anything 
like them.” This underwhelming appraisal of the potential of Bomber Command to win the war 
may have accounted for what seems to be a shift in the newspaper’s editorial policy.468 Lord 
Beaverbrook, the owner of the Daily Express was similarly doubtful that the area bombing of 
Germany could win the war. He took a pragmatic, commercially-minded view of this though, 
reckoning that swaying the newspaper’s editorial policy to undermine Bomber Command’s 
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influence would negatively affect sales.469 On this note, both the Daily Express and Daily Mail, 
having played so significant a role in the reporting of the Mannheim bombing, this time gave 
readers an insight into life within Bomber Command. The Mail reported from Bomber 
Command Headquarters, while according to the Express “[T]ails [were] up”, mid-way through 
the sustained period of attacks on Hamburg. Further discussion was of the airmen’s views of 
the bombing of cities: 
They have no views on the civilian side of the devastation. They take no pleasure in 
attacking other than the military personnel. The rest of the population should have 
cleared out on Mr. Churchill’s advice, they say. Now they must accept the 
consequences. 
That is their way of thinking.” 470 
The Daily Telegraph also reported from a Bomber Command base and under a grim headline 
(“City like a sea of molten lava”) reported an interview with a flight officer. He made an 
important point on the scale of attacks now being targeted on German cities: one which was 
picked up by a number of Mass-Observation panellists. “In comparison the enemy raids on 
London were child’s play.”471 It is to the responses of members of the public that this chapter 
now turns.  
Public responses 
In September 1943, a month after the end of the attacks on Hamburg, BIPO asked their survey 
group, as they had done earlier in the war: “What do you think is the most important war 
problem the Government must solve during the next few months?” As before, bombing 
Germany was seen as a very low priority. Just over 1% of people supported it (making it only 
the 19th most highly ranked priority) with nearly 21% of people answering “Invasion of Europe; 
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the Second Front”.472 Yet the weight of public opinion as found by BIPO, unlike the results from 
Mass-Observation which will be examined below, showed broad support for bombing German 
cities. Just under 7% of people stated “I’m against bombing”, with 16% professing dislike for 
the campaign but seeing it as a necessity. 47% responded: “Satisfaction, getting some of their 
own medicine. We ought to keep it up.”473 Bombing then, according to BIPO’s results, was 
subject to majority support, with a minority opposing that method of warfare. By considering 
the findings of Mass-Observation around this time it is possible to come to a greater 
understanding of the nature of the sentiments of those who opposed bombing.  
While some people sought a voice of influence with whom to discuss their concerns, such as 
those who wrote to William Temple, still others recorded in their diaries their discomfort with 
the growing scale of Bomber Command’s activities. Before considering this form of response 
among members of the public to the bombing of Hamburg, it is important to emphasise that 
the bomber offensive over Germany now far exceeded what the Luftwaffe would do over the 
Britain. “[T]here was not in Britain anything comparable to the long-drawn-out ordeal which 
many cities in Germany had to undergo.”474 This will be instructive here as it will no longer be 
appropriate to consider British people’s attitudes to reprisals. Instead it is important to 
examine how people responded to bombing which went far beyond what they themselves had 
experienced. As Andrew Knapp has written: “[The British public] were certainly in a position to 
know that raids on Germany, and civilian suffering, had reached a scale and intensity far 
exceeding anything visited on their own country.”475 
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In contrast to the minimal attention given to the bombing of Germany in Mass-Observation 
diaries around the time of the area attack on Mannheim in 1940, by this stage diarists were 
more willing to discuss their feelings about strikes on the Reich.  
James Hinton has addressed the intrinsic biases produced by the Mass-Observation panel. It 
does not provide an accurate representation of wider population demographics. As the war 
progressed so did attempts to even out some of the demographic shortfalls: the age make-up 
of volunteers by the end of the war was “broadly representative of the population as a whole”, 
while by 1943, the over-representation of male panellists had more or less been corrected. Yet 
imperfections persisted: London and the South East were significantly over-represented in the 
panel; Scotland and Wales by contrast were particularly poorly-represented. Further to this, 
and an issue which Harrisson and Madge were unable to offer an effective correction for, was 
the major over-representation of middle-class panellists. As Hinton notes, nearly two-thirds of 
respondents labelled themselves as such. While accepting this lack of representativeness, the 
diary entries and directive replies can still give an insight into how some people expressed 
their views of the bombing of Germany.476 
Their responses in diaries take many forms, and indeed for some the sentiment is one 
reminiscent of the fears present in 1930s Britain. Diarist 5239, an aerodynamist in her mid-
twenties, was out walking in early July 1943 when she saw a large stream of bombers leaving 
Britain for a sortie over mainland Europe. Her thoughts seem unresolved, hinting at a feeling of 
unease which she could not quite grasp. Her diary entry for 4th July closes: “I felt anxious to 
hear the news and to know where they [the bombers] had been. I felt very tired and rather 
restless when I got in, and not at all pleased at the thought of the week in front of me.”477 A 
number of respondents to the December 1943 Mass-Observation Directive (discussed below) 
                                                          
476 Hinton, The Mass Observers, 268-272. 
477 M-O A: D 5239, diary for 4th July 1943. 
163 
 
were clearer in their uneasiness at hearing bombers depart for Germany. One man writes that 
the people of Chelmsford “loathe” the sound of R.A.F. planes overhead. Another respondent 
was more conflicted. On hearing the bombers go out, she thought: “One loathes the RAF for 
what it is going to do, yet one honours them for their bravery, knowing that they are 
defending us.”478 For others though the presence of bombers overhead merely represented 
the new landscape of war. Diarist 5201 was in his mid-thirties during middle stages of the war. 
One night he describes hearing the sound of bombers passing overhead. This came at 11pm as 
he was getting ready for bed, and rather than stirring any deeper thoughts, he simply counted 
them. The restlessness the previous diarist describes seems entirely absent as he says: “75 we 
got up to, then I went to bed.”479 Diarist 5342, a housewife from Blackheath, London, recounts 
a conversation had with a friend whose concerns are for a world turned upside-down.  
“[I]n peacetime such an event as the bursting of a major dam [as occurred during the 
Battle of the Ruhr] would be placarded as a disaster & the whole world would have got 
up a fund for the relatives of the victims. It seemed terrible to her [the diarist’s friend] 
that we had to do such awful things.”480 
These observations were all made prior to the attacks on Hamburg. When the attacks came at 
the end of July and the beginning of August, some diarists engaged directly with this series of 
bombings. It is important to note here that unlike Mannheim, which did not on its own strike a 
chord with the British public in 1940, Hamburg in 1943 was a well-defined point of discussion.  
Diarist 5239 – the aerodynamist – perhaps still trying to find clarity in her thoughts on bombing 
discussed its effectiveness with a colleague. They found that: “[t]he heavy bombing of 
Hamburg did not seem to meet with approval with anyone in the office.”481 Diarist 5216, a 
chemist of around forty years old, also took conversations about the bombing of Germany into 
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the workplace. Following “arguments” with his colleagues, he wrote: “at best the British are 
the lesser of two evils, and if bombing goes on, we shan’t be much preferred to the Germans 
by ordinary victims.”482 He too had heard bombers passing overhead at night as they set off for 
Germany. His thoughts at this stage are more defined than those of Diarist 5239. He wrote:  
“On some of these fine nights we hear squadrons of bombers buzzing off at dusk or 
later, and sometimes at night I wake to hear them coming back, and feel ashamed to 
think that they have been earning for us the sort of reputation the Germans earned 
when they started city-bombing three years ago.”483  
The final part of this extract could be read as an acknowledgement that Britain had responded 
to, rather than initiated, area bombing. Whether or not this reading is accurate, Diarist 5216 
was certainly not reluctant to condemn the actions of Bomber Command. 
The scale of the Hamburg attacks was clear from some of the press reports and this was picked 
up by members of the public. In the summer of 1942 Diarist 5176, an officer worker in his late 
thirties, made the comparison between attacks on Cologne and the major raid on Coventry in 
November 1940. He imagined himself as a “helpless victim” – either in a bombed city of 
Germany or of the UK. To him it was the very fact of aerial bombardment which was upsetting: 
he drew no distinction between British and German civilians.484 When Hamburg was attacked a 
year later he could clearly see the disparity in scale of the RAF and Luftwaffe campaigns: 
“What a terrible ordeal the people of Hamburg must be going through. We thought we 
were having a tough time when we were being raided, but that was only like a musical 
comedy affair in comparison to what is being given to Hamburg. I can, I think, only 
vaguely realise the feeling that must weigh upon the minds of the inhabitants as 
darkness approaches.”485  
That the bombing of Germany was, according to press reports, on a new scale to that carried 
out in Britain, had evidently been picked up and accepted by this diarist. 
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Diarist 5261, a factory clerk in her mid-twenties, seems to have been particularly conflicted 
about the policy of area bombing. She supported what in her view was the long-overdue 
bombing of Rome in the week prior to the first attack on Hamburg. Further she suggested that 
critics of those attacks “should be shot”.486 But if this sentiment does not suggest a nuanced 
view of the debate surrounding aerial bombardment, her response to the attacks on Hamburg 
certainly adds depth to the picture. On 30th July 1943 she wrote: “Hamburg raided again. My 
goodness! it [sic] is appalling to think of the damage we must have inflicted on that town. 
Nobody exults over these raids, rather does everybody seem awestruck at the terrible power 
we now seem able to wield.”487 Another diarist did find “satisfaction” in the raids on Germany, 
but was uncomfortable at her own response. (The following passage refers to the bombing of 
Germany in general – rather than to specific raids – in May 1943). Diarist 5460 wrote:  
“The bombing offensive continues and one cannot suppress a feeling of satisfaction that 
now they know what it is like to be bombed; they boasted about what they could do to 
other people, enough. Even so I am appalled at myself. I am afraid of being bombed so 
[illegible] I to rejoice at another’s bombing? I wish I could feel reassured about this.”488  
This is reminiscent of a passage in the published diary of Vere Hodgson. On a number of 
occasions she makes clear her dislike of Germans as a result of the war (“I shall never bother 
with Germans or foreigners again”489) but still cannot rejoice at the news of major attacks. In 
April 1942 she wrote about hearing of the two large Bomber Command raids on Lübeck and 
Rostock. “We are all heartened by the terrible raids on Lübeck and Rostock. It is dreadful to be 
so glad – but we cannot be anything else.” She justified her satisfaction in the knowledge than 
British cities were still under attack: “They raided Bath heavily yesterday, and Exeter.”490 This 
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justification though would become harder to maintain as the balance of power in the air 
continued to tip more dramatically in the Allies’ favour. 
For Diarist 5429, a secretary in her forties, the bombing of Hamburg represented the grim 
reality of modern warfare. Though troubled by it, she saw the importance of the attacks and 
even went as far as to label the Nazis’ failure to aim for such destruction in London a “great 
mistake”. Of the bombing of Germany, she writes: “Most people seem rather appalled by the 
raids we are carrying out over Hamburg, etc. I can’t bear to think of it, or to look at the 
pictures. Yet I must admit, if one is going to bomb, one must keep on at it.”491 This has strong 
echoes of William Temple’s argument about fighting effectively. 
This question of military necessity brings us to those diarists who were members of the armed 
forces. Three men in particular offer contrasting views of the attacks on Hamburg. What they 
share is brevity of expression; each responds in a personal way to the bombings, but none 
explore their thoughts in great depth, at least on paper. Before turning to Hamburg itself, it is 
worth examining some of the other entries in the diary of a Flight Officer, Diarist 5103. He had 
been involved in raids on Cologne at the start of July 1943 which led to debate on how to 
officially acknowledge the impact. He writes on 8th July that damage to Cologne Cathedral 
presented an issue for Bomber Command to resolve, and this gives us an insight into the 
official thinking around this time. “Our official spokesman in paper and wireless cannot decide 
whether to boast of hitting a German cathedral after ours have been damaged or whether to 
deny hotly that it was ever hit.”492 On Hamburg itself, this diarist initially writes simply: 
“Hamburg pranged and at a low cost.”493 Later he writes further about the rationale for 
attacking the city with such force and indeed hints at the terrible conditions which necessarily 
must have followed such heavy bombing. “Raids in Hamburg have been most successfully [sic] 
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and I think the end of the war is in sight. Few nations could stand it as long at this and no one 
can stand it much longer.” The increased scale of the bomber offensive, according to this 
diarist, will be a determining factor in the swift end to the war. Where he speaks of an inability 
to “stand it”, he is surely making reference to the ever widening areas of devastation which 
the German people had to deal with. Without passing explicit judgment on the morality of the 
raids, he seems to be clear that they will help end the war quickly.494 And certainly he had a 
personal interest in Bomber Command crews no longer being required to attack Germany. Just 
days before this previous entry he had written, in his clipped yet thoughtful manner: “Jack 
Childs missing last night. There is no one we could lose and regret more and I hope we soon 
get good news.”495 
While the previous diarist considered the massive Hamburg raids as a necessary factor in the 
war’s endgame, Diarist 5210 was less convinced. His diary contains less of importance here 
than Diarist 5103, but he does still contemplate the significance of the attacks. After writing 
that the city had received a “terrific pounding”, he goes on to say: “Destruction must be 
immense, but does it help us much?”496 
Another take on the situation is offered by Diarist 5113, another member of the R.A.F. A year 
earlier he had written, briefly, about the bombing of Cologne. He said the feeling of most of his 
fellow officers was: “Poor devils – but they began it.”497 He does not say whether this 
sentiment reflects his own feelings, but if it did, then his sympathy seems to have waned a 
year on when Hamburg was struck. In general he is more interested in the news about 
Mussolini than the attack on Hamburg, but he does leave one short comment. “Germany”, he 
writes, “had “asked for” everything she gets.” This matches the earlier blaming of the Nazis for 
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beginning the war, and is no longer tempered by any outward signs of sympathy for those 
affected.498 Flight Lieutenant Norman How was another who paid more attention in his diary 
to Mussolini’s departure than to the raids on Hamburg, albeit light-heartedly. On 26th July he 
wrote: “Good news today: Mussolini has resigned. He must have heard that I am back on 
ops!”499 
With Mass-Observation diaries it is difficult to write with confidence about the level of anti-
bombing feeling. Historians who have used the Mass-Observation Archive have remarked on 
the astonishingly rich quality of the material; by contrast it is more difficult to offer a judgment 
on the quantitative view of public opinion. One opportunity to challenge this shortfall is with 
reference to the directive replies in December 1943. Bob Willcock, who was in charge of Mass-
Observation during the second half of the war, reflected on the reliability of both quantity and 
quality in responses. The responses, he wrote: “will reflect all the main outlooks and attitudes 
to be found among the general population…[although] not, of course…in the same proportion 
as the general population.” With this note of caution sounded, it is possible still to gain some 
insight into the volume of particular feelings by looking at directive replies.500 Where the 
diarists write about that which they choose to record about their daily life, the directives 
provided Mass-Observation with the chance to put specific questions to their volunteers. 240 
people responded to the question “What do you feel about the recent bombing of Germany?” 
The question is broad: no distinction is made for example between, on the one hand, the 
bombing of exclusively military installations and targets closely associated with the Nazi war 
effort, and on the other, the area bombing of cities. Interestingly most respondents refer 
specifically to the bombing of cities.  
                                                          
498 M-O A: D 5113, diary for 25th July 1943. 
499 RAFM: MF10057/20, ‘Diary of war service of Flt Lt Norman How, 1942-1943’. Entry for 26th July 1943. 
500 Bob Willcock, quoted in Hinton, The Mass Observers, 276-277. 
169 
 
The replies to this directive have made it possible to draw some quantitative conclusions from 
the mass of responses given, with the twin caveats that the sample size remains small, and as 
Willcock cautions, the numbers are unlikely offer an accurate mirror to the views of the 
population as a whole. Remarkably few respondents professed to being exclusively positive 
about the bombing campaign. Indeed, there is an almost even divide between those who show 
a stance which is absolute in its anti-bombing position and those taking a pro-bombing 
position. Many more still express mixed feelings. The most common response – broadly 
categorised – is one which shows discomfort at the bombing campaign (this is often profound) 
which is moderated by some degree of pragmatism. 
The question was categorised as ‘Priority B’ which meant it was not answered by all 
participants; nevertheless it still generated a strong response. Of the 287 people who 
responded to the directive at all, just over 16% chose not to answer this question. The results 
of those who did answer give a strong indication that by the end of 1943 there was 
considerable unease among this sample group about the way the bombing campaign was 
being waged. By now not only Hamburg but also Berlin had come under regular attack by 
Bomber Command.  
Around a fifth of the respondents expressed entirely positive feelings about the campaign, 
unmitigated by any sense of discomfort or restraint. These replies tended to be framed around 
the sense that German people deserved what they were now experiencing and needed to feel 
the effect of war in their homes; something the Allies should have “no compunction” about 
seeking.501 In remarking  on the necessity of the campaign one respondent suggested that this 
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was: “[n]o time for hyper-sensitive snivelling about it.”502 There is also a sense among those 
responding positively that the campaign would hasten the end of the war.503 
A similar proportion expressed entirely negative feelings about the campaign. The feeling that 
protest was not a viable option is again evident, as with some of those who wrote to William 
Temple. One respondent wrote: “I feel very distressed and angry, but feel quite helpless to 
make any protest, as nobody seems to care. It is definitely war on women and children.”504 It 
was “horrible and unchristian” according to another respondent.505 For some people the news 
of Bomber Command’s work in Germany brought back uncomfortable memories of the Blitz. 
One respondent expressed their feelings as follows: “Horror and intense sympathy with 
German men, women and children. Whenever I hear or see pictures of bombing in Germany, I 
live through London in Autumn 1940 again.”506 This is particularly revealing and suggests an 
enduring element to the sentiment during the Blitz which saw people who had experienced 
bombing rejecting the idea that Britain should attack Germany with the same or greater 
fervour. Lamenting a “moral deterioration”, one man decried the campaign, calling it: “as 
merciless as the Germans were in 1940”.507 Another man wrote of the lack of “sportsmanship” 
in targeting civilian areas, and how it offended English sensibilities. While he does express 
some sense of pragmatism, the appraisal of “our terror bombing” is severe: it was “inhuman 
and barbarous.” Further, he writes: “the punishment must make all civilised and intelligent 
men and women feel a little sick and perhaps a little shamed.”508 Another respondent 
described the campaign as: “a barbaric, non-ethical and disgusting crime.”509 
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The majority of respondents expressed mixed feelings on the bombing of Germany – neither 
offering unqualified support nor being entirely negative on the policy. Of these people, a large 
proportion were troubled – often deeply – by the heavy nature of the campaign but accepted 
it as a necessary part of war conduct. “[T]errible, but necessary” wrote one respondent very 
simply, although this is qualified with the contention that the targets should be military in 
nature.510 Similarly another woman started her response: “Sick, but I feel it is necessary all the 
same.”511 
Very many of those who were uncomfortable with the method of attack worried explicitly for 
civilian life – the thought of “women and children” under nightly attack is regularly invoked. 
One man wrote of what he called the “cowardly” decision to favour aerial attack over the 
opening of a second front. This was , he said, “preserving our fighting men, by slaughtering 
German women and children and old men.”512 For another respondent – a woman in her 
thirties – the unhappiness at the thought of those killed by bombs was compounded by the 
cultural loss: “I loathe and abhor the thought of anyone suffering under bombing and cannot 
bear the thought of beautiful cities being smashed indiscriminately.”513 Another person found 
this aspect the most troubling. Among a broadly positive appraisal of the bombing, he wrote: 
“Of course it’s very dreadful to think of the destruction of some of the delightful German 
cities”.514 
A weekly report of Bomber Command activities after the Hamburg raids represents the level of 
damage caused in the city and acknowledges that this is on a level above that which had been 
seen in British cities. Estimating the extent of “residential devastation” to be in excess of seven 
square miles, the report found: “This is on such a different scale from anything which 
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Germany, let alone this country, has ever experienced, that the implications of it are quite 
incalculable.”515 The Mass-Observation directive responses show that British people were 
beginning to understand that this was the case. Some respondents made explicit reference to 
their belief that British bombing of Germany was on a greater scale to that which British 
people themselves had had to endure, with some clearly stating that the bombing of Germany 
was now of an indiscriminate nature. One man for example wrote: “I know that our bombing is 
indiscriminate now, it hits innocent people as well as Nazis.” He added that the conditions in 
German cities amounted to a “hellish experience ten times worse than any we have 
experienced”.516 Another wrote: “One by one we are attempting to wipe out the big German 
cities.”517 And this process would include the destruction of residential areas. “We know 
dwelling houses are below; gone is our insistence that we bomb only military objectives.”518 
Yet the words of one respondent show the enduring ability of the government to maintain the 
illusion that only targets of military necessity were being attacked. This respondent questioned 
German reports of residential areas being hit. “This I do not believe – partly because I have no 
wish to believe that news is so misrepresentative and misleading.”519 A further concern for 
some of the respondents were the potential peacetime implications of destroying German 
cities and killing civilians. In the aftermath of the war B. Care, part of the Salvation Army Relief 
Team 144, echoed the idea that German cities had been far more badly damaged than those in 
Britain. On 3rd December 1945, she wrote: “Hamburg is just as badly blitzed as I had been 
informed. It is worse than anything I have ever seen in London.”520 
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In some respects it feels almost improper – given some of the glowing appraisals by historians 
of the depth and texture of the Mass-Observation Archive – to seek the quantitative: to strip 
out the glorious quality of the responses to find the pure numbers involved. This section of the 
chapter has been an attempt to touch both sides of this. Some figures illustrate the volume of 
people who broadly fall into particular categories: of unqualified support for or protest against 
the bombing campaign; of discomfort about the raids but with an acknowledgement of their 
necessity. These various positions are then supported with reference to what people actually 
wrote. In this way the quality of the responses are given a quantitative meaning – without 
which it is more difficult to offer conclusions on the volume of particular responses.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to address how attitudes towards the bombing of 
Germany were framed during the middle years of the war. The focus has fallen primarily on 
Hamburg for a number of reasons. The scale of the attacks and the extent of the devastation 
caused mark this assault as among Bomber Command’s most significant achievements during 
the war. What is also of note however is that the radar countermeasure Window was used for 
the first time in the attacks on Hamburg. Fears that the technology would be copied and used 
in attacks on Britain had subsided to an acceptable level and this indicates a realisation that 
the balance of power was now favouring the Allies. The idea that a turning point had been 
reached was also picked up by both outright opponents of area bombing and by those who 
were concerned about its application. The Bombing Restriction Committee produced a 
significant amount of literature calling for restraint and some members of the public also felt a 
need for the activities of Bomber Command to be reined in. As a public figure with potentially 
powerful influence, the Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple, was seen by some as the 
appropriate voice of protest. His rigid support for the bomber campaign even after the 
destruction of Hamburg had the effect – whether intended or not – of stifling grassroots 
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protest. This ensured that the area bombing campaign could continue to be waged into the 
closing stages of the war without an authoritative challenge to its nature or limits. The huge 
success of the raids on Hamburg would stand as a pinnacle of what could be achieved with 
area bombing. Bomber Command continued to seek similar results through to the destruction 
of Dresden in February 1945. 
  
175 
 
Chapter 4 – ‘A city of the dead’: Dresden and the end of the war 
By the start of 1945 the war was approaching its end. German military strength had been 
largely exhausted and by the end of January the Red Army was approaching Berlin. Meanwhile 
the area bombing of German cities continued.521 Over the course of two weeks from the start 
of January major attacks had been carried out on Nuremberg, Munich and Magdeburg. 16,000 
people were killed in Magdeburg alone.522 On 13th February 1945 a major bombing attack was 
launched against Dresden. The combination of relentless bombing and the particular 
atmospheric conditions created a firestorm, as had occurred in Hamburg. The attacks 
continued until 15th February, with the USAAF contributing further daytime raids. Prior to the 
attacks, Dresden had remained relatively unscathed by the hostilities, and as a result had been 
swelled with refugees fleeing Germany’s crumbling cities. The pre-war population of 600,000 
was boosted significantly, and it has proved impossible to accurately calculate the number of 
people killed in the attacks. The figure has been fiercely contested, with most historians now 
accepting that the total lies somewhere around 25,000.523  
This high death toll, which occurred at so late a stage in the war, has been hard to justify. In 
recent historiography and popular commentary arguments have been made that the attacks 
amounted to a war crime. The bombing of Dresden – and in particular on its anniversary – has 
become a symbol of protest and anger for a re-emergent far-right in Germany. The 
controversy though is embedded well beyond solely the realm of extreme politics. Victor 
Gregg, a British prisoner of war in Dresden at the time of the attacks, is unequivocal in his 
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denunciation of the attacks. In interviews accompanying the publication of his memoirs, he 
described the attacks as “a war crime at the highest level, a stain upon the name Englishman 
that only an apology made in full public view would suffice to obliterate.”524 
This chapter will show that as the end of the war drew close there remained a body of British 
people who were deeply concerned by the scale of the bomber offensive. The targeting of 
Dresden, which had received little previous attention from Allied planes, drew a critical 
response from a wide range of sources and even at the time stood out as a focal point for 
critics of the wider bombing campaign. Though the controversy about these attacks has grown 
significantly in the years since the war, the immediate response detailed here forms the 
essential base for much of these arguments. 
From Hamburg to Dresden 
On the back of so successful a mission as the sustained assault on Hamburg, Bomber 
Command continued to aim for similar results in cities across Germany. Yet as was noted in the 
previous chapter, Hamburg was – and remained – the peak achievement. In October 1943 
Churchill praised Harris for the recent successes of Bomber Command and Harris turned his 
attention to his next target. Further, he made clear his rather abrupt stance on the validity and 
utility of area bombing. In a letter to Sir Arthur Street, the Under Secretary of State for Air, he 
laid out his vision of the bombing offensive for the remainder of the war: “It should be 
emphasised that the destruction of houses [and] the creation of a refugee problem on an 
unprecedented scale…are accepted and intended aims of our bombing policy. They are not by-
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products of attempts to hit factories.”525 Harris was confident that by launching an assault on 
Berlin of the same scale as had been directed at Hamburg, Bomber Command could win the 
war for the Allies. He was bullish in his outlook for the capital city. “It will cost us between 400-
500 aircraft. It will cost Germany the war.”526 From November 1943 – a little over three 
months after the final attack on Hamburg – through to March 1944 Bomber Command carried 
out 16 major operations in pursuance of this vision of a knockout blow. Yet Harris’s grand aims 
were not met. The concentration of destruction achieved at Hamburg was not repeated. As 
Richard Overy writes, the cumulative results of bombing during the ‘Battle of Berlin’ were, by 
February 1944, meagre. “[O]nly 5 per cent of residential buildings and 5 per cent of industrial 
plant had been damaged in heavy raiding.” Neillands qualifies the terms of the defeat for the 
Allies: the bombing neither provided a knockout blow nor provoked major civil unrest against 
the Nazi leadership.527 Not only this, but the effects of Window had been countered by 
German technological developments. As such, the advantage Window had given to Bomber 
Command  proved to be short-lived. Losses increased and were at their highest on the final 
major attack against Berlin in late March in which nearly 9% of the 811 aircraft dispatched 
were lost. This figure was surpassed a week later during an attack on Nuremberg that saw 11% 
of the 795 aircraft lost in what the official historians call “the most severe disaster in [Bomber 
Command’s] history.”528 When set against the declining strength of the Luftwaffe bombing 
force, Bomber Command retained an upper hand. Operation Steinbock – the ‘little blitz’ – 
lasted from January to May 1944 but was far more ruinous for German resources than the 
British cities targeted. By the time the operation was aborted it had, according to Overy, 
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“sealed the fate of Germany’s bomber force.” Yet according to Max Hastings, the failures over 
Berlin and Nuremberg indicated that “time had run out on Harris” as well, and on his hopes of 
providing the knockout blow to Nazi Germany. Bomber Command continued to carry out raids 
on German cities – and of course launched the massive raid on Dresden the following year – 
but the Soviet advance in the East and the plans for Operation Overlord were seen to 
represent a more realistic route to final victory.529 
Of more concern to the British civil population than the largely ineffectual Operation Steinbock 
raids was the introduction of V-weapons. With the decline of the Luftwaffe bombing force 
these long-range missiles were introduced in June 1944. Though they caused significant 
damage and casualties when hitting urban areas, strategically the V-weapons were unable to 
have a major strategic impact. The disruptive and deadly effect on British civilian life was 
however sustained until the end of March 1945.530 In August 1944 half of those surveyed by 
BIPO found V-weapons “more trying than the blitz of three years before,” while a third found 
them less trying.531 
In mid-1944 plans were drawn up in Britain for a Bomber Command operation code-named 
Thunderclap. The idea was to hit Berlin with a massive raid with the intention of definitively 
breaking German morale and productivity. Yet as Taylor writes, the plan in that form was not 
seen to be realistically achievable, and it was not put into action. This rather supports Hastings 
assessment above: that Harris’s vision of Bomber Command winning the war for the Allies 
would not be realised. In early 1945 Bomber Command instead launched attacks on German 
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cities in the east of the Reich. Though not on the anticipated Thunderclap scale, these were 
still major attacks. The raids on Dresden caused by far the most widespread destruction.532 
Historiography 
Details of Nazi atrocities which emerged at the end of the war initially limited scrutiny of the 
Allied bombing campaign. Questions about the bomber offensive were tempered by the 
comparison to discoveries at, among others, Auschwitz-Birkenau, Bergen-Belsen and Treblinka. 
Given this context Vera Brittain could criticise the bombing campaign only by making 
simultaneous reference to the Holocaust. In 1946 she wrote: “The true and terrible 
significance of obliteration bombing, like the mass extermination of the Jews by the Nazis, lies 
in its utter denial of the sacredness of human life.”533 
The official history of the bomber offensive was published in 1961 and made reference to 
previously classified documents. This included the minute written by Churchill denouncing the 
Dresden attack which is used in the introduction of this thesis and discussed in more detail 
below. The authors of the official history, Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, stated that of 
the cities attacked in February 1945, “by far the heaviest damage was sustained by Dresden 
and by far the greatest proportion of it was inflicted by the Bomber Command night attack.” 
They were critical of Churchill’s attempt to shy away from responsibility, describing his minute 
as “perhaps, among the least felicitous of the Prime Minister’s long series of war-time 
minutes.”534 This publication offered a starting point for continued analysis of the bombing 
campaign and of the attack on Dresden in particular. The overt statement of the extent of 
damage caused by British forces, coupled with criticism of Churchill’s reaction, made further 
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negative appraisals inevitable. This began with the publication of a volume by David Irving 
which was dedicated to the attacks. In his study he described the extent of the physical and 
human loss suffered in the city and concluded that the bombing amounted to “the worst single 
massacre in European history.” Though Irving’s reputation has since been discredited, his book 
certainly had the effect of driving forward the conclusions of the official history by serving to 
extract Dresden from Second World War and portray it as a massacre worthy of consideration 
in its own right.535 At the end of the 1960s, the American writer Kurt Vonnegut accepted this 
premise and introduced a wider audience to the events of February 1945. Vonnegut was a 
prisoner of war in Dresden at the time of the attacks, and witnessed the destruction first-hand. 
In his science-fiction novel Slaughterhouse 5, first published in 1969, he argued, in agreement 
with Irving, that the bombings constituted “the greatest massacre in European history.” The 
book and subsequent film adaptation found an audience buoyed by the student uprisings of 
May 1968, and angry about the Vietnam War. In his account, he neatly collects the key reasons 
that caused Dresden to become such a contentious issue. He states that “Dresden was jammed 
with refugees.” The vengeful soldier Paul Lazzaro “did not exult” when Dresden was destroyed. 
“He didn’t have anything against the Germans, he said…He was proud of never having hurt an 
innocent bystander.” Of the indiscriminate targeting, he is most damning. “One thing was 
clear: Absolutely everybody in the city was supposed to be dead, regardless of what they were, 
and that anybody that moved in it represented a flaw in the design.”536 By the end of the 
1960s therefore, understanding of Dresden had shifted heavily. There was greater knowledge 
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of the extent of the damage and Vonnegut’s novel had also served to popularise the 
information about the Dresden attacks. 
These developments led to a greater tendency amongst historians to view Dresden as an 
unnecessary target, even an unacceptable one. Telford Taylor, who acted as Counsel for the 
Prosecution in the Nuremberg trials, wrote in 1970 that “it is a terrible memory that we did 
not stay our hand at Dresden, when the war was as good as won.” He added that “[i]t is 
difficult to contest the judgment that Dresden and Nagasaki were war crimes, tolerable in 
retrospect only because their malignancy pales in comparison to Dachau, Auschwitz and 
Treblinka.” Following Brittain’s cue he qualifies his judgment of Allied air strategy with 
reference to the more despicable crimes carried out by the Nazis.537 Anthony Verrier 
concurred with the view that the Allies went too far at Dresden, arguing that the raids showed 
a loss of perspective and restraint on the part of the Allies. To him, it “exemplifie[d] the 
dangers of carrying an idea to its logical conclusion”. This opinion is supported by the work of 
Freeman Dyson, a physicist who worked for Bomber Command during the war. He describes 
the Dresden firestorm as a “fluke” – the result of repeated attempts to recreate the damage at 
Hamburg a year and a half previously. Dyson tempers his acknowledgement of this success 
with the admission that “Dresden had little military importance, and anyway the slaughter 
came too late to have any serious effect on the war.” Based on Dyson’s recollections, which 
show the continuation of hostilities beyond the necessary point, it is hard to argue with 
Verrier’s indictment.538 
The Dresden controversy had by this stage acquired a steady momentum thanks to this range 
of publications kick-started by Webster and Frankland in 1961. Alexander McKee was unable 
to interest publishers in a book on the subject in 1958. This changed in 1982, after the 
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“tremendous furore” created by David Irving and the subsequent wave of historiography. 
McKee’s oral history approach – he spoke both to Allied aircrew and survivors of the raids – 
allowed for greater understanding of the conditions experienced in the city and the 
reservations of those who created them. The book was a further source of questions over the 
legitimacy of the bombing.539  
These questions were amplified through the 1990s and the start of this century. The sustained 
attempt by German academics to address why such a dearth of literature on the physical 
effects of the bombing existed at the end of the war. W. G. Sebald considered the question in a 
series of lectures which were later collected in a single volume. He blamed the lack of work 
immediately after the war for the situation where: “it is hard to form an even partly adequate 
idea of the extent of the devastation suffered by the cities of Germany in the last years of the 
Second World War, still harder to think about the horrors involved in that devastation.” 
According to his research, the images of destruction had not entered the “national 
consciousness.” He found further that: “quite a number of those affected by the air 
raids…regarded the great firestorms as a just punishment, even an act of retribution on the 
part of a higher power with whom there could be no dispute.” This important point shows that 
the justifiable disparity between considerations of the Allied air policy on the one hand, and 
the Holocaust on the other, was also accepted in Germany. Yet more recently Jörg Friedrich 
appeared to cast doubt on this position in The Fire, which has been discussed in previous 
chapters. It here becomes important to remember that whatever criticism is levelled at those 
who carried out the Dresden raids, they were carried out as a part of the necessary fight 
against German fascism and expansionism. Andreas Huyssen recently made this point clear in 
Bill Niven’s Germans as Victims, another book which contributed to the recent trend to 
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consider how Germans experienced the dying days of the war as fighting centred on the 
Reich.540  
Other recent texts have been written by authors seeking to defend the attack on Dresden. 
Patrick Bishop’s Bomber Boys is one such example. It contains some contemporary accounts of 
the attacks, but, like Nichol and Rennell’s Tail End Charlies, relies heavily on oral history 
created in the post-war period. Although useful resources, the approach does allow hindsight 
to influence the discussion.541 Against this background, Richard Overy’s 1995 publication Why 
the Allies Won – fifty years on from Dresden and the end of the war – gains greater 
significance. He described the vital part that the aerial policy had on the victorious outcome of 
the war. This added a different dimension to future appraisals of the Bomber Offensive, and in 
particular the Dresden raids. Since air power “proved to be the critical weakness on the Axis 
side and the greatest single advantage enjoyed by the Allies”, it became important to consider 
how the offensive was carried out. Whether Dresden still looked excessive when accepting the 
vital and primary contribution made by the Bomber Offensive to an Allied victory would need 
to be tested. If it did, it would become even harder to justify that attack.542 Another important 
publication came in 2004 courtesy of Frederick Taylor. His book, like Overy’s, offered some 
perspective to the historiography which went before. Also like Overy, Taylor acknowledges the 
vital role played by Allied air forces. The book is meticulously researched and is more 
sympathetic to the reasoning for the decision to bomb Dresden. Yet there is still a clear 
indication of the position Dresden has now assumed. Taylor writes: “The historic heart of one 
of Europe’s finest cities had been obliterated, along with most of the human beings who lived 
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there. It represented to most Germans, and many other neutrals, an outrage, the apogee of 
terror.”543 
In 2006 Paul Addison and Jeremy A. Crang edited a collection specifically on the Dresden 
bombings. As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, Donald Bloxham used his chapter to 
explicitly describe the bombing of Dresden as a war crime. The greatest success of the 
collection was its up to date interpretation of why Dresden matters, including how the 
rebuilding of the city has kept discussions current. Alan Russell stated that Dresden “has come 
to stand for something greater than its own suffering in war and has succeeded in uniting 
victims and victors alike in their understanding of this image.”544 A. C. Grayling’s Among the 
Dead Cities also dealt with the legacy of area bombing, warning that “we are at risk of 
repeating mistakes if we do not face up to their commission in the past.”545 Given the charged 
nature of the historiographical debate, it is worth now going back to consider the operational 
aspects of the attacks themselves. 
Operations 
Central to the controversy over the raids on Dresden has been the massive loss of life on the 
one hand, compared with the relatively light damage caused to military targets on the other. 
As John Ellis has advised, the railway marshalling yards, which were the stated targets for the 
Allied bombs, were functioning at a reduced level “within three or four days [of the 
attacks].”546 In stark contrast to the sheer chaos caused in the built-up areas of the city, the 
attacks by both British and American aircraft caused damage to the rail network in the city 
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without entirely knocking it out.547 In any case, the bombs dropped by Bomber Command, 
which created the firestorm that raged through the city, did not affect the railway. The 
damage caused there was by the USAAF which followed up the attacks after the firestorm had 
been raised.548 Inevitably once the controversy began, much of the attention fell on, and made 
villains of, those who planned and carried out the attacks. Max Hastings later wrote:  
“For the first time since the bomber offensive began, on the news of the destruction of 
Dresden a major wave of anger and dismay swept through Whitehall and the Air 
Ministry, echoed in Parliament, and finally reached the gates of High Wycombe [Bomber 
Command Headquarters]. Urgent questions were asked by important people about the 
reasons for destroying the city.”549  
This section of the chapter will examine these questions: why they arose, and the form that 
they took. The first official bulletin on the attack was released by the RAF on the morning of 
14th February. As Robin Neillands writes, great stress was placed on the military nature of the 
attack: 
“Unlike previous bulletins, this one went into great detail about the target, stressing 
Dresden’s contribution to the German military machine and emphasizing that it was a 
legitimate target and the centre of a railway network sending troops to the east. This 
emphasis, this tendency to protest too much, inevitably attracted attention.”550  
Aside from the attention raised simply by the existence of so much detail in this bulletin, it also 
raised the question of why Dresden – if so important to the German cause – had not previously 
been targeted. While there had been earlier attacks on the city – one in October 1944 and 
another in January 1945 – the raids that form the subject of this enquiry were by far the 
heaviest. They were also the first to target the residential areas. Before the attack of February 
1945 the few attacks which had taken place had not had widespread or long-lasting 
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consequences.551 Henry Probert alludes to a sense of panic in the offices of Bomber Command 
as it became clear that they had “far less information about the city than for most other 
potential targets, which made them wonder how strong was the case for the attack.”552 Sir 
Cuthbert Morley Headlam, a former Conservative minister, recorded immediately his dismay. 
“Dresden also is being smashed to pieces – it is an abominable business – but it cannot be 
helped in these enlightened days and no one now seems to have any compunction in killing 
crowds of civilians, so long as they are German or Japanese.” He described the raids as 
“hateful”, and justifiable only in the hope that such actions would “sicken people of war.”553  
A series of reports filed by the aircrew who took part in the raids pointed to probable 
devastation. A report from the first night of bombing stated: “Smoke plumes rose to 15000 ft. 
Late arrivals reported the target area a sea of fire with the glow visible 160 miles away on 
route home…This is considered an excellent attack.”554 The excellence of the attack in terms of 
what had been aimed for would later be described by Freeman Dyson, a physicist working for 
Bomber Command. Having created a firestorm in Hamburg in 1943, the aim thereafter was to 
repeat the effect. “We were trying every time to raise a fire storm. There was nothing special 
about Dresden except that for once everything worked as we intended. It was like a hole in 
one in a game of golf.” This point is key for two reasons. First, it shows the level of luck 
involved in creating a firestorm: other factors beyond the control of Bomber Command could 
not be relied upon. Second, like the speech given by Richard Peirse in November 1941 and 
discussed in chapter two, this thoroughly undermines the publicly made claim that only 
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military targets were being sought. The intention to raise a firestorm shows a far less 
discriminating approach.555  
With doubts already surfacing over the suitability of Dresden as a target, the roaring success 
began to seem excessive. A further report detailed how the extent of the fires in the city 
affected the manner of attacks. “Towards the end of the attack the fires had reached such 
intensity that it became difficult to distinguish markers.” As a result, the report went on to say, 
the master bomber switched the instruction to aim bombs at the centre of the fires in the 
absence of a discernible target. Adding to the already mounting evidence of Bomber 
Command being ill equipped to deal with its own success was the further submission that this 
had largely been an undefended attack. “Ground defences were very weak with only a small 
amount of heavy flak and no searchlights.”556 At this stage of the war, “Allied heavy bombers 
were available in large numbers and could fly with near impunity over German…air space.”557 
The interpretation reports following the bombing showed the extent of the damage to the city. 
As the thick smoke began to clear, a view of the ruined city began to emerge. A report from 
the afternoon of 15th February reported that the “Northwestern section of Dresden, which was 
previously obscured by dense smoke clouds, is now seen to be heavily damaged.” Twenty-four 
hours later, the picture was clearer still. “It is now apparent that the whole central, south and 
eastern sections of Dresden have been extensively gutted.”558 The sum of these fragments of 
information coming back from Dresden was that Bomber Command had lit huge fires 
throughout the centre of the city, to the extent that the last of the planes to arrive had only 
fire to aim at. They were able to do this with minimal resistance from German defences. A 
month later reconnaissance reports painted a picture of massive destruction through the city: 
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clearly this had been a devastating attack. “Damage in the city of Dresden is concentrated and 
intense and it is estimated that of the fully built-up area, 85% is destroyed.” The extent of 
residential destruction was made clearer a week later. “Damage to business / residential 
property in the centre of the city and inner residential suburbs is intense and whole rows of 
buildings as well as detached and semi-detached villas are gutted.”559  
During Richard Stokes’ lengthy debate in the House of Commons over aerial bombing in light 
of the Dresden raids – to be discussed later in this chapter – he stated that: “I have been told 
over and over again in my travels that [you] find responsible people in the Army and Air Force 
protesting against this mass and indiscriminate slaughter from the air.”560 Evidence in this area 
shows the immediate uncertainty about the moral justification for the attacks. These initial 
reactions provided the background to the debate that grew over the following decades.  
Immediate responses from aircrews which offer a critique of the bombing policy have proved 
far more elusive than retrospective accounts: reasons for this have been discussed in chapter 
three. Many of the initial responses fulfil an official role, and therefore are not given to wider 
comment. Operational Record Books, for example, which were filled in for every sortie, tend to 
provide purely factual accounts of the missions. They provide such details as the time and date 
of the mission, and the type and amount of bombs dropped. For this reason, the edited 
collection of Bomber Command war diaries provides little in the way of comment.561 A good 
deal of the contemporary pilots’ records are similar, and give no insight into their reflections 
on their work. One such exception to the norm was Ken Sidford, a pilot who flew in the 
Dresden mission. He kept a fairly substantial diary of his time in the air force, and the entries 
he made in February 1945 display a more critical response to the raids. His choice of words to 
describe the Dresden attacks is especially telling. J. M. Spaight had written twenty years 
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previously that in the future, “aircraft may be used…to create in the enemy population as a 
whole a feeling of depression and hopelessness”.562 Sidford appears to have recognised the 
fulfilment of this prediction, and shows his disapproval. First he notes that “Dresden is 
apparently a big army base, and is also full of refugees – somewhat murderous.” Given the 
number of accounts that offer little or more often nothing by way of opinion, this stands out 
for two key reasons. First, the fact that Sidford picks up on the refugee question at all is 
immediately striking and offers further confirmation that civilians were directly under attack in 
Dresden. Second, the fact that he considers the attacks on refugees as “somewhat 
murderous”, rather than seeing them as an opportunity to strike a weighty blow, gives an 
insight into his mind-set. Through these passages in his diary he shows no sign of wanting 
vengeance, or of wanting to crush German morale. He proceeds to write that the fires from 
earlier raids were visible 50 miles from the target area, and repeats that “the bombing must 
have been murderously effective.” It is evident from these passages that Sidford was focused 
on the mission, reporting as he does on its effectiveness, but the repeated use of the word 
“murderous” suggests discomfort with the notion of targeting civilians.563 For a man clearly 
affected by the intended results of his work, he may later have come to regret his unfortunate 
choice of words to describe the conditions in the cockpit. He recorded in his diary that the 
missions were: “chiefly memorable because of the heat. The sun shining on the perspex just 
cooked me”. As more and more details – both of the firestorm and of the horrific ways in 
which people died – emerged in the ensuing weeks, months and years, it is easy to imagine 
Sidford reflecting on the tragic irony of this passage.564 Flying Officer Robert Eric Wannop 
offers a further sense of the intensity of the fires which could be seen from air above the city. 
In his diary entry for 13th February – the night of the first attack – he writes: “Whole city one 
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mass of flames, target area at 19000’ so bright we could see each other + our own vapour 
trails.”565 
Evidence collected by Stephen A. Garrett suggests that Ken Sidford was part of a larger 
collective of airmen who were uncomfortable with the attacks on Dresden. He describes how 
some of the squadrons that took part in the raids “voted to forgo a customary ritual – the 
dropping of bits of concrete and other junk intended as an insult to the Germans.”566 As Eric 
Markusen and David Kopf have written, those planning the raids on Dresden “were well aware 
of the tide of refugees” whose presence ensured there were many more people in the city 
than usual.567 Authorising attacks in the east of the German Reich, Sir Archibald Sinclair 
recommended strikes against “Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden and associated cities where heavy 
attack will cause great confusion in civilian evacuation from the East.”568 In a briefing note to 
Bomber Command squadrons preparing to embark on the Dresden mission, the aircrew were 
told of the intention of the attack; “to hit the enemy where he will feel it most”. A. C. Grayling 
describes the “degree of moral set-aside” needed to target a city with an inflated civilian 
population, knowing that Germany would be most heavily affected by this, as 
“breathtaking”.569 We can learn from the diary of Ken Sidford that at least some of the men 
involved knew at the time that the population of Dresden had been boosted by an influx of 
refugees. By omitting the ritualistic dropping of inert missiles, some of the airmen involved 
removed a level of anger from their strikes and returned the bombing to purely its functional 
level. This echoes “the craftsman’s delight in a well-aimed bomb” described in chapter two and 
Squadron Commander Donald Simmons’ observation in chapter three about his men working 
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“conscientiously but without enthusiasm.”570 Getting the job done effectively appears to be 
valued over enjoyment at the thought of killing Germans. The technical aspects of the raids 
attracted the attention of those involved, rather than the opportunity to cause widespread 
damage. 
Sidford appears to recognise the moral issues involved in attacking Dresden with such force 
and therefore stands out from those who have used only the benefit of hindsight to criticise 
the raids. The question of guilt for the individual airmen involved in the Dresden raids, like Ken 
Sidford, is contentious. After the war, Bomber Command personnel did not receive the same 
flow of honours as other sectors of the armed forces. John Nichol and Tony Rennell, in what 
seems to be a thinly veiled swipe at David Irving, argued recently that “[b]ooks on Dresden 
quoting huge and inaccurate casualty figures further added to the shame heaped on Harris and 
his men.”571 More recently A. C. Grayling’s Among the Dead Cities emphasised the continuing 
confusion this question causes. Early in his book he states that the query is against those who 
authorised the raids, and emphatically not against the aircrew who carried them out. Yet later 
he reverses this position, stating: “Should airmen have refused to carry out area-bombing 
raids? Yes.”572 The post-war attempts to extricate the airmen from blame are founded on this 
rather confused base.  
Neville Wylie has shown how Allied prisoners of war gave a range of responses to bombing 
raids on German cities. Even leaving aside the fact that with Allied bombing attacks came the 
risk of death for prisoners of war, mixed views were expressed on the morality of such raids. 
Though some understandably celebrated, others, particularly as the later stages of the war 
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brought heavier raids, were far less comfortable with the evidence of attacks on civilians.573 
The diaries of two friends who were prisoners of war near Dresden in 1945 survive as excellent 
insights into the reaction to the raids of two members of the armed forces: both of whom fell 
into the latter category. They can offer a unique perspective of the events due to the 
combination of their first-hand experience of the destruction and their lack of influence by 
press reports. What they saw, and then wrote in their pocket diaries, is as close to a record of 
the events uninfluenced by outside sources as can be expected to be found. Alec White and 
Harry Goodwin were in captivity in the town of Cossebaude, just outside Dresden itself. Their 
initial reaction to the raids was fairly non-committal. They treat the events light-heartedly, 
with Goodwin concerned about possible “reprisals on us tomorrow re: skilly574 and rations 
etc.” White notes he has had three Polish cigarettes that day, and that “[i]t’s a hard job 
packing smoking in…” Incarcerated away from Dresden, neither had yet witnessed the 
aftermath of the bombing attack. A note in the papers accompanying Goodwin’s diary explains 
that for their safety, all prisoners were kept in the camps until 21st February.575 
The shift in both men’s moods is quickly apparent once they are sent to work clearing up after 
the raids. White was not involved in the working party on 22nd February, but noted that “Harry 
said it was terrible.”576 Goodwin’s own entry for the day is purely factual. Nevertheless, by the 
26th, he was moved to write that “Dresden has had it!” He adds an observation that lends this 
chapter of the thesis its title; that “[t]he lads say the town is ‘a city of the dead’”.577 The 
following day White noted in his diary that “Dresden in a fuck of a state.” By this stage he 
appears to have become drained by the work. His entries had become brief, and were stripped 
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of the humour or personal observations of previous notes. On 2nd March he recorded the 
following: “Working in bombed house. Plenty of dust flying around.” The following day his 
entry read simply: “Work all day! Deadly.”578 
Harry Goodwin continued to write more substantially for longer than his friend, but he too was 
evidently shocked by the effects of the raids, particularly the fact of the number of bodies left 
behind. On 27th February he did not work, but recorded what he heard from White. “Alec goes 
to Dresden working in the cemetery. Numerous dead bodies are strewn over the pavements. 
Some of the lads have the job of moving them.” Two days later Goodwin was back at work. 
“There’s quite a number of bodies laying [sic] in the streets after being extricated from the 
cellars. My word, what a stench!” On 4th March, he wrote: “What a time we are having 
working all weekend. It doesn’t seem at all like Sunday today. The town is dead and we are still 
in the streets working, that is Alec and me. Some of the lads are digging out the dead. What a 
stench there is!” As the days progress his entries become shorter, and in common with White’s 
diary, pick out the more macabre details of the day. The entry for 6th March was short: 
“Feeling browned off and glad to see 4 o’clock today. Brought out two bodies today.” Three 
days later he offered a similarly brief entry: “A few more dead bodies brought out.”579 Taken 
together, the accounts of these two men tell the story of the ubiquity of death in Dresden. The 
tone changes from light-hearted observations about life in captivity to sombre, quiet reflection 
on the death and destruction around them.  Their diaries provide a harsh reminder. David 
Divine writes: “To accept that this was a war of sophisticated weaponry has become a 
convention in the West, but it was in reality a war of desperate attrition, and victory in the end 
hinged upon human death.”580 This was brought into clear focus in Dresden. The Bomber 
Offensive had, according to John Ellis, “begun as a radical technological solution to the 
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deadlock of trench warfare but itself ended up being governed by the same logical vicious 
circle that had determined the course of operation on the Western Front.”581 Alec White and 
Harry Goodwin experienced and recorded the very visible aftermath. 
The major contribution that these diaries can give to our understanding of the Dresden raids is 
that they are a contemporary British perspective on the destruction that was wrought. As W. 
G. Sebald would later argue, few writers in Germany tackled the subject of “the extent, nature 
and consequences of the catastrophe inflicted on Germany by the air raids.”582 White and 
Goodwin did, but their written reflections came back to Britain with them. Their value now is 
in their ability to help us see beyond unwieldy death tolls and dry operational record books, 
and to begin to understand how British prisoners of war dealt with the end results of attacks 
by Bomber Command. John Ellis has written: “it is the sheer scale of the loss of human 
life…that must always be borne in mind when reading accounts of bomber operations that 
seem unable to see beyond the plotting table, the instrument panel or the headset.”583 The 
diaries of Alec White and Harry Goodwin help sharpen our understanding of what actually 
happened in Dresden. They display a very human reaction to mass death, a reaction that does 
not encompass thoughts of vengeance or justice. Perhaps what is most striking therefore is 
what the diarists don’t say. There is no suggestion in either diary that the men welcomed the 
bombing for what it might mean for the Allied war effort. While it would later become 
apparent that the destruction of Dresden was not a significant factor in the German defeat 
there is no recorded sense of joy at the huge strikes against the nation holding the two men 
captive. Here were men who had carried out the physical acts of war and who were now 
dismayed by the ultimate results of the campaign. 
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It is evident from the research described in this chapter that Dresden stood out immediately to 
some armed forces personnel as separate from other targets on Nazi territory. Ken Sidford 
considered his work “murderous”, and other airmen rejected a previously practiced bombing 
ritual. Alec White and Harry Goodwin did not celebrate the destruction of the city where they 
were held captive; instead they were sickened by the death and destruction which was 
encountered.  
The reconnaissance reports which describe the vast damage to the city, the unusual detail 
given regarding the importance of Dresden and the foreign press accounts (discussed below) 
gave succour to those who had long criticised Allied bombing policy. Throughout the war, a 
number of politicians had steadfastly stuck to their conviction that the Allies should not pursue 
an area bombing strategy over Germany, and that history would look unkindly upon them for 
doing so. In parliament Richard Stokes MP gave voice to this concern.584  
In the House of Commons on 6th March 1945, Stokes stood to question what he called the 
“blanket bombing” of German cities in light of the Dresden raids. The man who his questions 
challenged, Sir Archibald Sinclair, chose to leave the House before Stokes spoke. Stokes was 
not a pacifist but he had long opposed area bombing as a policy.585 However, in this instance, 
he claimed to “leave out the moral issue. I have given up in despair trying to persuade people 
on that issue.” This was a cunning statement, since while the thrust of Stokes’ argument was 
about the effectiveness of area bombing, he spent enough time discussing “the moral issue” to 
leave his fellow MPs in no doubt of his true position.586 Framing his argument around 
effectiveness “gave his arguments special strength: he supported his ethical position in part by 
referring to quite pragmatic considerations [how to deal with post-war Germany] that were 
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even then in the minds of Churchill and others.”587 Turning to the moral issue he claimed to 
leave out, he stated that “[o]ne reads the most ghastly stories of what is going on in Dresden”, 
before quoting at length from the Manchester Guardian, in which an article had appeared the 
previous day highlighting the extent of the damage in Dresden, and the fact that the 
population had been swelled by refugees.588 It was this article around which his argument was 
based, an article which will be discussed later in this chapter. His concerns are succinctly 
described by A. C. Grayling: “The city was known to be full of tens of thousands of refugees 
fleeing the approach of the Soviet troops. Was this a reason to bomb the city? Why was it not, 
on humanitarian grounds, a reason not to bomb the city?”589 In spite of Stokes’ determination 
and his refusal to be fobbed off, he was unable to draw much support from his fellow MPs. 
After hearing the Manchester Guardian report, Sir Wavell Wakefield, MP for Swindon, could 
not understand Stokes’ argument. “If, as I understood the hon. Member to say, bombing was 
not much good, has he not just shown the value of this strategic bombing?”590 Indeed, it was 
not until much later that an official response was given to Stokes’ question. Sinclair’s deputy, 
the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Air, Commander Brabner, responded:  
“We are not wasting our bombers or time on purely terror tactics….It does not do the 
hon. Member justice to come to this House and try to suggest that there are a lot of Air 
Marshals or pilots, or anyone else, sitting in a room, trying to think how many German 
women and children they can kill.”591 
Over five hours after Richard Stokes had first stood up to raise his question, the answer he 
received was a curt, swift denial. As Frederick Taylor wrote recently, “the debate ended in 
anticlimax. There would be no further formal discussion of the bombing question before the 
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war ended.”592 For all Stokes’ bluster, he had been unable to occasion a substantial response, 
or even a debate, which drew in a large number of MPs. However, Sinclair’s departure from 
the House and the brusque nature of the eventual reply suggest Stokes had touched a nerve. 
His protestations that day left at least three positive legacies. First, he had ensured that his 
reservations over the Dresden attacks would be entered onto the public record. In particular, 
the major benefit was that the Cowan Dispatch – discussed below – was entered onto public 
record in Hansard. The dispatch had previously been suppressed from the public.593 Second, he 
had ensured that the anti-area-bombing views were aired in parliament in relation to the 
Dresden raid. A long-time opponent of the area bombing of Germany, he had vindicated his 
earlier concerns by quoting from the Manchester Guardian article on the devastation caused. 
Anticipating the controversy over Dresden which had just begun but would later erupt, Stokes 
argued: “I think that we shall live to rue the day we have done this and that, in many ways, it 
will stand for all time as a blot upon our escutcheon.”594 Third, his sustained questioning may 
have influenced Churchill’s late-March volte-face, when he backed away from responsibility for 
the Dresden raids. Frederick Taylor speculates: “Perhaps Stokes’s barbs in the House of 
Commons three weeks earlier had penetrated and festered beneath the prime ministerial 
skin.”595 Certainly the immediate adverse reaction to the Dresden attacks concerned Churchill, 
as he quickly sought a retreat from responsibility for the attacks. Stokes’ decision to so 
publically challenge the bombing of Dresden would leave a mark which helped set the stage 
for greater investigation in the post-war years. 
For all they may have been coolly received, Stephen A. Garrett points out that Stokes’ 
protestations were prescient. He sensed the waning of relations between the Allies and the 
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Soviet Union once the war ended. Foreseeing a propaganda coup for the Soviets, Stokes 
“noted that the Russians seemed to have avoided the policy of devastating whole cities and 
thus the obloquy that was likely to follow those who had pursued such a strategy once the war 
was over.”596 So it would prove, as on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain, the Dresden 
bombing would later form a pillar of anti-Western propaganda.597 Stokes must also fit into Max 
Hastings’ class of “farsighted airmen and politicians [who] began to perceive that history might 
judge the achievements of strategic air power with far less enthusiasm than their own Target 
Intelligence departments.”598 
Perhaps inevitably, much of the attention following the attacks fell upon Sir Arthur Harris. 
Harris was later unrepentant about the fate of Dresden. John Colville, Winston Churchill’s 
Assistant Private Secretary, offers evidence of Harris’ position. Colville recorded in his diary a 
discussion he had with Sir Arthur Harris the week after the Dresden raids. “Before dinner, 
while waiting in the Great Hall for the P.M. [sic] to come down, I asked Sir Arthur Harris what 
the effect of the raid on Dresden had been. “Dresden?” he said. “There is no such place as 
Dresden.””599 It was, argues Tami Davis Biddle, such sharp and dismissive attitudes which 
made Harris “an uncomfortable figure for those who daily had to consider public perception 
and opinion – including religious and humanitarian sentiment – in Britain.”600 John Ellis goes 
further: “Harris’s own pleadings on behalf of area bombing rarely smacked of intellectual 
rigour.”601 Unwavering in the belief that he was pursuing the most effective bombing policy, 
Harris entered heated correspondence with Charles Portal, Marshal of the Royal Air Force. 
Portal felt that at this stage of the war the Allies should move away from the area bombing of 
cities and concentrate on targeting German oil plants: his correspondence with Portal is 
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discussed below. He encouraged Harris to do so but was met with a stern defence of area 
bombing.602 After the war Harris became the figurehead of the Allied area bombing policy, and 
recognition of his wartime service was muted. Max Hastings suggests that it was Harris’ 
behaviour at this time – steadfastly and angrily refusing to end the area bombing of German 
cities – that led to his relative ostracism in the post-war years. The policy of visiting mass 
destruction on the Reich at the end of the war, symbolised by Dresden, was beginning to affect 
opinions of Harris.603  
The thoughts of Portal, along with those of Sir Archibald Sinclair, could be revealing here, yet it 
is not possible to give a clear picture for either man. Portal did not keep a diary during the 
period and there is very little of relevance in the papers of Sinclair which have survived. 
Portal’s correspondence with Harris during late 1944 and early 1945 does though reveal his 
frustrations with Harris, who was convinced both by the inefficacy of the plan to target oil 
plants and in the absolute value in continuing to load maximum resources into the area 
bombing campaign. Portal did not intend for the area bombing of cities to cease, yet a letter 
written to Harris on 12th November suggested that the “magnetism” of the German cities still 
functioning was distracting Bomber Command from the primary targets. Portal urged Harris to 
“re-assure me that this is not so” and to confirm that oil objectives were being effectively 
targeted.604 Harris remained of the belief that wiping out oil plants serving the Nazi war 
machine was an unrealistic aim.605 Director of Bomber Operations Sydney Bufton wrote to 
Portal that Harris’s argument “cannot be accepted” and Portal told Harris that he was 
“profoundly disappointed” by Harris’s apparent rejection of the plan to target oil.606 
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On the moral questions surrounding the area bombing of German cities, Portal’s private views 
are harder to pin down. In Denis Richards’ biography of Portal he casts him as pragmatic on the 
question of German civilian deaths, and defends him against a charge of hypocrisy. Portal 
believed that cities should feel the weight of the bombing campaign without actively seeking 
to cause mass death of their inhabitants. “To many, bearing in mind the weight and fury of 
Bomber Command’s attacks from 1942 onwards, this distinction may seem unreal, or even 
hypocritical. Portal, however, was least of all men a hypocrite.”607 
It is easier to fill in the role of Winston Churchill. Between 22 and 27 January correspondence 
between Churchill, Portal and Sinclair shows that Churchill was impatiently pushing for news of 
plans for a heavy attack on cities in the east of Germany which would be intended to both aid 
the Soviet advance and strike a severe blow against German civilian morale.608 It would give 
him, according to Addison, a “strengthen[ed] hand at the negotiating table”609 at the 
forthcoming Yalta Conference. At the time of the Dresden attacks, he was on his way back to 
Britain, via Athens, from the conference. He was in Athens when the attacks began. Colville 
explained that Churchill was not consulted about Dresden specifically, since “it was in accord 
with the general policy of bombing German towns massively”, a policy Churchill had approved. 
The correspondence in late January places Churchill at the very centre of the push for an 
attack.610 He goes on to describe the “apparent equanimity” with which his boss received the 
news about Dresden, adding that Churchill “never mentioned it in my presence, and I am 
reasonably sure he would have done so if it had been regarded as anything at all special.”611 
This seems to lend weight to the suggestion that Churchill’s critical response to the Dresden 
attacks – not forthcoming until six weeks after the attack – was based less on his own prompt 
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appraisal and more on the criticism which was quickly attached to the raids. It took him six 
weeks to reach the conclusion that Dresden should not have been attacked.612 Before this, the 
Prime Minister had been personally criticised for the raids. In the days following the attacks, 
Violet Bonham Carter, daughter of H. H. Asquith, who had served as Prime Minister during the 
First World War, rebuked Churchill. Having demanded to speak with him at Downing Street, 
she then “soundly berated the most powerful man in Britain for bombing Dresden.”613 On 25th 
February a letter was sent to Churchill from an anonymous source in Germany which called on 
him to defeat Nazi Germany without bombing civilians.  
“Dear Mr Churchill, you are a just man. Why do you vent your hatred on innocent 
people? Do a good work and free the world from the horrible Nazi Beast.  
God bless your work.”614 
Churchill’s official response to the bombings was not issued until the end of March. The effect 
these direct challenges to Churchill had on him cannot be proved with certainty. Yet as 
Maxwell Philip Schoenfeld writes: “Dresden now began to acquire that haunting position it has 
retained to the present day in the story of Churchill’s war ministry.”615 
At the end of March, with the outcome of the war increasingly certain, he drafted his oft-
reproduced minute on the policy of area bombing, retrospectively withdrawing his support for 
the attacks. An initial draft was especially scathing of the attacks: 
“It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German 
cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should 
be reviewed. Otherwise we shall come into control of an utterly ruined land. We shall 
not, for instance, be able to get housing materials out of Germany for our own needs 
because some temporary provision would have to be made for the Germans themselves. 
The destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied 
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bombing. I am of the opinion that military objectives must henceforth be more strictly 
studied in our own interests rather than that of the enemy. 
The Foreign Secretary has spoken to me on this subject, and I feel the need for more 
precise concentration upon military objectives, such as oil and communications behind 
the immediate battle-zone, rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction, 
however impressive.”616 
The inflammatory tone of the first draft was changed after strong criticism from Portal yet still 
saw Churchill seek to distance himself from the decision to make such a destructive raid: 
“It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of the so called “area 
bombing” of German cities should be reviewed from the point of view of our own 
interests. If we come into control of an entirely ruined land, there will be a great 
shortage of accommodation for ourselves and our Allies: and we shall be unable to get 
housing materials out of Germany for our own needs because some temporary provision 
would have to be made for the Germans themselves. We must see to it that our attacks 
do not do more harm to ourselves in the long run than they do to the enemy’s 
immediate war effort. Pray let me have your views.”617  
Stephen A. Garrett notes that:  
“Churchill, after all, knew full well what area bombing had meant for Germany, even if 
most of his countrymen had not, and one day the actual historical record would be open 
for inspection. Churchill, with his historian’s instincts, presumably was preparing for this 
eventuality.”618  
Clement Attlee had also noted this aspect of Churchill’s character – his “intense realisation of 
history” – during the war. In a letter to his brother he describes Churchill’s thought-process in 
the same way as Garrett suggests. “He sees all events as taking place in the procession of past 
events as seen by the historian of the future”.619 Attlee himself seemed largely unmoved by 
the destruction across Germany during a visit to mainland Europe in March 1945. His focus, in 
a letter to his brother, was on the lack of architectural loss the bombing had caused. Most of 
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the houses were, he wrote, “pretentious florid affairs with caryatids etc very German [sic].”620 
The lack of any sustained engagement with the morality of bombing by those at the very top of 
British command during the war may indicate a number of factors; the intention to avoid the 
creation of a paper-trail to be picked up after the war fits the descriptions of Churchill’s 
historical instincts. For his own part Churchill did little to dispel this suggestion either during or 
in the years after the war, a point for which he is criticised by biographers. Churchill’s vast 
history of the Second World War gives minimal attention to the Dresden raids particularly; on 
the wider Bomber Offensive, Paul Addison describes Churchill’s treatment of it as “oblique and 
inadequate”;621 David Reynolds writes that Churchill “glosses over the bomber offensive and 
the criticisms of it”;622 Norman Rose suggests that the details of the Dresden raids “seemed to 
have slipped Churchill’s memory.”623 Evidence to support this latter point comes in the form of 
a response Churchill gave when asked to clarify some factual points. “I cannot recall anything 
about it. I thought the Americans did it. Air Chief Marshal Harris would be the person to 
contact.”624 Reynolds does note that when Churchill wrote volume four of his history of the 
Second World War he did not yet have a dedicated air war researcher, and suggests that this 
contributed to the “piecemeal” way in which the area bombing campaign was addressed.625 
Addison argues that the alteration of the minute is “a matter for speculation”.626 Geoffrey Best 
concludes, similarly, that with regards to the position of Churchill on the bombing of German 
cities: “each reader must judge for himself.”627 
Sir Arthur Harris issued his memoirs in 1947. He offered little other than factual description of 
the Dresden raids. Where he did engage with the questions as to the morality of the attacks, 
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he was brief. Acknowledging those people who had supported other bombing missions but 
condemned the Dresden attacks, he stated that the latter were “at the time considered a 
military necessity by much more important people than myself.” The unshaded implication 
here is that Harris was acting with the approval of his bosses. Harris added that his arguments 
on the ethics of bombing – that civilians had always been killed in wars – should be applied to 
Dresden as to any other city targeted in the war. The soundness of this argument has 
undergone rigorous testing, and can be criticised since the attacks occurred at a time when the 
war was approaching its end. In any case, Harris, like Churchill, offered little of a substantial 
nature for critics to discuss at this stage.628 In the early 1960s, around the time of the release 
of the Official History, Harris wrote a seven page rebuttal of the idea that he – and he alone – 
was responsible for the decision to attack Dresden. His note begins: “I have no intention, as at 
present indicated, of going down to History as the author or the sole executant of the 
Strategical plans to destroy the cities of Germany.” Harris outlined the chain of command 
within which decisions were taken, confirmed that the standard checks of operational orders 
had taken place, and described Portal’s “preponderating influence over bombing strategy”. He 
went on claim that the plan to bomb Dresden “of course [came] from the other side of the Iron 
Curtain”, a suggestion which Overy firmly rejects.629 
Paul Addison asked recently what we now know about Dresden, and what we know because of 
Dresden. He notes that one of the main legacies of the attacks was to undermine the 
credibility of those who made it happen: “If the attack on Dresden inflicted little in the way of 
military damage on the enemy, it caused lasting damage to the reputation of Britain and the 
United States, not to mention the airmen and politicians who took the key decisions.”630 
Churchill’s actions and response to the Dresden attack have damaged his legacy. Conversely, 
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those who questioned and condemned the raids at the time emerge with reputations 
enhanced and helped ensure that the attack has been subjected to sustained scrutiny.631 John 
Colville, whose diary has been quoted here, reflected on the reaction to the Dresden raids in a 
later publication. He suggested that, with respect to Churchill’s initial acceptance of the 
attacks, “the accumulated horrors of the war hardened all our hearts”.632 As evidence in a 
previous chapter shows, before the war Churchill was, at least in his public pronouncements, 
against area bombing as a policy.633 If we accept Colville’s analysis, and it seems reasonable to 
do so, we can understand that the years of war and the failure to finish off the German war 
effort had taken their toll on many of those in power. This resulted in the administering of a 
brutal attack on a largely untouched city in the very late stages of the war. Even after more 
than five years of war, there remained a determined few who were not afflicted with the 
hardened hearts Colville diagnoses. 
Press responses 
An example of relative censorship dynamics in the United States and the United Kingdom can 
be displayed with reference to the ‘Cowan Dispatch’ – mentioned by Richard Stokes in his 
address to parliament – on the Dresden bombings. Frederick Taylor explains how this episode 
was played out. RAF Air Commodore Colin McKay Grierson advised a press conference of the 
reasons for the raids on Dresden and other cities targeted at the same time. One of the 
reasons he stated was that “they are the centres to which evacuees are being moved.” In 
response to further questioning on this, Grierson added, in the words of Taylor, “a fairly 
offhand remark about also trying to destroy “what was left of German morale.””634 The Cowan 
Dispatch refers to a report submitted the following day by Howard Cowan of the Associated 
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Press. It stated: “Allied air commanders have made the long-awaited decision to adopt 
deliberate terror bombing of German population centers as a ruthless expedient to hastening 
Hitler’s doom.” This report was quickly supressed in Britain but gained greater traction in the 
United States. Without the rapid transfer and exchange of information now available this 
information was not widely known in Britain. It was certainly not published in British 
newspapers. This story is a firm reminder of the high censorial controls applied to British 
newspapers and begins to explain the block on relaying the kind of information that would 
lead to direct questioning of wartime policy.635 Yet in spite of the strict controls, there are 
numerous examples of passages which were deemed acceptable by censors and which appear 
critical of the Dresden raids. Stuart Allan describes how during the war “the BBC succumbed to 
pressures which severely compromised its editorial independence. No such restrictions were 
requested vis-à-vis the newspaper press, nor would their imposition likely to have proven to 
be successful.”636 This greater strength of editorial independence allowed some more critical 
reports to go to press. This was not the rule however, with many newspapers focusing on the 
military significance of such a heavy attack. Plenty of reports explained the scale of “the 
greatest air offensive of the war”, details of which were “expected to show that it was a 
record.”637 In the Coventry local press the reporting is factual and draws no similarities with 
the experiences of citizens in the two cities: neither celebration nor empathy is apparent.638 
Since the first attacks took place late on the night of 13th February, the first newspapers to run 
the story were the evening editions of 14th February. It was not until the following morning 
that there was full coverage of the raids. This section of the chapter will show how newspapers 
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did ask implicit questions of the attacks, in spite of both censorship levels and of the general 
trend followed by other media outlets to faithfully report, not question. 
Cecil H. King, a senior executive at the Daily Mirror, wrote his reaction to the Cowan Dispatch 
in his diary on 17th February, describing Allied terror bombing as “entirely horrifying.” He 
added that it was “wicked as well as being typically un-British.” Prophetically, he added: “I 
cannot help feeling that the price, political and moral, we shall have to pay for all this will be a 
grievous one.” The effect this had on his newspaper’s reporting of the raids was that they 
“rang up the Ministry of Information as soon as the news came in, to urge that it be 
suppressed – a very forlorn hope – and in any case did not print it.” A few weeks later King 
added that “[t]he destruction of Germany is quite awful, and I am afraid I am far more 
appalled by the prospect of rebuilding a prostrate Europe than elated at the idea of victory.”639 
One man’s moral outrage though did not lead to the wider distribution of information about 
the attacks: quite the reverse in King’s case. Martin Bell has since speculated upon the effect of 
showing the British public the true extent of the Dresden attacks. He considers the 
hypothetical response to Hamburg and Dresden in an age of satellite television reporting, and 
questioned whether such attacks: “would have been politically sustainable, or whether the 
tens of thousands of civilian casualties and the images beamed up from the smoking ruins 
would have turned the home front against the prosecution of war by such ruthless and brutal 
means.”640 Similarly, perhaps if Cecil King’s disgust at the Allies’ tactics had translated into a 
more critical stance in his newspaper’s reporting, more people would have turned against this 
manifestation of the bombing offensive. It is noticeable in studying the archives of the Daily 
Mirror that it does not make any mention of the negative side of the Dresden raids. Articles 
reporting the raids discuss the facts and figures of the attacks, such as the number of planes 
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involved and the number of bombs dropped.641 The aforementioned censorship controls 
prevented newspapers overtly criticising the attacks. Yet there is ample evidence of reportage 
which would prompt more astute readers to ask questions of the raids. The case of the 
Manchester Guardian discussed below is a prime example of how a newspaper was able to 
raise concerns without directly criticising Bomber Command. Such an approach might have 
enabled King to acknowledge his “horror” while presenting sympathetic readers with cues for 
further enquiry. 
The Daily Mail headline of 16th February described Dresden as it was for the people there – a 
shelter. With the Bomber Offensive producing widespread destruction across the Reich, there 
were few population centres of any size which remained virtually intact. Dresden was one such 
area, and Germans who had lost their homes in other cities had converged in the town. Where 
many of the newspapers concentrated on the reasons given by the Allies for attacking 
Dresden, the Daily Mail’s angle: “The last ‘shelter’ cities go”, very much evokes images of those 
who were there at the time.642 The most obvious and widely used example of sensitive 
reporting is the consistent line taken by the Manchester Guardian. The report of 5th March 
1945, as mentioned previously in connection with Richard Stokes’ protestations, and discussed 
further below, is well known. Yet the initial report is stark, especially by comparison to the 
Daily Herald, Daily Worker, and Daily Mirror articles quoted above. Early in their article of 15th 
February is the following passage: “An Air Ministry communiqué said that the R.A.F. went to 
Dresden twice on Tuesday night. Both attacks were highly concentrated and large fires were 
left burning.” This employs more descriptive language than the reports stating numbers and 
figures, and sets the scene for what follows. The final line of the article notes that “Dresden’s 
pre-war population of 640,000 has been swollen by thousands of evacuees from much-
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bombed German cities.” This was the only article to make explicit mention of the refugees in 
the city.643  
In The Times, the reports filed in the editions of 15th and 16th February 1945 show nothing to 
suggest that the raids were morally questionable.644 However, in an editorial on the 16th, the 
editors indicated a greater level of concern. As with the Manchester Guardian report, the 
language used is telling. Describing a surprising lack of response to the air raids by the 
Germans, the editorial explained that the explanations for this “derive from the 
unprecedented fury of the onslaught from the air, which of late has fallen upon Germany 
continuously by day and night.” Rather than exult in the increasing level of attacks on the 
enemy, this phase was described as “a new and terrifying prodigy of air power.”645 In the first 
chapter of this thesis there is a quote from Daniel Waley about the British public appetite for 
news of foreign affairs being whetted by the Italian actions in Abyssinia.646 Here, this more 
critical response to the bombings, according to Tami Davis Biddle, would have alerted 
“perceptive readers” to the characteristics and implications that the bombing campaign would 
now take on. She continues: “In key respects, the Combined Bomber Offensive had become 
different from previous years. Both British and American raids were, at this point in the war, 
unprecedented in their size and sustained fury.”647 The Times appears to have picked up on 
this, and relayed the development to their readers.  
The Daily Sketch was another newspaper to quickly understand the extent of the devastation 
in Dresden. In their front-page article on the subject on 15th February, the newspaper 
described how “Germany has taken the worst scourging of the war from the air on her cities, 
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railway centres, troop concentrations and supply lines.” This line is fairly standard in terms of 
how the most newspapers were handling the attacks. What followed however is perhaps the 
most poetic description of the raids to be found in any paper. In bold type, the following 
passage appeared. “Into a sea of fire spread by a cascade of 650,000 incendiaries the bombers 
poured hundreds of “block-busting” 8,000lb. and 4,000lb. high explosive bombs.”648 The Daily 
Sketch backed up this article with another, in which the author quoted extensively from the 
“one prompt, comprehensive, and factual report at this stage of what had happened in 
Dresden”, which was written by Rudolph Sparing of the German Overseas News Agency 
(GONA).649 This second article is the most explicit of the first wave of reports in terms of what 
it told the British public about the raids. “The Dresden catastrophe is without precedent. In the 
inner town not a single block of buildings, not a single detached building, remain intact or even 
capable of reconstruction. The town area is devoid of life.” This was a direct quote from the 
GONA, which added that “[a] great city has been wiped off the map of Europe.” There 
followed an explicit description of the effects of the raids. “The raging fires which spread 
irresistibly in the narrow streets killed a great many from sheer lack of oxygen.” The quotes 
reproduced here make up the majority of the article. Only the opening line, introducing the 
German report, was not a direct translation. There was no comment, propaganda, or 
mediation by Daily Sketch editorial staff. Other newspapers, when quoting from German news 
sources, tended to temper the reports with qualifications. Take for example the following 
passage from the Daily Express. “The Germans went on to complain of the loss of art treasures 
and beautiful buildings. But the truth is that Dresden is a major city in the German war 
effort.”650 This article was similar in source material to the Daily Sketch report. The Daily 
Express qualified what they wrote with more Allied-friendly background information. The Daily 
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Sketch allowed a German voice to be heard without an Allied perspective being played over 
the top. An almost identical translation from the original German line beginning “[t]he raging 
fires…” appeared later in the Manchester Guardian, to greater fanfare (see below), but it was 
the Daily Sketch which first chose to run this version of events. 
Later, on 5th March, the Manchester Guardian printed the most explicit and substantial 
description of the conditions created in Dresden by the raids. This would prove to be a critical 
event in the reaction to Dresden, for it provided ammunition for Richard Stokes to use in the 
House of Commons. The Manchester Guardian was now informing government. It is as a result 
of Stokes quoting from the article during a Commons debate that the gruesome details can be 
found on parliamentary records in Britain. The article was based on a German report, but the 
editors did not seek to undermine the report by dismissing it as a propaganda tool. The article 
stated:  
“Tens of thousands who lived in Dresden are now burned under its ruins. Even an 
attempt at identification of the victims is hopeless. What happened on that evening of 
February 13th? There were 1,000,000 people in Dresden, including 600,000 bombed-out 
evacuees and refugees from the East. The raging fires which spread irresistibly in the 
narrow streets killed a great many from sheer lack of oxygen.” 651 
For the first time in the British newspapers, the effect of the fires on the residents of Dresden 
were fully explained. Although the early reports of the attacks told of the fires raging in the 
town, none made the explicit link between this situation and how it would affect the people. 
Shrewd readers may have made the link, but here for the first time was a proper description of 
what went on. Prior to this, the average reader of newspapers in Britain could not 
unreasonably have believed that the effect of the fires had been to destroy bricks and mortar 
rather than flesh and blood. This raid was not comparable to what had been experienced in 
British cities. The same newspaper had previously revealed that the population of the town 
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had increased due to the stream of refugees bursting out of the increasingly bombed out cities 
of Germany. This point was reinforced in the article.652 Whether the quoted figures were 
correct or not is open to discussion, with the Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels 
thought to have had a hand in manipulations of the official story.653 Nevertheless, that 
Dresden had become something of a ‘shelter city’ is unarguable. This was transmitted to 
British readers by the Manchester Guardian article. What followed however was more 
shocking, as the text described the manner in which a great number of the town’s occupants 
had died. “The raging fires which spread irresistibly in the narrow streets killed a great many 
from sheer lack of oxygen.” As if the idea of citizens burning to death was not graphic and 
appalling enough, readers were now told that suffocation acted as a multiplier of the death 
toll.654 More recent research has uncovered further dreadful ways in which people in Dresden 
had met their deaths. Metal bomb shelters acted as ovens which cooked their occupants. 
Sönke Neitzel has described how those who sought to escape the firestorm by immersing 
themselves in water tanks for use by fire crews were boiled alive. People wearing loose shoes 
soon lost them to the chaos underfoot, and found they were quickly unable to walk as their 
feet became too badly burned.655 The details described in the Manchester Guardian so soon 
after the attacks have become just a part of the narrative of widespread horror visited upon 
civilians in Dresden. The article played an important role at the time however, since it pried 
open a window through which British people could view the chaos and devastation 
experienced in the hours and days following the raids.656 
The very fact that the Manchester Guardian article was published three weeks after the 
attacks is revealing. Elsewhere, other stories became the focus of media attention, such as the 
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continuing advance of the Red Army, and developments in the Pacific theatre of war.657 The 
appearance of a supplementary report on the state of Dresden three weeks later displays not 
only the scale of the damage caused, but also the fact that it was still considered newsworthy. 
As with Mannheim and Hamburg before it, Dresden was becoming a reference point in the 
bomber offensive on Germany. By this stage, newspapers could confidently report that 
Dresden had been destroyed without adding further information. On 6th March, reports were 
filed telling of the bombing of Chemnitz, another eastern German city. The Daily Express 
described Chemnitz as being “near “obliterated” Dresden”. This shows how quickly the state of 
the town post-Allied bombing had become widely known in Britain.658 
Looking back years after the war, journalist Charles Lynch described his profession during the 
war as playing a “cheerleading” role. “We were a propaganda arm of our governments. At the 
start the censors enforced that, but by the end we were our own censors.”659 Applying this 
observation to the newspaper reporting of the Dresden raids, this can explain the response of 
those newspapers which ran with stories of a “[r]ecord day blitz” amounting to the “war’s 
greatest air offensive”.660 Alan Russell describes the “prevarication” of the media.661 Yet this 
chapter has shown that Lynch is overly critical of the role played by journalists as a whole. The 
Daily Sketch, The Times, and the Manchester Guardian are all notable examples of newspapers 
which gave an immediate indication of the scale of the attacks on Dresden. In more recent 
years hindsight has led to a broader range of more overt criticism of the raids. However, those 
journalists and editors who ran the more sensitive reports – while Dresden’s fires still burned 
and charred bodies still lay decomposing in the streets – used not hindsight to raise implicit 
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questions about Dresden, but their immediate sense of concern. By electing to print such 
reports the information was made available to the wider British public. 
Public responses 
It is important to reemphasise here the focus on contemporary sources, particularly for this 
specific aspect of the thesis. By April in Britain knowledge of Nazi atrocities in concentration 
and extermination camps was becoming more widespread, particularly after the liberation of 
Bergen-Belsen by British troops. There was only a brief period between when the assault on 
Dresden began on 13th February 1945, and when the discoveries of the concentration camps 
started to feature heavily in the media.662 This had a hardening effect on British public opinion. 
As Grayling writes: “For many in this mood, the area bombing in general and the destruction of 
Dresden in particular seemed no more than just punishment.”663 A file report for Mass-
Observation in April produced evidence of a good deal of angry and unsympathetic views 
towards Germans. These views form the vast majority. The commonalities of experience 
during the Blitz and the simultaneous bombing of German cities which were a feature of 
attitudes to reprisals earlier in the war were certainly not widely reflected upon here. Mass-
Observation had asked how Germany and Germans should be treated once the war was over. 
One person said: “I think this: the children should be taken out of the country, and we ought to 
turn their gas-bombs on them and exterminate them.” Another stated: “They’re to blame. The 
only innocent ones are those found in the concentration camps.” One person answered: “I 
hate every single one of them.”664 Yet even now among a minority, enduring empathy was in 
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evidence, albeit in qualified form. One person wrote: “The older ones are much like ourselves; 
the younger ones have been brought up to this idea of complete domination. But there are 
many kind and nice Germans of course.” This idea of an intoxicated generation was echoed by 
another person surveyed: “I think they had no alternative but to follow their leaders.” One 
man said simply: “Well, I should say the German people are like us.”665 
Unfortunately the BIPO surveys for this period of the war have not survived; it is therefore 
difficult to convey an impression of the extent of public support or discomfort around the 
bombing of Germany and how it compared to when Hamburg was attacked. There is though 
still much which can be derived from Mass-Observation diary entries around this time.  
As the previous section on newspaper coverage has shown, there were a substantial number 
of written reports that ought to have enabled observant readers to gather that there was a 
contentious issue unfolding over the destruction of Dresden. The questions raised – often 
implicitly – in newspaper articles were transferred into visible disapproval of the Dresden 
attacks. As elsewhere, this section should not be read in such a way as to suggest that the 
attacks received widespread and outspoken condemnation. Simon Garfield offers the example 
of Pam Ashford, a diarist who in the same year had already come to value a swift victory over 
the fate of towns in Germany where she had developed fond relationships through her 
business dealings. She admitted that “[t]here is even indifference in my feelings for Duisburg 
and Dresden, though there real personal friendships existed.”666 This was long before the Allies 
destroyed Dresden. In February 1945 there was not a mass outpouring of rage over the 
destruction of Dresden. This lack of widespread public condemnation of the raids led Juliet 
Gardiner to write recently that to some people, the attacks were “confirmatory evidence of 
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the ‘sickening’ nature of war and raised little adverse comment at the time.”667 Yet to accept 
this proposition is to ignore the thoughts of those people who did immediately question the 
raids. In amongst the statements of direct vengeance or indifference to the German fate, what 
is revealing are the views of people who did condemn the raids even after more than five years 
of war and with the newer threat posed by V-weapon attacks.668 
In diaries kept for the Mass-Observation Archive there is a regular instance of diarists singling 
out and recording their thoughts on Dresden without prompt. This is telling in itself, even 
before examining the nature of those thoughts. From the responses gathered it is clear that 
the Dresden attacks touched a particular element of the public consciousness. 
Even where there is no obvious criticism or sadness at the destruction of Dresden, a large 
number of diarists do mention the attacks in their entries. Clearly this was an event recognised 
by members of the public as a key development. This is especially true of male diarists, who 
often commented on Dresden while giving little in the way of opinion about it. Diarist 5004 
exemplifies this phenomenon. His diary entries in mid-February offer comment on the 
possibility that the Dresden attacks were a product of negotiations at Yalta, and the Russian 
advance over land.669 There is no evidence of a moral argument being advanced. There is a 
greater trend for female diarists to offer more personal responses to the devastation wrought. 
Another trait observable in the diaries of men is the echoing of the style and tone used by 
press reports. For example, Diarist 5132, a buyer in his late thirties, describes the “terrific 
hammerings” with which the Air Forces had hit Germany. This mirrors the almost bombastic 
language employed in some of the more sensational reporting from the region. He also follows 
the style of reporting which portrayed a ruined landscape that had been reduced to a pre-
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civilised state. In one entry he writes: “Dresden seems to have been absolutely liquidated in a 
matter of some 40 hours or so”.670 This is in keeping with newspaper reports that used the 
terms “smashed to atoms”, “pulverised”, and “completely wiped out”. His recording of the 
bombing is mostly framed in terms of strategic considerations; the only minor note he makes 
which does not fit this pattern is: “the Huns must be feeling pretty mad about it.”671 
When studying the entries made particularly by women in their diaries, it is clear there was 
much angst about the demise of Dresden. As Tami Davis Biddle and Max Hastings have 
explained, Dresden would have been known to a section of the British public prior to the war. 
The responses therefore often contain a clue suggesting that the diarist had visited the city. 
“Educated Britons knew it mainly for its cultural life and its fine examples of Baroque 
architecture”, according to Davis. 672 Hastings adds that “Dresden was a city of which an 
important section of educated Englishmen had heard, read, even seen.”673 Accepting that 
Dresden was a city viewed with a level of fondness by a proportion of the British public, it is 
possible to understand the following entry in these terms. Diarist 5272, a sixty-year-old 
musician and farm worker, described the city as being “of singular charm”. She goes on to 
frame this observation with descriptions of the beauty of the surrounding area. This makes it 
clear that she had either visited the city, or was aware of it in some other way. She opens her 
thoughts on the subject with the contention that “[p]oor Dresden got a fearful dose”.674 Diarist 
5338, a civil servant of similar age to Diarist 5272, framed her lamentations along the same 
lines. Of Dresden she wrote: “I know it has to be because of its industrial and traffic 
importance. But it is such a beautiful city and I have so many happy memories of it.” Two days 
later she added “The News today is of large scale air war over Germany and Japan. I can’t help 
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feeling very grieved over Dresden, which they say is practically wiped out.”675 Evidently this 
diarist fitted into the class described above by Davis and Hastings. What is clear from these 
entries and those which follow is that a number of Mass-Observation volunteers knew of the 
cultural importance of Dresden. “Many people knew that boasting of the destruction of 
Dresden, sometimes known as the Florence of Germany, was like rejoicing that York or 
Cambridge had been obliterated.”676 Diarist 5390, a foreign shipping correspondent, had 
another reason to be especially saddened by the bombing of Dresden. One of her diary entries 
shows that she had an acquaintance from the city. “Dresden occurs often to me as Johanna’s 
home.” Unlike Pam Ashford, she had not grown indifferent to the fate of a city that it seems 
she had visited in the past: “I am sorry that such beautiful buildings are being destroyed. I have 
many photos of them.”677 One diary that is particularly revealing is that of Diarist 5337, a 
housewife from Oxfordshire. In her diary she concentrates broadly on her daily life, rarely 
mentioning events occurring in the war. This gives a rich picture of everyday life in Britain 
during the war. Yet the Dresden raids must have had a particular effect on her. As with other 
diarists, she implies that she has visited the city. In amongst descriptions of her daily routine, 
she mentions with regret the damage caused. “They have bombed the Opera House and lovely 
picture gallery at Dresden, so many happy memories I can recall.”678 The fact that she knew 
about the raids shows that she was aware of current affairs. While she rarely mentioned 
developments in the war, the Dresden bombings moved her sufficiently to record them in her 
diary. Due either to her previous experience of the city or her feeling that this was something 
above the ordinary, or  perhaps a combination of the both factors, the attacks on Dresden 
stood out. 
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Donald Bloxham has written, “while the assessment of the value of cultural loss is a relative 
one, the human loss is, or should be, absolute.” The examples above suggest that some diarists 
either felt the architectural and cultural loss more keenly than the inevitable human cost, or 
perhaps could not bring themselves to directly contemplate the massive civilian casualties.679 
One question raised by the sadness over the loss of buildings is elucidated by A. C. Grayling in 
his examination of the Allied bombing policy. He rhetorically asks: “was there a half-spoken 
intent on the part of the Allies…to effect what would be called ‘culturecide’ upon the two main 
Axis powers?”680 The examples provided above of people who lamented the structural damage 
at Dresden point to a fear of this. The incidence of relegating the human cost is not, however, 
common to all Mass-Observation diarists. The aforementioned Diarist 5272, for example, was 
troubled by “the misery that all this is causing to millions of people – many of them innocent 
and perhaps even in opposition to the Nazis doesn’t bear thinking about. [sic]”681 By the end of 
February, Diarist 5296, a housewife of a similar age, noted that: “[w]e wonder how on earth 
there is a town or person left alive.”682 These examples show a genuine concern for the 
German civilians and refugees in Dresden at the time of the attacks. The opinion of Diarist 
5283, a nurse companion in her late fifties, mirrors many of those replies to the December 
1943 Mass-Observation directive which saw the bombing as a grim necessity. She writes about 
the regular attacks: “I found it rather sickening, necessary as it is if the war is to be won.”683 
Diarist 5338 takes this point further: “War news continues very cheering. But I can’t help being 
sorry about the bombing of Dresden.” This lament about Dresden is explicitly set against the 
diarist’s evident pleasure at the wider progress of the war.  
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The evidence used above shows examples of people upset by the effects of the raids. This 
concern is the common thread which links the contributors who were sad at the loss of 
particular cultural treasures with those whose unease or alarm centred on the loss of human 
life. There were however other reasons that diarists used to criticise or question the raids. 
Diarist 5403, a librarian in her early twenties, doubted whether the raids would affect the 
Germans’ will to continue fighting, whatever physical damage was caused. “Germany’s getting 
a terrific pasting from the air; this may have the desired psychological effect, but I don’t think 
so.”684 After all, British morale had not collapsed during the Blitz in 1940 and 1941. “[W]hat is 
remembered as the spirit of the Blitz could and did prevail even in the most shattered 
circumstances.”685 While the extent of this ‘Blitz spirit’ has been debated, certainly there was 
no overwhelming societal breakdown in London or Coventry in the aftermath of large bombing 
raids.686 This diarist seems to have picked up on what a good deal of those in positions of 
power could not; that if British morale could not be broken by aerial bombardment, there was 
no reason to believe that this would be any different in towns and cities across Germany. 
Recent work by Donald Bloxham offers support for this proposition: that the Dresden raids 
were far more effective in inflicting physical damage than they were in denting morale. “The 
balance of the specialist historiography on the subject suggests that the area bombing strategy 
was not successful in demoralising the German population into opposing the Nazi regime”.687 
John Keegan is also supportive of Diarist 5403’s suggestion, when he hints at a galvanising 
effect that Allied bombing may have had. He notes that the level of destruction in Dresden 
ensured that it “did not begin to function again until after the war was over”, but adds that the 
Allies were unable to bomb the German civilian population into submission. “Nothing better 
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vindicated the German people’s reputation for discipline and hardihood than the resilience of 
their urban men and women under Allied air attack in 1943-5”.688 
There is another conclusion to be drawn from analysing these diary entries together. They 
seem to show a slight change in mood from the diary entries and directive responses discussed 
in the previous chapter. Certainly the dismay about the area bombing of civilians remains. Yet 
where in 1943 expressions of frustration and disappointment about the lack of official protest 
– particularly through the Church – were strongly evident, here an air of resignation seems to 
have settled over many diarists. Those who are critical of the attacks on Dresden tend to 
lament its destruction without going on to call for protest about the area bombing campaign. 
Chapter three showed how desires for channels of protest to be opened were not met and 
that some people admitted not feeling able to publically challenge Allied war conduct. The 
legacy, 18 months later, of this aspect of the response to the bombing of Hamburg is clear. 
With the end of the war in sight concerns remained a platform for acting on them was absent. 
The diaries of White and Goodwin are of similar tone. While it is not surprising that neither 
serviceman was outspoken about the actual method of attacking Dresden, both appear deeply 
affected by the dead bodies they came across, but do not explicitly stray into thoughts of 
anger.  
It is worth here returning to the earlier quoted proposition from Martin Bell, who queried how 
Dresden would have looked to a satellite television audience. It seems certain that for some, 
the images would have been worthy of jubilation or at least satisfaction, especially once the 
discoveries of German atrocities had become common knowledge. Yet this discussion of 
responses to the Dresden attacks has shown that a section of British people would have shied 
away from such sentiments. The sense of sadness evident in a number of the diaries show that 
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these people would not have seen reason for celebration. According to Richard Overy, the 
attacks on Dresden have “come to symbolise since 1945 the use of ‘excess force’ and the 
deliberate killing of civilians which it entailed.”689 Dresden has become a name widely 
associated with vast destruction. The questions asked and criticisms offered in the immediate 
aftermath – as outlined here – contributed to the creation of this symbolism.  
Conclusion 
Hindsight has not been kind to those who made the decision to bomb Dresden. But as this 
chapter has shown, it is not only with hindsight that the raids can be questioned. Max Hastings 
argued at the end of the 1970s that “the attacks on Dresden…aroused a revulsion even in the 
dying days of the war which has not been diminished by the passing of a generation.”690 
Another generation has passed since he wrote these words, and still the subject forms a rich 
area for debate. Dresden remains a touchstone in debates on the nature of appropriate and 
proportionate conduct in war. The immediate reaction to the raids – variously of discomfort, 
horror and protest – effectively laid the path for a rigorous examination in the years after the 
war of the decision to bomb Dresden with such vigour. A. C. Grayling was right to state that: 
“Historians of the future will in part be guided by judgments we make now.” It is important 
therefore that these historians of the future are not guided by judgments which focus 
exclusively on how bad Dresden looks in hindsight. Knowledge and understanding of the 
uncomfortable immediate reaction at the time can make a full and enriching contribution to 
the way in which we now reflect on the bombings.691 
Dresden has taken on a symbolic position beyond that of a destroyed city. According to Waites 
and Emsley, In photographs of the aftermath: “we see not just ruins, but gratuitous 
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destruction and the degradation of the Allied cause”.692 The perceived gratuitous destruction 
remains the great legacy of Dresden. As Paul Addison wrote: “Dresden has become a symbol 
for things greater than itself: the bombing of civilians; the horrors of total war; man’s 
inhumanity to man.”693 But it is also true that the second part – the degradation of the Allied 
cause – echoes through the concerns of many of those who criticised the attacks. From a 
vantage point sixty years on, it is possible to endorse Richard Stokes’ prediction that Dresden 
“will stand for all time as a blot upon our escutcheon.”694 According to Cecil H. King, the raids 
made “a nonsense of all our protestations about our war aims and about our bombing 
policy”.695 That “[t]he destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of 
Allied bombing” is as true now as it was when Winston Churchill sought to rein in the Bombing 
Offensive in late March 1945.696 The Allies’ cause was unarguably a just one. But Dresden 
represents the culmination of a bombing strategy which, certainly at this late stage in the war, 
could not be considered a vital part of the Allied strategy. Yet attacks continued, and in 
Dresden, “[t]he machine was up and running and had developed a momentum and logic all its 
own.”697 By continuing to attack urban centres, most devastatingly in Dresden, “the British, 
and to some extent the Americans, lost the moral high ground.”698 As A. C. Grayling advises, 
“civilised standards have to be made to apply even in severe situations, both for intrinsic 
reasons and because there is, properly, a reckoning always to come.” The reckoning began 
quickly after the raids took place, and the judgment does not reflect well on the decision to 
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bomb the city. The wide acceptance now that the bombing of Dresden could not be justified 
vindicates those who recorded their immediate concerns.699  
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Conclusion 
“It should not be too long now before the story of the bomber offensive is told to the 
public”.700 In October 1945, with victory in the Second World War secure, Sir Archibald Sinclair 
wrote these words to Squadron Leader A. Beale. Yet the account of this story remains 
contested; its changing narratives still at stake today. 
In The Secret History of the Blitz, Joshua Levine describes the “consensus narrative” of British 
society under German bombs.701 This represents a comfortable – and widely known – myth of 
British people pulling together and responding positively to the difficulties faced on 
international, national, local and personal levels. Levine, by his own admission, is not the first 
to question the extent to which this popular narrative accurately represents the period.702 
Angus Calder advocated the development of a more nuanced consideration and understanding 
of the period.703 British people did not all think and act alike during the Second World War. 
Levine suggests the possibility that: “we mistake nuance for weakness”.704 This thesis is an 
attempt to find such nuance, and to demonstrate the complexities that lie behind the very 
substantial support for the Allied war effort.  
Wartime consensus of opinion did exist. There was a very high level of political, public and 
press support for the war against Nazi Germany. Yet this consensus was not absolute in its 
nature. It is important to recognise that opinions on the Allied bombing campaign, and in 
particular the area bombing of German cites, were not uniform.  
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Through three case studies – each focusing on a very different stage of the war – this thesis 
charts and analyses the changing nature of attitudes to the bombing of German cities through 
the war. There is a strong focus on press reports and editorials which covered the progress of 
the war, as well as on the letters and diaries of British politicians, citizens and servicemen. By 
considering both of these broad source bases it has been possible to assess how attitudes and 
opinions were influenced by the availability of information, how personal thoughts on 
bombing were framed, and how opinions changed through the course of the war.  
During the Blitz – particularly in the aftermath of the attack on Coventry and in the weeks 
before and after the raid on Mannheim – anti-bombing feeling was framed around the 
question of reprisals. Different newspapers took noticeably different stances on reporting 
public feeling in Britain. The Daily Mail and Daily Express advocated a strong response to the 
attack on Coventry. This certainly struck a chord for those keen to know that German civilians 
were feeling the weight of war. Yet in local and national press the presence of reports which 
showed an absence of anger or malice gave a degree of legitimacy to the idea that reprisal 
attacks should not form a part of British policy. The divided nature of public opinion– as 
depicted by Mass Observation and BIPO – confirms a lack of consensus on this issue. Winston 
Churchill’s speech in the summer of 1941 suggested near-total public support for the intention 
to meet and surpass the level of attack experienced by British civilians. The evidence analysed 
in this thesis contradicts Churchill’s line and the reporting in the Daily Mail and Daily Express. 
People experiencing hardship and danger did not all expect similar treatment to be given to 
civilians in an enemy country. Over 43,000 people were killed by bombing in Britain between 
September 1940 and May 1941. Yet their neighbours and friends, many of whom were injured 
or saw their own homes destroyed, did not unanimously demand retribution. Some had 
feelings of empathy for their fellow civilians which overrode any desire for revenge. Others 
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were emboldened by their communities’ ability to withstand bombardment and saw little 
value in trying break morale where their own had remained steadfast.705  
These false assumptions and representations made during the Blitz set a dangerous precedent. 
The adoption of area bombing as an official policy in 1942 led to the growth in weight and 
scale of attacks on German cities. When Hamburg was attacked in the summer of 1943 Allied 
capacity for bombing raids exceeded the capabilities and priorities of the Luftwaffe. The 
Committee for the Abolition of Night Bombing – succeeded by the Bombing Restriction 
Committee – aimed to publicise the horrors faced by civilians in Germany, and newspaper 
reports presented readers with clear evidence that German civilians were now experiencing far 
heavier attacks than British civilians had faced. As Andrew Knapp observes, evidence of this 
was available to the British public, who were “certainly in a position to know” about the far 
greater threats posed to German cities.706 This knowledge was neither clandestine nor 
restricted to the pages of niche publications. Popular daily newspapers, with a collectively 
huge circulation, gave prominent coverage to Allied attacks on German cities. The significantly 
reduced attacks on British cities, in association with other wartime developments, indicated 
that a turning point had been reached.707 The Mass Observation directive replies analysed here 
present a complex picture of attitudes at this stage. Many expressed concern or anger about 
the manner of the area bombing campaign. There is clear evidence to confirm what Knapp 
writes: that members of the British public understood the new scale on which Bomber 
Command was operating. For a large proportion of people this was to be celebrated. Yet a 
significant number of other people either did not support that fact or expressed strong 
reservations about it. 
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By this stage a proportion of the British public was seeking to find an effective channel through 
which they could express their unease. The divided nature of reprisal feeling during the Blitz 
had developed into more explicit calls for restraint as the weight of bombs falling on German 
grew. Chapter three shows clearly that the Archbishop of Canterbury’s lack of agreement with 
those who wrote to him served to effectively stifle a ripple of protest and prevent it gaining 
traction and further support. The dismay expressed by Denis Riley at Temple’s inaction 
illustrates the frustration with which his lack of support was met. The absence of an effective 
focal point for protest about the bombing of German cities, and of a vocal and sufficiently 
influential leader for the campaign, was critical at this stage of the war. The concern around 
area bombing – and in some cases outright condemnation – was present in a number of circles 
by this stage. It did not gain sufficient momentum to have a limiting effect on the work of 
Bomber Command as the war progressed into its final years.708 
Despite the lack of a leader of real influence, there remained a distinct undercurrent of dissent 
against the bombing campaign at the start of 1945. Mass Observation diarists who recorded 
their thoughts on the bombing of Dresden indicate clearly that even after over five years of 
war, they maintained the view that large-scale area attacks on cities could not be justified. The 
post-war controversy is founded on the immediate condemnation and negative appraisal 
which the operation received. Churchill’s criticism of the decision to bomb Dresden came after 
the publication of lurid foreign press reports which informed, and were transmitted by, the 
British press. It was also preceded by indications of concern from prisoners of war who 
witnessed the attacks and their aftermath, and from members of the public back in Britain 
who heard about the results. The explicit calls for protest which had appeared around the 
attack on Hamburg seem to have subsided in the diary entries analysed here, yet profound 
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discomfort remained. Richard Stokes’ intervention in the House of Commons was only the 
most prominent expression of protest; it was supplemented by explicit dismay from others 
who did not have access to the same platform.  
Wartime dissent against the area bombing of civilians in German cities existed in many forms 
throughout the Second World War. It is far from merely a post-war construction. This thesis 
shows the vital importance of promoting greater and wider awareness of the immediate 
reaction to events. The area bombing campaign came under such varied scrutiny as it took 
place as to raise serious doubts about its legitimacy, morality and public backing as it was still 
being carried out. Yet not until late-March 1945 did Winston Churchill act to rein in the 
method of attack. By this stage almost all of the German civilians killed by bombing attacks 
during the war were already dead.709 
The findings outlined above pose a direct challenge to Brett Holman’s argument that “the Blitz 
myth and the reprisals debate cannot coexist”.710 British people could and did lend the weight 
of their support to the Allied war effort while at the same time opposing attacks on civilians in 
German towns and cities. An appreciation and understanding of these nuances is vital if we are 
to fully understand the nature of British society during the Second World War. The evidence 
presented in this thesis demonstrates, very clearly, that certain decisions taken in relation to 
the aerial war against Nazi Germany were not unanimously backed by the British public. The 
extent to which there was protest, concern and discomfort about the nature of bombing policy 
was underplayed at the time and continues to be underestimated by historians today. Against 
Mark Connelly’s search for the reasons British people had for supporting the bombing of 
German cities, it is at least as important to also recognise, assess and understand why others 
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ideologically rejected that method of warfare. That this rejection began at a time when British 
civilians faced an uncertain future is worthy of far greater attention by historians. The texture 
of attitudes – accessible through thoughtful, substantial diary entries and letters – is of 
enormous value to a fuller understanding of anti-bombing sentiment.  
A further form of misleading analysis of dissent against bombing policy persists. Connelly and 
others have argued that within the historiography, too great a weight of influence has been 
placed on the roles of prominent figures such as Vera Brittain and Bishop George Bell in 
discussion of anti-bombing feeling.  Their views have been used, Connelly suggests, to 
exaggerate the extent of wider popular concern or protest about the area bombing 
campaign.711 This thesis proposes a different view. Brittain and Bell have certainly been 
touchstones in historiographical discussion of anti-bombing sentiment. By widening the scope 
to focus on a much broader section of British society, and giving only limited consideration to 
the roles played by more well-known figures, it has been possible to show clearly that such 
views and feelings were very much in evidence beyond these public figures, and to 
demonstrate the ways in which they were manifested.  
Those members of the British population whose support for the war effort was qualified in 
some way by concern over the pursuance of increasingly heavy attacks on German civilians 
have, prior to now, been under-represented in the historiography. For this reason it has been 
possible to claim, as Patrick Bishop has done, that criticism of the area bombing campaign is 
luxury afforded by hindsight. The attacks culminated with the devastation of Dresden at time 
when, Bishop writes: “the end was not in sight. No one could know when the war would finish 
and in the middle of February 1945 there was no indication that the Germans would not fight 
on until the death of the last Nazi.”712 The weight of much recent historiography presents a 
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stern challenge to this justification. Yet in key respects the debate over whether it was evident 
that the war was coming to an end is an exercise in misdirection. Many of those people whose 
views have been explored in depth in this thesis framed their doubts in moral terms 
throughout the war. For these individuals the assumed proximity to the end of the war was 
not a factor in recording their concern about attacks on German civilians. Even when the final 
outcome of the war was far from certain, and when British civilians suffered their own 
hardships under aerial bombardment, people argued that area attacks on German civilians 
could not be justified. Still others expressed strong misgivings about the nature of the 
campaign. This thesis has shown that these people – who broadly speaking supported the war 
against Nazi Germany – retained a clear sense of the way in which it should be waged, and did 
not support the bombing of civilians in German cities. Hindsight, and knowledge gained from 
research after the war, have given commentators the opportunity to question the morality and 
legality of the Allied bombing campaign, and such criticisms have nourished and sustained an 
enduring controversy. But we must not ignore the voices of those whose concerns stemmed 
from the events as they were taking place.  
This development of British attitudes to the bombing of German civilians through the war 
presents a complex picture. It also has longer term consequences. There is little argument 
within a broad range of historiography that Winston Churchill’s minute in late March –
criticising area bombing attacks he himself had supported and encouraged – reflects poorly on 
him.713 Frederick Taylor has suggested that condemnation of the Dresden raids may have 
influenced Winston Churchill’s decision to question the legitimacy of the attacks.714 As this 
chapter of the thesis shows, it is difficult to make an absolute case for this position. Yet it 
marks the point at which a thread of dissent against the policy of bombing German cities – 
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fluid in its nature but present through the attacks on Mannheim, Hamburg and Dresden – 
coincided with Churchill’s direct condemnation of a heavy raid. As this thesis has 
demonstrated, Churchill’s pronouncement on the bombing of Germany in July 1941 was out of 
step with public opinion as he significantly overstated the extent of calls for reprisals. The 
effect of his 1945 minute was to row back on support for a bombing campaign which had 
provoked concern throughout the war: not just in the aftermath of the attack on Dresden. This 
move from cheerleader to arbiter came too late to have an effect on the major legacy of the 
area bombing campaign. The controversy over the Dresden bombing helped lead to the lack of 
memorial afforded to Bomber Command long into the post-war years. Winston Churchill’s 
response to the attack sowed seeds of resentment between those men who risked their lives 
in service of Bomber Command and the leaders whom they served. The long wait for a 
permanent memorial did not end until 2012; the reasons for it began before VE Day. Yet this 
thesis clearly demonstrates that the expressions of protest, anger and dismay which followed 
the attack on Dresden – but preceded Churchill’s minute – did not exist in isolation. Support 
for the bombing campaign did not suddenly decay with the bombing of Dresden: its levels 
varied through the war and it was subject to conditions. The post-war controversy owes as 
much to the growth of area bombing through the war as it does to the Dresden attack alone.715 
Existing historiography has not engaged on a sustained level with the wider aspects and 
expressions of anti-bombing sentiment discussed within this thesis. The work of A. C. Grayling, 
Donald Bloxham and others continues to give impetus to the debate over the bombing of 
civilians in German cities.716 By addressing the views of people who have not previously been 
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given a wider audience, and considering the conclusions which can be drawn from them, this 
thesis adds a new layer of discourse to the controversy over the area bombing campaign. It 
displays a more nuanced image of British opinion than has often been drawn. Notable 
condemnation and discomfort was expressed by a broad range of people. Within different 
sections of the disparate body that comprises British opinion there was an observable 
proportion of people who challenged the bombing campaign as it was taking place. This 
reaction manifested in many different ways, from private correspondence and diaries, through 
campaign groups, to discussion in the House of Commons and editorials in national 
newspapers. Collectively, the people who expressed them form an important minority in 
British wartime opinion. The responses were born in an atmosphere which was not broadly 
receptive to, or stimulating of, dissent against the bombing campaign. Often there was broad 
support for the bombing of Germany, but it is important to show that this was not universal. 
There are clear complexities and nuances within the popular wartime consensus that 
conferred strong support to the Allied war effort. As Michele Haapamaki writes: “there are no 
easy generalizations about the wartime populace.”717 It is not tenable to argue for the 
existence of a single common experience of war, even amongst the citizens of one country, 
and Sonya O. Rose rightly states that the people of Britain were not simply of “one mind”.718 If 
we accept that the picture is far more complex, the challenge then is to apply this analysis to 
aspects of the war outside daily life and experiences on the home front. By addressing the 
bombing of German cities it is possible to illuminate an area of British wartime experience 
which further challenges the way we understand the “consensus narrative”.719 
That the strength of feeling did not develop into an effective, large-scale protest movement 
allowed the bombing offensive to gain momentum without such scrutiny as could check its 
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growth. But by restoring the voices of those who challenged the nature of the campaign it is 
still possible to learn lessons about how wars are still waged today, and how military actions 
can be underpinned or undermined by wider attitudes. Of the post-war debate that area 
bombing has engendered, Tami Davis Biddle writes: “[w]e have questioned Hamburg and 
Dresden and Tokyo and Hiroshima, and this kind of informed questioning may be an important 
first step toward the development of a consensus on standards for the future.”720 It is vital that 
we understand how and why methods of warfare were debated as they were being carried 
out. By understanding specific concerns and the ways in which they are voiced – as well as the 
nature of qualified support for military action – governments and armed forces can more 
confidently formulate policy in a way that acknowledges and addresses public concerns. 
In the autumn of 2014, the British government voted – by 524 votes to 43 – to begin bombing 
operations on ISIS targets in Iraq. It represented a large majority, but as an editorial in the 
Guardian noted: “[i]ts size masked the conditionalities and nuances which characterised much 
of the full day’s debate and most of the important speeches”. Reservations were expressed 
over the length of engagement and how the intervention will be framed and constrained. John 
Baron MP claimed that there is “no co-ordinated plan” while Dennis Skinner MP asked: “How 
long will this war last and when will mission creep start?” Prime Minister David Cameron 
replied: “This is going to be a mission that will take not just months but years. But I believe we 
have to be prepared for that commitment.”721  
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Memories of the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan remain strong: the Independent reported 
the “unease” felt by veterans of those campaigns. One soldier, Stewart Harris, supported the 
move to begin bombing raids: “as long as they are reaching their real targets”.722 Memories of 
these recent, ongoing conflicts still dominate discussion of British policy in the Middle East. But 
thoughts might also turn to the Second World War, even at a time when first-hand memories 
are fading. Dissent against a major aspect of the Allied campaign – the area bombing of 
civilians in German cities – was changeable in nature and extent. Yet it was also an ever-
present strand of political, press and public opinion encompassing a wide range of views. The 
evidence analysed in this thesis and the conclusions drawn can inform the present-day debate 
and make a vital contribution to the way in which we understand the nature and nuance of 
support for military actions.  
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